Moldova and Ukraine – “Allies by Necessity”

It is becoming increasingly difficult for the Moldovan authorities to conceal the problems in relations with Ukraine behind a facade of ostentatious unity and solidarity

Prime Minister Alexandru Munteanu’s recent visit to Kyiv was a classic example of “flaunty friendship”. At first glance, relations with our eastern neighbor appear perfectly stable and replete with various initiatives. There was the signing of yet another package of agreements, discussions on energy projects, and, as always, mutual words of support and solidarity. Yet a closer look reveals that both capitals and Chisinau in particular are compelled, grit their teeth, to project an image of constructive dialogue, simply because at present they have nowhere to retreat from one another. Ukraine remains an exceptionally complex partner, with whom we have been balancing between pragmatism and accumulated irritants for many years. From a political standpoint, Munteanu’s trip confirmed that dialogue is ongoing, while his meeting with Volodymyr Zelensky served as a continuation of presidential contacts, the two leaders having last met in The Hague in December of last year. European integration remains the main unifying factor for both countries, and Chisinau and Kyiv entered 2026 with the doomed understanding that their EU path will be synchronized for the time being. However, as has been said many times, there is growing discontent in Moldovan government circles about the fact that we have to tread water in our European integration because of our forced tandem with Ukraine. Formally, Moldova is considered a more prepared candidate in a number of areas, but its ties to its large and problematic neighbor create a “negative coupling” effect, slowing down and, to some extent, even freezing negotiations with Brussels. However, this does not seem to bother many in the EU at the moment. As for the visit, it is crucial to highlight a major infrastructure project across the Dniester River and, along with it, the creation of a new road border crossing point, “Cosauti-Yampil”. It is clear that the new bridge both increases the traffic capacity between the two countries, creating convenience for the population, and also integrates them into European transport corridors. The economic dimension, however, is far less encouraging. Moldova, in essence, has little to offer the Ukrainian market, while Ukraine’s agro-industrial sector has long and firmly secured shelf space in our stores. Moreover, it is noteworthy that precisely on the day of our governmental delegation’s visit, this issue moved out of the shadows. On January 26, ANSA imposed a ban on the import of Ukrainian poultry after detecting a prohibited antibiotic in animal feed. Kyiv reacted sharply: Deputy Prime Minister Taras Kachka promptly dispatched a note warning of possible reciprocal measures. Reportedly, this could involve restrictions on the import of Moldovan wine. The logic is clear: Ukraine purchases Moldovan alcoholic products worth $30.7 million, while exporting $32.7 million worth of poultry to our market. This conflict episode is a perfect illustration of the fragility of the Moldovan-Ukrainian partnership and the existing imbalance in relations between the two countries, as evidenced by Kiev’s willingness to act sharply and decisively, despite the positive political atmosphere and broad smiles. This suggests that any attempts by our government to protect local consumers and producers, even the timidest ones, may be met with a harsh response in a branded sector such as winemaking, which we have previously only seen from the Kremlin. A certain shift has also occurred in the military-technical sphere, resulting in an agreement to update the relevant cooperation accord originally signed back in 1993. The new document places emphasis on the exchange of expertise in cybersecurity, logistics, and innovation. Of particular interest, however, is cooperation in the field of civilian drones for monitoring borders, power lines, and agricultural land. Without a doubt, this will not be an easy topic for us. It is no coincidence that the authorities regularly reiterate their commitment to neutrality and that foreign troops will not appear on Moldovan territory. For many, one thing is clear: such military cooperation with a country at war is unlikely to be covered up by purely humanitarian intentions. Moreover, in the sphere of cross-border security, relations with our Ukrainian neighbors are, to put it mildly, far from smooth. Ukraine is commonly viewed not only as a shield against Russia, but also, regrettably, as a major conduit for the illicit trafficking of weapons and drugs in the region. Strengthening cooperation between law enforcement agencies is therefore, without doubt, an attempt by our Ministry of Internal Affairs to exercise at least some degree of control over these risks. The most intriguing and complex block of negotiations is energy. And here, despite the fact that Moldova and Ukraine are in the same boat, they sometimes have to row in different directions, only pretending that they are heading in the same direction. Our delegation’s visit took place against the backdrop of a recent blackout that occurred on January 31 due to icing and an accident on the Vulcanesti-Isaccea power line. At that time, almost all of Moldova was left without power, and Ukraine lost important power flows from Romania. This incident vividly demonstrated that, beyond the benefits, grid synchronization carries a flip side: mutual vulnerability. The countries, of course, agreed on long-term projects, including the construction of a new 330 kV power line between Balti and the Dniester Hydroelectric Power Plant, and also decided to “connect” the operators Ukrenergo and Moldelectrica. Unfortunately, these measures cannot eliminate the short-term risks that exist here and now. Particular attention should be paid to Kyiv’s reiterated offer to supply coal to the MoldGRES. It is clear that this gesture reflects less concern for consumers on the left bank of the Dniester than Ukraine’s own interests, namely, an acute need for a stable energy source for the Odesa oblast. According to Ukrainian calculations, the MGRES, operating within a mutually beneficial framework using Ukrainian coal, could help balance the energy system of southern Ukraine. For Chisinau, this offer represents something of a strategic crossroads. On one hand, Moldova is dependent on Ukraine for electricity, and openly rejecting Kyiv would hardly be a prudent move. On the other hand, operating the MGRES at export capacity could disrupt the existing electricity procurement scheme from Romania, which also serves to justify the construction and commissioning of the Vulcanesti-Chisinau power line. Moreover, enhancing the functionality and significance of the left-bank energy hub substantially strengthens Tiraspol’s economic base, thereby complicating the reintegration process. In sum, our delegation’s visit to Kyiv can be considered successful to the extent that this is possible between two countries of different weight categories and with a load of mutual grievances that has not gone away. Important tactical achievements were secured: agreements on border management and the repatriation of children were signed, the legal framework for military-technical cooperation began to be updated, and measures were identified aimed at minimizing potential energy crisis risks. At the same time, the militaristic mindset of the Ukrainian elites and their impulsiveness, which even much larger and stronger states sometimes cannot cope with, frankly speaking, greatly frighten the Moldovan authorities. Ukraine is indeed an extremely complex neighbor, as can be confirmed in Moscow and Minsk, as well as in Budapest, Bratislava, and Warsaw. Our politicians need to understand one thing: problems and a coerced friendship cannot be hidden indefinitely behind a façade of diplomatic courtesies and ostensible unity. Sooner or later, we will need to find a way to balance our genuine support for our neighbors with the protection of our own national interests.