Four Years of War in Ukraine: Deadlock Without Prospects?

Sergiu CEBAN

As the fourth anniversary of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict approaches, neither of the warring sides appears ready to make the genuine compromises that could finally bring an end to years of bloodshed

Today marks exactly four years since the start of full-scale war between Russia and Ukraine, the largest in Europe since World War II. During this time, the conflict has gone through several phases: from the rapid maneuvers of the first months to today’s sluggish bloodshed. According to military experts, this anniversary is passing without any decisive events on the front lines, and the confrontation itself has finally turned into a war of attrition, where the key factors are not so much tactical successes on the battlefield as economic potential and demographic resources. That is why each new year of war increases the scale of destruction and the number of human casualties. According to estimates in a recent report prepared jointly by the World Bank, the European Union, and the UN, Ukraine will need approximately $600 billion over the next ten years to rehabilitate its destroyed infrastructure and economy. This is an enormous sum, comparable to several years’ worth of the country’s budget. Therefore, the question already arises today as to what the post-war reconstruction will look like and who will be willing to take on such a financial burden. The fourth anniversary occurs amid a temporary reduction in combat intensity and a sort of operational halt, which followed the continuous offensive actions of the Russian army since March 2025. However, this does not in any way mean that military operations are gradually giving way to diplomacy. Rather, the period of relative calm is seasonal in nature, as experience over the past few years has shown that offensive operations tend to intensify in the spring, when weather conditions allow for such maneuvers. It is also worth noting that over the four years, the conflict has undergone a noticeable evolution. In 2022, the Ukrainian army demonstrated its capability for maneuver operations, achieving significant successes in the Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts. Both operations became emblematic of that period of the war, when Kyiv could seize the initiative and shape the strategic development of the conflict. However, in subsequent years, Ukraine’s offensive capabilities gradually diminished, as the counteroffensive toward the Sea of Azov in the summer of 2023 failed to deliver the expected results. By 2026, according to expert assessments, the Ukrainian army is effectively capable of conducting only one operational-tactical level action at a time alongside defensive measures, indicating serious resource constraints, primarily in personnel and equipment. The situation of the Russian army has also evolved. After its rapid advance in late February 2022, it was subsequently forced to retreat in certain sectors. However, Russia later managed to significantly expand the scale of its operations and, by 2025, was capable of conducting active combat simultaneously across four fronts. This primarily reflects substantial rear-area resource support and increased operational capabilities, which could ultimately pave the way for a transition to strategic-level operations. The shift in the balance of power and resource distribution between the two armies has primarily been reflected in the territorial aspect of the Russia-Ukraine war. While in 2023 Russian forces occupied only about 92 square kilometers, by 2025 this figure had risen to roughly 6,000. Although, by conventional wartime standards, this remains a slow rate of advance, the trend is nonetheless clear. One of the important aspects of the current stage of the war is the combination of demoralizing factors, the direct consequence of which is a growing personnel shortage in the Ukrainian army. According to various estimates, the shortage of personnel reaches 45-50% of the authorized strength of combat units, and it is exacerbated by demographic constraints, large-scale emigration, and public fatigue with mobilization campaigns. Another element of pressure was the intensified destruction of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, especially this winter. Russian strikes on energy facilities were one of the main instruments of strategic, humanitarian, and resource pressure on Ukraine and, as a result, its armed forces. In the event of further escalation, it cannot be ruled out that missile strikes will spread to other elements of critical infrastructure: transport, logistics, and communications. Such a development could not only seriously complicate the functioning of the country and its rear, but also lead to irreversible consequences for the Ukrainian state. Parallel to the military operations, Kyiv and Moscow continue to engage in negotiations. Since the administration of Donald Trump became involved in the dialogue, the intensity of contacts and discussions over the specific parameters of a potential peace agreement has noticeably increased. Unfortunately, however, the dominant theme is not so much a genuine desire by the parties to end years of bloodshed, but rather the White House’s ambition to secure a deal before the active phase of the midterm congressional election campaign begins. Of course, the desire of Washington or Trump alone is not enough to successfully conclude the negotiations, since, unfortunately, the positions of Ukraine and Russia remain diametrically opposed. Moscow continues to insist on the recognition of territorial changes, the voluntary withdrawal of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the Donetsk oblast, and the de facto dismantling of the current Ukrainian political and legal system. Kyiv, meanwhile, continues to believe that there are no grounds for capitulation, despite the fact that the strategic course of the war is raising enough questions about the long-term stability of our neighbor. Categorically rejecting Russia’s terms, Ukraine and its European allies appear intent on presenting the Kremlin in the near future with their own set of tough counter-demands, which would in effect require Moscow to acknowledge its defeat. At the same time, voices calling for the restoration of dialogue with the Kremlin are growing louder in a number of EU countries, particularly in France. This essentially reflects Europe’s fatigue with the protracted conflict and the severity of the economic consequences of the sanctions confrontation, which, incidentally, is reflected in the ability of member states to adopt further packages of restrictive measures. Looking ahead, the most likely scenario for 2026 is that the war will continue at least through the first half of the year. However, military action will be accompanied by active negotiations, which could lead to unexpected diplomatic breakthroughs. From a military point of view, the initiative is likely to remain with the Russian army, and Moscow is likely to focus its main military efforts in two directions: establishing final control over the entire territory of the Donetsk oblast and continuing its advance towards Zaporizhzhia. For Ukraine, the strategic objective in 2026 is to hold the front lines and preserve state resilience while awaiting possible political shifts in the United States. In Kyiv and Brussels, there are expectations that the Trump administration may be weakened after the midterm congressional elections this coming autumn and, as a result, that the Democratic Party’s position could strengthen. Such a development could potentially alter the White House’s approach to negotiations with both Ukraine and Russia. For certain countries, such as Moldova, the course of the war is of fundamental importance, since the future of the entire region largely depends on the territorial and political shape of post-war Ukraine. Contrary to statements by our politicians that Moldova is not part of the Ukrainian negotiating agenda, the actual model for resolving the conflict will inevitably be extrapolated to the entire region – from Belarus to the Black Sea coast. That is why our political elites are watching the situation unfold with trepidation, as it concerns Moldova’s long-term geopolitical status and its place in the future history of Europe. The fourth anniversary of the war demonstrates the main tragic conclusion: neither side is yet ready to compromise in a way that could end this bloodshed. At the same time, neither Kyiv nor Moscow has been able to gain a decisive advantage, paying an extremely high price. And the longer this conflict continues, the higher the cost of ending it becomes.