Sergey Cheban
The head of the Russian Defense Ministry will pay a return visit to Moldova, and will certainly come by Transdniestria.
As it became known, at the end of this week a group of high-ranking officials of the Russian Defense Ministry will arrive in Moldova on an official visit. The Russian delegation is likely to be headed personally by Sergei Shoigu. The Defense Minister of the Russian Federation received the invitation to visit Moldova at the July meeting with his Moldovan counterpart Pavel Voicu. Earlier the President of Moldova Igor Dodon said about this noting that “it would be nice if he (Shoigu) comes”.
The Kremlin almost immediately accepted the kind offer of Chisinau, which leads to certain thoughts. Russia, apparently, wants to make the best use of the current warming of relations with the Moldovan leadership, trying to establish contacts in the field of security. As you know, over the past decade, the cooperation between Chisinau and Moscow in the field of defense has practically come to naught for various reasons. The failure of attempts to persuade the Kremlin to withdraw its troops from unrecognized Transdniestria and replace peacekeepers with civilian observers pushed the Moldovan elites into the arms of the West and the North Atlantic Alliance. The authorities of Chisinau saw in them the only chance to get rid of the Russian military presence.
The confrontation culminated in a series of demarches of Chisinau on the anniversary of the peacekeeping operation in 2017. Moldova obstructed all the celebrations, deported almost the entire Russian military attache office from the country and recognized the Russian military in Transdniestria as “occupation troops” through the puppet constitutional court. Later, in 2018, on the initiative of Chisinau, the UN General Assembly voted for a resolution on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova.
The situation began to change dramatically only after the overthrow of Plahotniuc. The Defense Minister position was given to a man from the immediate circle of Igor Dodon, which seemed to hint at the desire of Chisinau to resume cooperation with Moscow in the defense sector. This is especially important for the Moldovan President, who took over the Transdniestrian settlement and seriously expects to reintegrate the country in the foreseeable future. At the same time, it is obvious that the issues of further security on the banks of the Dniester are directly related to the political solution to the Transdniestrian issue.
The upcoming visit of the delegation of the Russian Defense Ministry must have a goal to understand the situation in the region after the years of lacking contacts between the relevant ministries of the two states. Russian security forces will try to draw up a ‘road map’ of cooperation with Chisinau. There is reason to believe that the Russian Defense Ministry delegation will also visit Transdniestria. We can hardly expect any difficult discussions with Tiraspol politicians – probably, only current organizational tasks will be discussed.
Of course, the Shoigu’s visit will not result in major and loud concessions from Moscow, but certain steps towards are more than likely. For example, the Kremlin can settle for the ‘optimization’ of its military presence and unblock the issue of depots in Cobasna, which have long been the focus of attention of Chisinau and Kyiv. In return, Moscow will most likely demand to deblock the rotation of its peacekeepers and de-isolate the Russian group to ensure the material supply of the Operational Group of Russian Troops until the completion of the Transdniestrian settlement.
As always, it will not do without a major catch. Softening the position on the Russian military will put Moldovan politicians in a difficult position. At least, it is easy to predict a tough reaction from Washington, Brussels and, especially, Kyiv, which in no way will tolerate the strengthening of the Russian military factor in the region. Moreover, the very inspection visit of the RF Ministry of Defense on the left bank of the Dniester can cause internal disputes. It will undoubtedly outrage a certain part of the Moldovan public, which will see it as a revenge of Moscow in the region and a setback in Euro-Atlantic integration. Questions to the socialists in charge of the Russian direction will certainly come from the ACUM bloc, which supports the restoration of relations with Moscow exclusively in the trade and economic framework.
Strengthening military cooperation with Russia promises considerable benefits to Moldova as a whole, as well as to the PSRM and President Igor Dodon, who oversees it. However, the further it develops, the more difficult it will be for Chisinau to find a balance between the interests of Moscow, Western partners and coalition allies.