Sergey Cheban: Moscow Deters Dodon from Independent Action in Transdniestria

RTA expert Sergey Cheban is sure that it’s no coincidence that Dmitry Kozak warned not to touch the Transdniestrian issue ahead of time on the eve of Igor Dodon’s visit to the United States Moldova is a Wonderland, as people say. The country, without exaggeration, became the number one newsmaker in regional geopolitics in 2019 and will certainly go down in the political science books as an example of a much unexpected ‘friendship’ of the three centers of power in the situation of mutual and total distrust. Moscow, Brussels and Washington overthrew the toxic all-powerful oligarch Plahotniuc to hand over power to a coalition of pro-European and quite pro-Romanian right-wingers from the ACUM bloc and pro-Russian left-wing socialists of Igor Dodon. So June 2019 can be described something like that. Three months have passed since then, but the ‘unnatural’ PSRM-ACUM alliance is still united. At the same time, the Sandu-Dodon government, due to its two-headed nature, manages to smartly receive bonuses both in the West and in the East. So, Sandu is well received in Brussels and is given macro-financial assistance, loans and grants. Dodon’s favored in Moscow – it will just suffice to mention the President-related sensational proposal by Sergei Shoigu to begin the ammunition disposal in Transdniestria or multiple visits to the country of the Deputy Chairman of the Russian government Dmitry Kozak. At some point it became clear that Igor Dodon steels the initiative from Maia Sandu. There are several reasons for this: first, Pro-Europeans were given government posts, along with a huge responsibility for the socio-economic situation in the country. If European reforms fail again, and the population does not feel the growth of living standards, they will call on the Cabinet of Sandu, not Dodon, for an explanation. The Party of Socialists does not have now a fraction of the responsibility that the ACUM has assumed. Secondly, the pro-Europeans have no substantive agenda. The Sandu government managed to skillfully get funds from international institutions and the European Union, but ACUM has a poor idea how exactly to spend them and, most importantly, what to get in the end. This is an objective problem of professional oppositionists: having come to power, they do not fully understand their next steps. Igor Dodon in this sense remains a politician and focuses on colorful and much-hyped topics: internationally guaranteed neutrality, warming with Russia, removal of ammunition, cheap gas. To complete the set the President needs only the Transdniestrian settlement – this could be the main achievement of Dodon, literally write it down in Moldovan history and strengthen him in power in the country for a long time as honored unifier of the banks of the Dniester. It became difficult to hide that Igor Dodon rode a successful wave and is in the groove. In addition, the unconvincing actions of the Sandu Cabinet became a good background for the President’s success. The visit of the Moldovan government delegation to Washington was prepared with fanfare, but then postponed. And when Sandu with Nastase, accompanied by an extensive company of officials still went to the United States, they did not bring any real results from the New World, except photos with Ivanka Trump. They even failed to shake the ground under Plahotniuc, who is rumored to be hiding in Miami. Now Igor Dodon is going to Washington, and just at this moment Moscow for some reason decided to pull the Moldovan leader up. Putin’s special envoy Dmitry Kozak, one of the architects of the current ruling coalition in Moldova, said publicly in Chisinau that Moldova should not solve the Transdniestrian problem right now. Formally, Kozak was courteous and spoke diplomatically, saying that Russia is in no hurry in this matter and advise others not to be. But in fact, as many experts rightly noted, the Deputy Prime Minister of Russia pointedly pulled Igor Dodon up: neither behind the scenes, nor in general terms, but publicly at a pompous Russian-Moldovan event, which Dodon will repeatedly boast of as an example of an unprecedented reset of relations between Moscow and Chisinau. It is no secret that a day before Dodon spoke of the Presidential Office’s plan for the settlement of the Transdniestrian issue. According to Dodon, the status of the Left Bank there is defined as “very strong autonomy”. However, a few days later the socialist leader clarified that in Chisinau there is no unity on Transdniestria and in fact other matters need to be addressed. However, the situation, apparently, caught the Kremlin’s attention and caused quite an unambiguous reaction. Apparently, Moscow was not too happy about independent actions of Igor Dodon in the Transdniestrian direction. Russia sees risks from what is happening both for Moldova itself and for Russian interests, since hardly anyone except Moscow knows what Russia is trying to achieve in Transdniestria. It should be understood that the problem is not the personality of Igor Dodon as a politician and President, but that in the wake of his isolated successes, the President of Moldova is trying to push the issue, which could not be solved by individual politicians or entire countries for almost 30 years. It is true that this question can break up the ruling coalition: the ACUM bloc has outspoken unionists and hard-liners in the settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict. Dodon himself wants to be friends with the left bank, but accuses Tiraspol of smuggling and theft, which does not strengthen the confidence of residents of the Transdniestrian region in him personally. There’s no talk about any “favorable moment” to resolve the conflict and it will hardly come so easily and quickly. Careless manipulation of facts and positions in the Transdniestrian issue can cost Igor Dodon too much. No wonder Kozak’s warning came before the Dodon’s visit to the United States: the Kremlin is deterring the socialist leader from discussing his settlement models in the US and even more so from trying to pass them off as a project agreed with Moscow. The President of Moldova may find himself in an extremely awkward situation, however, as his partners in Moscow, especially before the expected progress in Donbas. Russia, apparently, started quite a long positional game with the renewal of the Moldovan government and the disposal of 20 thousand tons of ammunition on the Left Bank of the Dniester. The true intentions of Moscow probably fit no longer in the propaganda formula “to influence the whole of Moldova through Transdniestria” and are hardly reflected in the settlement projects developed in the office of Igor Dodon.