Sandu’s Poland Trip: Motives and Implications

There are signs that Chisinau is in search of a regional military ally capable of moving beyond declarations and actually assisting with army reform and preparations for a possible armed clash

At first glance, Maia Sandu’s visit to Warsaw yesterday did not stand out from a series of routine trips to European capitals in search of support for Moldova’s European integration. Everything followed a familiar script: an official reception, closed-door meetings, a joint press conference, and customary statements on support and regional security. Yet beneath this outward formality lay a far more pragmatic rationale. Moldova and Poland share a long-standing and largely positive record of bilateral relations. Diplomatic relations were established on July 14, 1992, and the political dialogue that followed has developed without major disruptions or confrontations. Consequently, Warsaw has long been perceived in Chisinau as one of the most reliable and consistent foreign policy partners. Meanwhile, Poland sees Moldova as a key like-minded actor in the EU’s Eastern European policy. Moldova-Poland contacts have clearly intensified in recent years. Regular high-level visits, the work of the Moldovan-Polish Parliamentary Assembly, which has already met ten times, and close cooperation between relevant ministries all testify to a mutual desire to move relations from a friendly format to something resembling a strategic partnership. Therefore, Sandu’s next trip to Poland is quite logical from a political standpoint. As for yesterday’s visit, several fundamental points can be highlighted at the outset. Polish leader Karol Nawrocki noted the importance of Chisinau’s strategic (read: geopolitical) choice, namely, to leave Russia’s sphere of influence and pursue a course of accession to the European Union and deeper cooperation in the field of security. In her speech, Maia Sandu presented Poland not only as a potential military and political ally, but also as a bearer of correct historical memory, with extensive institutional experience of long-term confrontation with Russia. In this regard, it was no coincidence that alongside economic and security issues, the negotiation agenda also incorporated the topic of national memory and history. Against this backdrop, Nawrocki’s statement about supporting Moldova in shaping its own historical policy can be seen as Warsaw’s willingness to participate not only in purely practical issues, but also in the political and ideological “alignment” of Moldovans’ civic identity. The Polish Institute of National Remembrance, which has extensive experience in designing state policies for the effective dismantling of the Soviet legacy and nostalgia, which, as is well known, still have a noticeable influence on public sentiment in Moldova, will probably be called upon to assist in this endeavor. Overall, an analysis of Maia Sandu’s remarks at the joint press conference shows that they revolved around a single central idea: Moldova is an object of constant pressure from the Russian Federation. At the same time, according to her, the country is strengthening its resilience and sovereignty, has achieved energy independence, successfully countered attempts to interfere in elections, and is actively confronting hybrid threats and disinformation. In this sense, Moldova is presented as a “successful case” in resisting the Kremlin and therefore as a state in need of additional support in this strategic confrontation. Nevertheless, the key question is why Sandu needed to go to Warsaw at this particular moment. On the one hand, Poland is a prime example of Eastern European success in the EU and a country that has gone from being a post-socialist state to a key military and political player in the European Union and NATO. Therefore, for Moldova, in one way or another, the Polish experience can be considered a role model. However, the real purpose of the trip to Warsaw is not to be found in official assessments and statements. The fact is that Romania, which Chisinau has always regarded as its closest ally and potential guarantor in a crisis situation, has not given a clear signal of its readiness to provide real support in the event of an existential threat, essentially ruling out any forced unirea process. Bucharest will, of course, remain Moldova’s most important partner, but the capabilities of the Romanian state and the political will of the elites in the security sphere appear to be limited. Poland, in this regard, is a regional player of an entirely different caliber. Over the past decade, it has significantly strengthened its geopolitical position and, in effect, become one of the bastions of American interests in Europe, especially on the eastern flank. Warsaw has been steadily expanding its military potential, enjoys firm support from Washington, and maintains a hardline stance toward Russia. Moreover, the recently elected president, Karol Nawrocki, represents the conservative, sovereigntist wing, aligning well with Donald Trump’s current transatlantic policy. Therefore, for Maia Sandu, establishing close contact with the Polish leadership is not only a factor in strengthening Moldova’s position in Brussels, but also a direct channel to the White House, where, as we know, our authorities are not particularly successful. So, while Moldovan-Polish cooperation previously focused mainly on institutional reforms, the development of local self-government, and projects within the framework of the Polish Aid program, priorities may shift significantly in the near future. As a result, the military-political dimension of relations between the two countries is likely to become more pronounced. At present, Poland is actively developing its own defense-industrial complex, providing military assistance to Ukraine while simultaneously seeking to diversify production and expand the export potential of its defense sector. For Moldova, which has suddenly recognized the need for urgent army modernization and a departure from Soviet-era weaponry, the Polish direction appears particularly interesting. The first step in this regard was the signing of an agreement with MESKO S.A. in February 2024. Therefore, this time Maia Sandu’s trip should not be seen as an ordinary diplomatic journey aimed at accelerating Moldova’s European path. Rather, the motivation is different – to find a real military ally in the region, capable not just in words but in practice of assisting with army reform, preparation for potential armed confrontation, and, in extreme cases, providing direct military support. One can talk endlessly about democratic and European choices, but in this case, the logic of the visit is purely utilitarian. Apparently, our authorities operate on the assumption that war in the coming years is an almost inevitable scenario, and in this logic, Poland appears as the most reliable support. And here a quite legitimate question arises: what exactly is the current political class in Moldova preparing the country for, why are all the “bridges” and opportunities for diplomatically neutralizing military threats being burned? And do our strategists even realize what price the state and society may ultimately have to pay for such military-political maneuvering? Choosing Poland as a key partner means one thing: Moldova is effectively being integrated into the NATO Eastern Flank architecture, with all the attendant political, military, and foreign policy consequences. By betting on one of the most staunchly anti-Russian regional players, which implies, among other things, synchronizing practices of systematic opposition to Moscow, Moldova is effectively abandoning its neutral status. In such conditions, any potential escalation in the region would automatically draw us into a crisis, regardless of our formal status and limited military capabilities. Thus, this situation marks a turning point in foreign policy, indicating Moldova’s attempt to move from its long-standing practice of geopolitical balancing to a logic of preventive preparation for the worst-case scenario, which we are rapidly bringing upon ourselves. The only question is whether any of the authorities intend to accompany all this with a full-fledged public debate so that everyone has the same understanding of the long-term consequences of the chosen course.