Rule by Crisis and Scandal: The Moldovan Model

The guiding principle and indeed the sole purpose of the ruling regime’s functioning is to retain power and shield its principal beneficiaries, first and foremost the president, from accountability

Anton ŠVEC, RTA: The ruling regime remains in a constant state of stress-testing its own anti-democratic system. Remarkably, these unscheduled “exams” are administered by PAS representatives themselves, beginning with Maia Sandu, who makes all the key decisions. Even against the backdrop of a docile and largely incapacitated opposition kept under criminal investigation, the current officials continue to display professional incompetence, diligently entangling themselves in dubious and corrupt schemes that inevitably erupt into scandals. Any exit from this “managerial coma” takes the form of periodic anti-crisis campaigns, designed primarily for media damage control and to offset the fallout from mistakes and abuses of power. A vivid example of the essence of the PAS regime under Maia Sandu is the attempt to shift responsibility from the president to the Prosecutor General’s Office in yet another high-profile case involving the pardon of a convicted criminal. Last week, Moldovan and Ukrainian security services burst into the information space with reports of arrests of individuals allegedly preparing assassination attempts against Ukrainian officials and journalist Dmytro Gordon. It later emerged that a Moldovan citizen, Nicolae Sepeli, previously convicted in Russia on drug trafficking charges and pardoned by the head of state, was implicated in the alleged plot. The very narrative of the joint Moldovan-Ukrainian special operation appears to unravel under objective scrutiny: the gun presented as evidence fires only blanks, and two young women from the Transnistrian region have personally disputed both their alleged involvement and the circumstances of their detention. Nevertheless, the aura of involvement in the planning of terrorist acts by a person released through Sandu’s discretionary decision has triggered a scandal that, in a democratic country, could easily have led to impeachment proceedings and a significant political reckoning. The President’s Office attempted to deflect responsibility by blaming the Prosecutor General’s Office for submitting the relevant petition, hinting at the personal liability of opposition figure Alexandr Stoianoglo. However, he responded immediately, pointing out that the Prosecutor General’s Office had proposed pardoning six individuals considered potential victims of human trafficking, yet only Nicolae Sepeli was ultimately released. He also stressed that the decision was made at a time when Stoianoglo had already been stripped of his powers and was himself under investigation, and that, in any case, the final verdict fell within the competence of the pardon commission and the president personally. Pressure on the authorities persists over issues that have already become chronic. Citizens are overpaying for gas – according to former Prime Minister Vladimir Filat, the total over the past three years has exceeded half a billion euros. The blame lies with opaque procurement schemes at prices significantly above the European average. While for the government, purchasing energy with EU subsidies allocated for energy independence, even at inflated prices, may appear costless in the short term, in the long run this arrangement amounts to a heavy burden on the country’s future. Ongoing disputes also surround the electricity sector: the authorities resist contracting with the MoldGRES power plant, which could lower prices and enhance system stability, but would simultaneously strengthen Tiraspol’s economic position. Given that such politicization of economic activity closely mirrors current EU practices, official Chisinau appears to weather the accompanying criticism with relative ease. Meanwhile, the National Anticorruption Center has reported a major investigation into the embezzlement of budgetary and donor funds allocated for the construction of roads, water supply systems, and sewage networks through public procurement schemes. Searches are being conducted at forty sites across ten districts of the country. Instances of theft have also been identified and substantiated in the implementation of PAS’ flagship “European Village” program. Notably, these crimes are being committed amid cuts to budgetary funding that already leave little room to maintain infrastructure even at its current level. The parliamentary majority and the government have decided to reduce the road fund by one third (from 2.5 to 1.8 billion lei in 2026) bringing it down to less than half a percent of GDP. Meanwhile, according to World Bank standards, at least 5 billion lei annually is required merely to preserve the existing condition of the road network, given that fully half of the republic’s roads are currently classified as being in poor or extremely poor condition, without even accounting for the damage caused by the severe weather in January and February. Amid severe shortages and widespread cutbacks, from staff reductions at the state enterprise “Moldova Railway” to the closure of educational institutions and the curtailment of social services, one can only wonder how certain officials and business leaders continue to plunder the country’s economic potential with impunity. In this scenario, PAS’ anti-crisis PR strategy focuses on highlighting past “excesses” in the sector. The Vladimir Plahotniuc case, now reaching the critical stages of judicial proceedings, has conveniently reemerged. Recently, the defendant himself spoke, though apparently not very convincingly. Reviving the long-standing issue of banking fraud provides a media boost for Maia Sandu, which largely explains the speed with which arguably the most high-profile criminal case in Moldova’s history is being pushed through. Reasonable questions arise. Where and when will PAS’ incompetent administration be caught up in the next scandal? How exactly will the president’s team cover and defend it, and who will serve as “immolation” – for instance, the recent criminal case launched against former President Igor Dodon, possibly connected to what he received in a black kuliok from Plahotniuc? And when, finally, will the opposition begin to seriously leverage the regime’s mistakes to effect real changes in the country’s flawed political system?