Foreign Labor Inflows and the Future of Moldova’s Socio-Political Balance

Faced with an acute shortage of working-age population, the authorities, instead of seeking to bring compatriots back from the diaspora, appear to have opted for importing cheap labor from Asian countries

Our authorities increasingly speak of the need to attract foreign workers to sustain the economy, framing this measure as an “inevitable” response to objective trends. Recent statements by government members, diplomatic activity with several Asian countries, and the state of the domestic labor market all indicate that this is no longer a matter of hypothetical plans, but rather concrete state decisions that, it seems, have already been made. However, the frankly hasty intent to address the labor shortage through the import of cheap foreign labor, in our view, risks creating significant social problems and equally serious political challenges. A clear indication that things, one way or another, “get busy” can be seen in recent signals from the country’s leadership. Last week, Maia Sandu received the credentials of nine new ambassadors, including representatives from South and Southeast Asian countries. Shortly thereafter, Foreign Minister Mihai Popsoi held separate meetings with diplomats from India, Egypt, and Bangladesh. Formally, these discussions were presented as focusing on the development of economic ties. However, given Moldova’s path toward European integration, it is clear that these contacts were most likely aimed at laying the groundwork for expanding labor migration from several Asian states. It is no coincidence that just a week earlier, Minister of Economy Eugeniu Osmochescu announced plans to further liberalize the labor market, including for workers from non-EU countries. As the saying goes, this follows the playbook of leading European countries that have actively imported migrants over the past several decades. Much has already been said about the outcomes of such policies, so we will not dwell on them. According to Osmochescu, the national economy is facing an acute shortage of personnel, particularly in construction and agriculture, sectors where, as is well known, Moldovan citizens used to work extensively. From an economic standpoint, the argument appears convincing. Yet, looking at the situation more broadly, it becomes clear that the government’s anticipated measures touch on far more complex issues than merely filling vacancies that, strangely enough, everyone has so far been reluctant to discuss. Moldova has long been experiencing one of the most severe demographic crises in its recent history. According to data from the National Bureau of Statistics, in 2025 the country’s population declined by nearly 30,000 people, reaching approximately 2.39 million. This represents a drop of almost 1.2% in just one year. Rural areas are shrinking particularly rapidly, losing 18,000 residents over the past year alone. Since the collapse of the USSR, Moldova’s population has nearly halved, falling from 4.36 million in 1991 to roughly 2.4 million in 2025. The main reasons include low income levels and overall quality of life, which together have driven the mass emigration of skilled and working-age citizens. By various estimates, more than a million Moldovans now live abroad, and this “exodus” shows no signs of stopping. Over the past five to eight years alone, up to 300,000 people have left the country. Clearly, such trends directly impact the national labor market. For example, in 2024 the economically active population fell to 889,000 – a 4.3% decrease compared to the previous year. In other words, Moldova is entering a phase of structural labor shortage. In these circumstances, all official rhetoric from the authorities about liberalizing the labor market for EU citizens is largely symbolic. In practice, the flow of labor migration between Moldova and the EU remains almost entirely one-way. European countries themselves face labor shortages and actively attract migrants, including from our country, offering far more attractive conditions. Consequently, the real source of labor for Moldova lies in developing countries, which explains the increasingly frequent contacts with states such as India, Bangladesh, and the Philippines. According to expert estimates, by early 2026 the number of foreign workers in Moldova had, for the first time, exceeded 50,000, whereas just five years ago it was around 20,000. Today, foreigners account for roughly 7% of the workforce, with most employed in construction, agriculture, and the service sector. This means the figure is increasing by approximately 4,000-5,000 people per year. From an economic perspective, this may alleviate the shortage of labor, and such a practice is used in many countries worldwide. However, the effectiveness of this measure depends less on the mere fact of attracting foreigners than on how capable the state is of administering this, to put it mildly, complex process. For the policy of bringing in foreign workers to truly work, at least two key conditions are required. First, the authorities must be able to ensure full social and cultural integration of migrants; second, there must be a well-thought-out demographic strategy. But serious doubts arise as to whether PAS can handle such a complex task, especially considering how leading European powers have “managed” it. Even developed countries with substantial budgets, such as France or the United Kingdom, face serious problems with migrant integration. Persistent conflicts in suburban areas, closed Muslim communities, urban ghettos, and the rise of ethnic segregation and crime in British megacities illustrate just how challenging this task truly is. And here a natural question arises: how prepared is Moldova for this? Let’s be frank: our small country has a fairly homogeneous cultural environment, shaped by Orthodox traditions, a Soviet past, and a rural way of life. Consequently, a large-scale influx of labor migrants with different cultural and religious backgrounds could create additional lines of domestic political tension. Without a well-thought-out program and an open public discussion on the foreign labor infusion into the economy, hastily made decisions risk generating new contradictions that will be much harder to overcome later. There is another, no less obvious effect that deserves separate attention. When the state begins actively seeking and attracting cheap labor from abroad, it can be perceived as a signal that the return of its own citizens is no longer a priority. Meanwhile, abroad sits a vast reservoir of our human capital – over a million Moldovan citizens. As a result, instead of developing programs to bring back our diaspora, the ruling party and Maia Sandu are effectively acknowledging that it is easier for them to replace departed compatriots with foreign workers who are more financially accessible. For Moldova, this issue has yet another dimension, one related to state resilience, given that the country already faces serious challenges to its territorial integrity and political cohesion. Against the backdrop of ongoing demographic decline and mass emigration, the authorities should be seeking ways to prevent processes that could provoke social and ethno-national split. In this context, the import of a specific type of labor force from Asian countries may further fuel centrifugal and separatist sentiments. In essence, we stand on the threshold of another set of difficult decisions of immense strategic significance not only for the economy, but also for the country’s political, social, and demographic well-being. Any poorly thought-out move will come at a high cost, and the consequences of these steps may shape the character of the state and society for decades to come.