How Ukraine Became an Arena of Struggle for Leadership in the Orthodox World

In the Orthodox world, the church conflict that has arisen after the appointment of the Exarchs of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Ukraine continues to flare up in preparation for the granting of autocephaly to the local Orthodox Church. In the opinion of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), this step was “an invasion of the canonical territory of the Moscow Patriarchate”. This week, the growing confrontation has taken on a new dimension. In Kyiv, U.S. Department of State Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom Sam Brownback said that the United States would further support Ukraine in its struggle for the right to have the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. Washington’s support of Ukraine in this matter did not come as a surprise since it fits into the context of the rapidly developing geopolitical conflict between the US and Russia, which encompasses new spheres every day. It should be noted that in Ukraine itself, many representatives of political and church circles have long called for the establishment of an official local Ukrainian church. One of the main supporters of this idea is the president of the country, Petro Poroshenko, who regularly speaks in support of non-canonical metropolises, which have a conflict with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (which has a self-governing status within the ROC). The church agenda in the rhetoric of Petro Poroshenko has recently taken a particularly important place: in the light of the deep religiousness of the local population, the separation of the Ukrainian church is considered one of the key elements of the policy of breaking ties with Russia. In the same line there are such steps as the preparation of denunciation of the treaty of friendship with Moscow, the intention to leave the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the termination of the railway communication with Russia. According to experts, these decisive measures taken by the head of the Ukrainian state are largely caused by the upcoming presidential elections in Ukraine, which Poroshenko is approaching with still a very low rating. Interestingly, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church did not officially ask for autocephaly. However, part of its clergy, along with the non-canonical Kyiv Metropolis and the self-proclaimed Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, have dreamed of this since the 90s of the last century. If the Patriarchate of Constantinople decides to support their demands and still passes a Tomos on recognition of autocephaly of non-canonical churches, a new wave of redivision of church parishes may begin in Ukraine. It can be predicted that part of the parishes of the UOC will voluntarily transfer to the formed autocephaly, which in time will inevitably lead to its gradual ousting from the religious map of Ukraine. Perhaps, Fanar (neighborhood of Istanbul, where the headquarters of the Patriarchate of Constantinople is located) expects to provoke a “transfer” of the parishes of the UOC and thereby weaken (and eventually completely eliminate) the influence of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine. During the Middle Ages the Constantinople Church for hundreds of years retained its influence on the policies of entire states. However, today the situation is different: the Orthodox world consists of 15 equal local churches, which, according to the canons (church laws), are in religious contact. At the same time Fanar considers itself the most senior and has repeatedly demonstrated the desire to restore its influence. In 2016 Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople even tried to convene the Ecumenical Council of Orthodox Churches (for the first time since the VIII century), but this idea was not supported by a number of patriarchs, including the Moscow Patriarchate. At the same time, Fanar often raised the question of the right to make a decision about autocephaly, which it understood as the “imperial” prerogative of the Church of Constantinople. The main obstacle to the restoration of the former religious weight is rightly considered to be the ROC as the most authoritative and powerful Orthodox church. Fanar had already tried to limit its influence, for example, when in 1996 issued a decree on the establishment of the Estonian Metropolitanate of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. This led to a church conflict that has not been settled so far. It is interesting that the Patriarchate of Constantinople since the 1940s enjoys the full support of the United States – then the American archbishop Athenagoras was put on the church throne. During the Cold War, Fanar, in fact, performed its own task in the ideological confrontation of the two systems, being, in fact, an antagonist of the ROC. Today we see the repetition of this situation in a similar configuration: the religious conflict between the two most influential patriarchates for leadership in the Orthodox world against the backdrop of geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the United States. In this conflict, several churches have already spoken out against the “violation of the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church”, for example, the Belarusian Church and the Russian Orthodox Church abroad associated with the Moscow Patriarchate, as well as the local Jerusalem Church and the church of the Czech Lands and Slovakia. Despite this, there is as yet no unambiguous understanding of how the rest of the patriarchate will behave in the event of a meeting at a hypothetical conclave on the issue of Ukrainian autocephaly. Probably, the ROC can count on the support of traditionally loyal Antiochian, Serbian, Georgian and Bulgarian churches. At the same time, the opposite position may well be taken, for example, by the Romanian Orthodox Church, which itself claims to the territory of the Russian Orthodox Church in Moldova, where for several decades there has been a jurisdictional dispute between the Metropolis of Bessarabia and the Orthodox Church of Moldova. This conflict in fact repeats the situation in Ukraine: more recently the Romanian Patriarchate appointed its bishops in Moldova, exacerbating relations with Moscow. It is possible that in the near future Fanar will carry out a secret diplomatic work to find out the position of other local churches. The Patriarchate of Constantinople is unlikely to go on to further aggravation of the situation if it remains in isolation, especially under conditions when the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church has already threatened to sever ties. However, if Fanar is supported by at least a few official patriarchates, and they still go on to create Ukrainian autocephaly, the Orthodox world will suffer another shock – probably the most severe one since the Council of Florence in 1439. First of all, it will affect the ROC, which can largely lose its authority and influence in the Orthodox world and, most likely, will gradually begin to “become self-absorbed”. If, of course, they reconcile with the new state of affairs.