Opinion: Moscow Will Try to Seize the Initiative on the Moldovan Track

RTA expert Mikhail Bezhenev reflected on the ongoing processes on the banks of the Dniester and how the Kremlin is trying to maintain influence on Chisinau. In the past few days, the situation has intensified significantly around the Russian armed contingent in the territory of Transdniestria, which is not controlled by the authorities of the Republic of Moldova. There are reasons to think that important processes are now taking place in the region, which will significantly affect the situation in the whole Republic of Moldova in the future. I would like to point out that over the past year and a half the government of Moldova has been continuously working to limit the ability of the Russian Federation to influence the regional situation. First of all, the focus of RM leadership’s efforts was the Russian troops stationed in the breakaway territory of Transdniestria. The government, with the support of the parliament and the constitutional court, has already created the necessary legal framework justifying the illegality of the presence in Transdniestria of a so-called “Operational Group of Russian Troops”. In addition, this year the Russian military withdrawal, as well as the evacuation of the Soviet weapons depot from the region, has become part of the agenda of the UN General Assembly and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. Undoubtedly, third-party analysts may see the electoral context in actions of the Moldovan government and regard such steps by the leadership of the Republic of Moldova as an attempt to score political points from their partners in the EU and the USA. However, I tend to believe that the upcoming parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova are only an additional incentive for the current government, a motive for not lowing vigilance. After all, it is no secret that the configuration of forces in the Moldovan parliament in 2019 in many ways will determine whether Chisinau can continue rapprochement with the EU, or take a turn towards Moscow. Therefore, for Moldova today it is important not to slow down the pace of cooperation with partners in the west in order not to lose the support of the European vector of Moldova. It is important to understand that today this is especially risky, particularly in the context of the complicated domestic situation. Hardly anyone has missed the risky maneuver of the leader of the Democratic Party of Moldova, Vladimir Plahotniuc, who announced the new “pro-Moldovan” policy and abandonment of geopolitical rhetoric. This decision is undoubtedly a trick, through which the Democratic Party will try to enlist support of the voters of the Socialist Party of President Igor Dodon and other conventionally ‘left’ political forces. However, taking the pro-European vector into the background is somehow a bold and adventurous step, which doubtfully gained positive assessment from Brussels. It is no coincidence that individual PDM speakers were forced to hastily clarify the new party policy, and even re-actualize the idea of incorporating the pro-European course in the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova. The primary task for the Moldovan leadership is to prevent critical mistakes in electoral combinations and a series of deceptive maneuvers, which will question the progress achieved in rapprochement with Western partners. Moreover, Moscow will not fail to take advantage of the unstable situation. The appointment of Dmitry Kozak as Putin’s special representative for Moldova marks the Kremlin’s attempt to seize the initiative on the Moldovan direction. Kozak’s name is associated with a nearly-implemented 2003 settlement project of the Transdniestrian conflict, which proposed the federalization of Moldova and in fact gave Transdniestria leverage on Chisinau’s policies. It is hard to estimate the mandate of Dmitry Kozak 15 years later, but experts and politicians who know him speak of the new Putin’s special representative as of a tough and persistent negotiator. Kozak has already held two meetings with President Igor Dodon, the leader of the Socialist Party, which is considered one of the favorites in the upcoming election race. Vadim Krasnoselsky, the leader of the unrecognized Transdniestria, also held a meeting with Dmitry Kozak in Moscow, right after another meeting with Igor Dodon. It is obvious that Moscow is trying to respond to Chisinau’s increasing pressure, and immediately before the elections to the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova can go on the offensive in the Moldovan direction, actively using its resources for this. On October 1, the Russian representative in the negotiation process on the Transdniestrian settlement Sergei Gubarev arrived in Moldova. According to the Transdniestrian media, today he also visited Tiraspol. The visit of a high-ranking official of the Russian Foreign Ministry could be considered ordinary if literally a week before the head of the Moldovan government Pavel Filip again hadn’t declared in the UN the need to withdraw the Russian military from the legal territory of the Republic of Moldova, and vice-premier of Moldova Cristina Lesnic hadn’t begun to discuss with representatives of Kyiv the possibility of international observation of Russian military property on the territory of unrecognized Transdniestria. In my opinion, there can be no doubt that on the eve of the parliamentary elections Moscow is trying to block the increased activity of the Moldovan leadership around the issue of Russian troops’ withdrawal from Transdniestria. Contacts at the level of Dodon, Krasnoselsky, Kozak, and finally a quick visit of the veteran of the Transdniestrian talks Gubarev confirm that Moscow intends to maintain its influence on both sides of the Dniester. A barely visible, but very specific contours of the European-Russian compromise emerged around the Transdniestrian issue, which even allowed the former Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini to talk about an early political settlement of the conflict. As can be seen, the Government of the Republic of Moldova will have a hard time in the coming months – trend of curtailing Brussels’ support for the ruling pro-European coalition may lead to the situation when the principled position of the Moldovan authorities on limiting Russian influence throughout the region will be left without necessary support from traditional partners in Europe. In this regard, a lot will depend on whether the Moldovan leadership can continue to maintain a delicate balance in its policies and listen to the recommendations of European partners. With the upcoming elections and increasing tensions in the struggle for power, this will undoubtedly become increasingly difficult.