Will Munteanu Get Reforms Off the Ground?

Over the course of its first 100 days in office, the current PAS cabinet has lost its technocratic sheen without having meaningfully embarked on economic reforms. Against this backdrop, many are predicting a change of prime minister before the end of the year

Alexandru Munteanu had long warned that he would not report on the first 100 days of his government’s work, calling the tradition an “outdated Soviet practice”. Indeed, criticism and opposition performances largely bypassed the prime minister, who left for Kyiv on an official visit accompanied by one deputy and two ministers. As a result, the MAN party’s protest outside the government building, featuring the symbolic display of a “whole lot of nothing”, as well as the Communists’ press conference in parliament, where it was stated that “neither Munteanu nor his cabinet correspond to the current situation, are capable of governing, or should be running the country”, remained merely symbolic gestures without political consequences. The government was appointed in the interests of Maia Sandu and officials within the PAS orbit, and it is they who will ultimately decide its fate. Munteanu was expected to adopt a maximally technocratic approach and to develop an ambitious reform agenda that would lay the groundwork for economic recovery. Despite generally positive assessments of the current prime minister himself and his investment background, especially compared to his predecessor, who proved incompetent yet highly active on social media, such expectations appeared inflated from the outset. First, at this stage Alexandru Munteanu is constrained by a brief campaign-style pamphlet, “EU. Peace. Development”, hastily compiled from PAS’ electoral platform. The document is poorly structured and largely consists of banal, repetitive slogans boiling down to the claim that Moldova’s EU integration is the sole path and instrument for achieving prosperity. The current government has no other programmatic documents, even though formulating a comprehensive agenda for economic transformation was its primary task. According to the president, such a concept may still emerge sometime in the spring. And, as PAS MP Natalia Davidovici echoes her leader, it is simply too early to report on results after only 100 days in office. One might assume that trips to Bucharest, Brussels, Kyiv, and Davos have left little time for developing a coherent vision and implementing concrete economic projects. Second, the new prime minister was not allowed to bring in his own team. The only figure considered fully his appointee is Economy Minister Eugen Osmochescu, who, incidentally, stands out from colleagues retained from Dorin Recean’s tenure with comparatively progressive and measured rhetoric, as well as an absence of scandal. All other members of the broader government grouping, the “clientele” of Maia Sandu and individuals from her inner circle, including Andrei Spinu, operate within their own agendas and in the interests of their respective patrons. Third, Munteanu faces a structural-functional problem that essentially limits any reformist initiatives and their potential impact on the economy. The fact is, Chisinau’s political focus on rapid EU membership does not allow for an independent economic strategy supported by broad trade and investment networks, nor for sovereign control over the budgetary process. The Prime Minister cannot, with the stroke of a pen, cut budget expenditures on bureaucracy, nor can he trim the public administration sector and reallocate resources toward domestic investment in production, infrastructure, workforce training, or promising industry projects. On the contrary, EU integration entails not only the implementation of the full body of European Union legislation but also so-called “institutional readiness”, that is the existence of concrete executive bodies with personnel, competencies, and funding to fulfill specific regulatory requirements. Moreover, during negotiations with Brussels, the existence of these institutions must still be demonstrated, including by providing the sources of budgetary support for their operations. Moldova will be compelled to continue along the path of bureaucratization and increased public administration spending, regardless of Alexandru Munteanu’s personal views. Meanwhile, attracting investment is hampered by the political agenda. This is not only about the principled refusal to maintain relations with a number of countries that do not share EU “values” and are under Brussels’ sanctions (and, by extension, Chisinau), nor solely about the controversial appointment of ambassadors in China or the United States. The problem also lies in the fact that Moldova cannot mobilize funds from its diaspora, even though the Prime Minister considered this avenue highly promising, because PAS-enacted laws severely restrict the free flow of money earned by citizens abroad. The plan to outsource European companies (relocating production from China to Moldova) is also faltering due to the constant emphasis on security and war in the nearby border region, which objectively deters partners from trade and industrial cooperation. Thus, in his first 100 days at the helm of the government, Alexandru Munteanu, even if he had any fundamental vision for economic restructuring, was far from being able to implement it. Instead, he has already had to face a series of crises, in which he has clearly not performed at his best. The recent blackout was met with contradictory statements from various agencies, while the Prime Minister himself appeared indifferent. Local authorities, including those in the capital, responded to the severe weather conditions far more promptly and clearly, whereas central bodies seemed to almost call on citizens to “grab a shovel in their own yard” or “wait for the snow to melt after the thaw”. The reduction in gas prices for consumers, which could have been seen as a notable success, was lost amid reproaches over delays at the National Energy Regulatory Agency (ANRE) in preparing it, the termination of the electricity subsidy program for the population from January 1, and the huge heating bills in January. Another of his so-called “achievements” was his involvement in the redistribution of property, again under notable political influence. The sale of the strategic port in Giurgiulesti at a reduced price, as well as the dispute with Lukoil and an American investment fund over the fuel terminal at the airport, clearly did little to build a professional and predictable reputation for this government. The attempts by Maia Sandu and the parliament to turn Moldova into a kind of digital penitentiary, legislatively restricting social networks, international purchases, and other elements of citizens’ freedom of choice, also create a burdensome backdrop for the government, which will have to implement all these repressive initiatives in practice. Dozens of Moldovan politicians are already issuing a “red card” to the current government. Among the parliamentary opposition, assessments are fairly straightforward: according to Igor Dodon of the PSRM, the cabinet will last at most until October; Renato Usatii of the “Our Party” gives it until May-June; and Vasile Costiuc of “Democrația Acasă” predicts only a couple of months. Both politicians and commentators link the limited prospects of the current government to intrigues within PAS and circles close to Maia Sandu. In particular, attention is drawn to the ambitions of Andrei Spinu, Natalia Gavrilita, and Dorin Recean. If Munteanu is committed to this position and confident in his course, now is the critical time to demonstrate early results. Otherwise, all his rivals within the PAS orbit could easily “topple” his government, with or without the help of the opposition.