Parliament’s Agenda for the Start of the Year

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Anton ŠVEC
Next week marks the start of the parliament’s spring session, which promises to be extremely eventful. On the immediate agenda are votes of no confidence in the executive branch, while upcoming topics include European integration, the severing of ties with the CIS, and unirea
February will kick off with two plenary sessions of parliament. On February 3, it will formally resume work, with the heads of the legislative bodies of the Baltic states attending the event. The “Baltic Tigers” and Romania remain Moldova’s key partners in advancing European integration and in amplifying the so-called Russian threat, making this choice of ceremonial decor for the opening of the spring session unsurprising. Among the Community’s driving forces, there are some skeptics. For example, visiting Bucharest, German Federal Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who has also fundamentally supported the idea of Moldova’s and Ukraine’s EU membership, stated that such a decision would be impossible in 2027 (the very date proclaimed for Kyiv by Volodymyr Zelensky) due to procedural reasons. According to the plan, a full parliamentary session will take place on February 5, with an already approved agenda. From the very start, it includes a motion of no confidence submitted by the opposition, so far a local one, targeting the policies of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry. Considering the disaster in the agricultural sector, persistently ignored by the government, the timing for this initiative is quite apt. The opposition has yet to focus on the consequences of natural disasters, the mitigation of which has posed serious challenges for executive and local authorities. Frosts are expected to intensify in the coming week, requiring better coordination between the government, emergency services, and utilities. Paradoxically, such freezes could benefit the agricultural sector by contributing to increased crop yields. Apparently, the cabinet’s plan is that most problems will resolve themselves, while the opposition lacks the capacity for effective political struggle and “flip of events”. At the same time, the Socialist Party plans to soon initiate a vote of no confidence against the entire government of Alexandru Munteanu. According to Deputy Vlad Batrincea, the Prime Minister should appear in parliament and report on the first three months in office, including an explanation for the lack of “economic projects”. It is evident that the PAS authorities and their opponents are driven less by the legislative process and more by political and geopolitical considerations. Meanwhile, during the first plenary session, deputies will discuss a number of potential bills, but without topics likely to spark clashes between factions. The agenda includes bills on using confiscated property for social purposes and combating the sexual exploitation of children, both carrying the EU label, showing that their adoption is part of implementing EU directives into local legislation. Amendments to the Audiovisual Services Code and the Tax Code will be discussed, as well as several international projects, including the ratification of a government agreement with Japan on the modernization of TeleRadio-Moldova’s equipment. The spring session of parliament could last until July, so deputies have decided to ease into work gradually, avoiding contentious issues from the very start. PAS’ slimmed-down majority of 55 seats still allows Igor Grosu to feel fairly secure, even amid the intrigues and scandals rocking his political force, the latest being Anastasia Nichita’s anticipated resignation from her parliamentary seat. In its current fragmented and divided state, the opposition poses no serious threat to the stability of the government’s course or to the regime itself. On the contrary, judging by the previously mentioned doomed vote of no confidence and the reaction to Maia Sandu’s speech at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the main opposition role to PAS and the president is once again falling to the Socialists and Communists. Over the years, however, they have become extremely convenient sparring partners for the authorities, who wield a range of leverage tools, including criminal cases, financial sponsors, and compromising material, that effectively curb any threat coming from the PSRM or the PCRM. At the same time, during the first months of the spring session, a number of contentious issues will inevitably come before the lawmakers. It is worth noting that Mihai Popsoi has announced plans to submit draft legislation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the denunciation of key agreements within the CIS by mid-February. Socialist leader Igor Dodon has already criticized the diplomats’ decision. It is likely that he, along with Lenin Prize laureate Vladimir Voronin and his party colleagues, will attempt to slow down the consideration of these bills in order to preserve their sponsor relationships with Moscow. However, Dodon appears to have already resigned himself to the outcome, stating his intention to restore relations with the CIS in the future, once the political situation changes. The Socialists and Moscow should pay far more attention to the developments in Gagauzia. Chisinau is attempting to dismantle the autonomous region’s electoral commission, bringing it under central control, which has already disrupted the elections for the People’s Assembly. The PSRM has a vested interest in ensuring that the autonomy retains its electoral powers, as left-wing, pro-Russian parties have traditionally dominated there. Meanwhile, in regions where the central authorities historically hold or manage to seize control, election results often raise questions about possible manipulation and fraud. However, it seems that unirea will be the most high-profile issue likely to “come to a head” during the spring session. Vasile Costiuc of the “Democracy at Home” party immediately promised, following Maia Sandu’s media-political bombshell, to push in parliament for consideration of a referendum on unification with Romania. His faction holds sufficient authority to bring the issue onto the agenda of one of the sessions, and it is hard to imagine what could realistically stop Costiuc from doing so. Perhaps only a radical rebuke from Bucharest, which would instantly inflict a reputational blow on the ruling coalition in Romania, triggered by the Moldovan establishment’s reluctance to take responsibility for imprudent statements, might stand in the way. At the same time, Costiuc’s initiative could easily gain support – many PAS MPs and officials have already indicated that they would support such a referendum that will now be difficult to interpret otherwise. Such a plebiscite could also attract the interest of the socialists and communists, since a failed referendum would give a significant boost to their “pro-Moldovan” positioning. The idea of a public vote on unirea, if it cannot be contained at the parliamentary level, could take on a life of its own, much like the ten-year-old saga of Brexit. And the outcome of this “race” could also prove unexpected. It is clear that the people of our country, if they made a choice at all, did not elect Maia Sandu and the 12th Parliament to take steps that would compromise sovereignty and statehood. Yet the logic of historical processes is often unpredictable and relentless.