The New Citizenship Law: When Security Becomes Discrimination

In their attempts to establish total control over citizens and gain additional political and financial leverage, the authorities effectively discriminated against their own population

For several years now, Moldovan citizenship has been one of the practical tools used by the ruling party to exert influence both externally and internally. Maia Sandu personally used her powers to demonstrate political strength. Granting citizenship to Russian opposition figures and musicians who criticize “Putin’ regime”, as well as revoking the citizenship of Transnistrian residents serving in the Russian army (Operational Group of Russian Forces), was presented as a political readiness to openly confront with Russia on the side of Brussels. The new citizenship law, signed by the president on September 18 and enacted at the end of December, was primarily aimed at depriving our fellow citizens on the left bank of the Dniester and representatives of the diaspora living “in the East” of their legal rights, including voting ones. However, in practice, it led to blatant discrimination against the country’s own residents. It is worth recalling that no public hearings or broad public consultations were held on the law already in force. When presenting the initiative in parliament, members of the ruling party focused on the need to compel applicants to demonstrate knowledge of the Romanian language and the Constitution. Russian-speaking citizens have long been an irritant for the authorities: in their view, they “refuse” to learn the language, insist on calling it Moldovan, and vote against the course toward European integration and the severing of ties with Russia. From the PAS perspective, this segment of the population should be reduced. Especially since the Moldovan passport has grown in popularity and has even appeared in rankings of the world’s most powerful travel documents. When acquiring Romanian citizenship, everyone goes through standard procedures: verification of language proficiency, taking an oath, and so on. Why not, the authorities reasoned, introduce similar requirements for obtaining citizenship on the left bank of the Prut as well? With this approach, it will be entirely possible to ensure a national mono-majority in the country in ten years. As for fellow citizens temporarily or permanently residing in Russia and other CIS countries, the authorities’ logic is strikingly explicit. Over time, these people are expected, by design, to lose their legal ties to Moldova. Even if the children of labor migrants were born in the country, up to the age of 14 they will be required to complete all documentation procedures exclusively on its territory. Those born abroad will face even greater bureaucratic hurdles in order to retain the benefits associated with a Moldovan passport. For many, this turns into a dubious undertaking, given the complicated logistics and the costs involved. The need to preserve family ties at the price of enormous effort ultimately pushes families to relocate children and elderly relatives abroad once and for all. The statistics bear this out. The approach toward residents of the Left Bank is also fairly transparent. Those who wished to obtain a Moldovan passport and demonstrate loyalty to Chisinau, in the authorities’ view, should have done so over the past years. Despite the Bureau for Reintegration’s regularly publicized achievements in increasing the number of documented citizens in the eastern districts, any further expansion of the electorate from that area is now deemed inexpedient. Moreover, obtaining Moldovan passports involves a detailed check of applicants by law enforcement agencies and special services. When drafting subordinate legislation for the new law, the SIS explicitly requested the authority to request additional information and conduct interviews with applicants from Transnistria. However, this practice already existed unofficially: local media have repeatedly reported on alleged attempts to pressure, “recruit”, and even detain applicants for Moldovan citizenship. The shift toward a hard-line policy for the Left Bank has prompted a mixed reaction within Chisinau’s expert community. Denials of citizenship and the revocation of citizenship objectively slow down the reintegration process. A significant share of residents who remain undocumented in Moldova will remain so, while the growing number of exclusively Russian citizens within the so-called “Russian army” only exacerbates the problem of its withdrawal from the country’s territory. However, judging by the authorities’ lack of a clear reintegration plan, the ruling circles seem to have opted for a policy of freezing and isolating the region. It is likely that in the near future we can expect tighter administrative control from constitutional structures. There are simply no other quick ways to formally comply with EU requirements in the current circumstances. However, the attempt to revise the state’s civil-law relationship with its own citizens has turned into an outright embarrassment. The net cast against “geopolitically undesirable” compatriots in the East proved to be indiscriminate. It ended up ensnaring the Western diaspora as well, which has traditionally and overwhelmingly supported the ruling party. As of March 31, 2025, a mandatory requirement has come into force obliging all individuals aged 14 and over to obtain a Moldovan identification card. However, ID cards are issued only to those residing within the country, which automatically excludes the entire diaspora. Moreover, children of Moldovan citizens born abroad who do not relocate to the country before turning 18 are effectively classified as emigrants. The broader public has learned about all these changes only now. “The cherry on top” is a situation in which people residing in the country are stripped of their constitutional rights while continuing to bear the full range of civic obligations. A telling example is that of a young man who completed his service in the National Army, only to later face requirements to pass exams in Romanian and on the Constitution, pay 6,000 lei, and wait a year in order to obtain an identity card. The state is demonstrating a fundamentally new model of relations with its citizens. Whereas previously the logic of authority was perceived as an expression of support and inclusion, now many are obliged to prove to the state that they have the right to be called its citizens – and to pay extra for it. Tens of thousands of people will find themselves faced with the need to “make up for lost time”. Recently, the Minister of Defense confirmed plans to increase the size of the army from 6,500 to 8,500 servicemen. According to explanations from Anatolie Nosatii’s department, one can defend the homeland even without an identity card – proof of birth and military registration is sufficient. The absence of an ID is not interpreted as lack of citizenship, since the Constitution prohibits arbitrary deprivation of it. However, these seemingly obvious arguments are recognized by the state only in terms of obligations, not rights. The same logic is echoed in comments from the Public Services Agency: the responsibility for documenting minors is placed entirely on the parents, while the state effectively shirks its own obligations. The gutless stance of the People’s Advocate, who declared that there are no mechanisms for intervention, only confirms the grim reality: there are no legal means to protect citizens from state arbitrariness. The ombudsman’s recommendations on the citizenship bill last year were simply ignored – there is no reason to believe the situation will be any different now. The experience of the Baltic states in segregating the population based on civil-legal status has served as an example for the ruling authorities and is being implemented in Moldova with full awareness, expanding their tools of influence and without fear of consequences, at least in the short term.