Christian RUSSU
The authorities in Chisinau are steadily taking steps to dismantle the Gagauz autonomy, viewing this as a straightforward way to secure control over and the loyalty of the local elites
Calls to restore “constitutional order” in Gagauzia today sound almost as insistent as they did in 1994. This time, however, they leave no room for compromise on the part of the central authorities.
Over the decades since the adoption of the core legislative acts regulating the functioning of the autonomous territorial unit within Moldova, disputes and disagreements have repeatedly arisen over the compatibility of the two legal systems – central and regional. Comrat has reacted sharply to recurrent “trial balloons” aimed at curtailing the autonomy’s powers, while Chisinau has insisted on compliance with national legislation, which the parliament has often adjusted to suit the needs of the parties in power.
Numerous attempts to reach a compromise failed time and again. Neither changes in the configuration of the ruling forces nor the involvement of international partners proved effective. With each new phase of escalating political confrontation, Chisinau began to entrench the view that reducing the powers of the authorities in Comrat was the only viable long-term solution to the problem. This was the case, for example, in 1999, when the Constitutional Court ruled unconstitutional the provision granting the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia the right to participate in the appointment of judges within the autonomy.
When it proved impossible to establish control over the autonomy within the existing rules and to put an end to the production of irritating “anti-European slogans” in Gagauzia, PAS functionaries turned to harsher remedies. In addition to targeted measures aimed at sidelining individual political figures deemed toxic by Chisinau, it was decided to finally bring the political life of the autonomy into full compliance with current legislation. The logic is simple: if Comrat has no special powers, there will be no subject left for disputes and disagreements with Chisinau. In the view of the central authorities, the 1994 law is hopelessly outdated and no longer fits the “realities” shaped by the government led by Maia Sandu. Following the same scenario as in the subordination of regional prosecutorial bodies and changes to financing and taxation procedures, the authorities also plan to deal with the Gagauz people’s electoral privileges.
Attempts at self-organization and a reboot of the autonomy’s institutions following the blows dealt to political leaders in Comrat are simply being suppressed, forcing the Gagauz either to submit to ultimatums from the capital or to exist under conditions of paralysis of local authorities. In both cases, Chisinau gains the necessary levers of influence over the political situation in the region.
The “rules of the game” proposed by the authorities for future cooperation became known as early as the end of last year. Representatives of the State Chancellery and the Central Electoral Commission, with the support of a close circle of civil society experts, explained to the target audience in Comrat that from now on all electoral activities in the region must be conducted strictly within the framework of national legislation. If local regulations conflict with national law, particularly the new Electoral Code, they must be promptly and properly adjusted.
At the same time, the parliament never really bothered with ensuring compliance with the Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauz-Yeri. Legislative acts passed to suit the current political climate systematically ignored its provisions. Moreover, the legislative process in Chisinau has always been viewed as a convenient tool to exert pressure on unruly regions, whether Gagauzia or Transnistria.
In 2022, PAS deputies decided that Comrat would no longer have its own central electoral commission, but only a “council”. Naturally, no political debates or public hearings were held regarding this latest act curtailing the rights of the Gagauz. Now, however, the authorities are demanding the practical implementation of this decision. Whereas previously emerging legal conflicts were often left aside, with each side relying on its own interpretations of the regulations, Chisinau is now determined to act decisively.
Every attempt by the Gagauz to make unauthorized decisions is being blocked through appeals to the Superior Council of Magistracy. Formally, the plaintiff is the State Chancellery, which demands an end to the previous practice of forming the autonomy’s electoral body. The reformed judicial system acted in a coordinated manner: on January 19, the appeal was forwarded from the Court of Appeal to the Superior Council, and the very next day a decision was issued, news of which reached Gagauzia only through the media.
On January 21, the deputies of the People’s Assembly decided not to set a new date for the elections previously scheduled for March 22, citing the non-functionality of the electoral commission. However, this political maneuver leaves the Gagauz deputies with few favorable options for resolving the situation. They must either acknowledge their lack of authority (as required by the amendments adopted by the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia in 2024, concerning the election appointment date and the loss of legislative powers after their mandate expires) or revise their own decisions to extend their mandates and address the political crisis.
In the latter case, the deputies in Comrat must resume preparations for the elections by February 9, when the mandate of the Gagauz electoral commission expires. This scenario is seen by the central authorities as optimal. The Gagauz are expected to acknowledge their own incompetence, extend their mandates, and accept the top-down requirements to align the autonomy’s legislation with national laws. Essentially, they are being forced into an act of capitulation, which they must formalize themselves in violation of their own legal foundations. Such a step in the desovereignization of the autonomy can then be presented to external partners as a voluntary decision made by the Gagauz themselves.
The calculation of the central authorities is simple: Chisinau is convinced that, in order to preserve their temporary mandates, personal security, and well-being, the Gagauz deputies will sooner or later make concessions and effectively relinquish the autonomy. Otherwise, the prolonged paralysis of the autonomy’s institutions would provide a formal basis for the central authorities to assume responsibility for forming structures that ensure the conduct of elections in full compliance with the letter and spirit of Moldovan law.