What’s Putin Planning in Moldova?

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The Kremlin’s generous ‘gifts’ make Moldovan partners nervous This year Russia amazes: Moscow has clearly changed its tactics in the conflict zones of Eastern Europe. Unexpected moves of the Kremlin look unusual, but please the Western capitals, and Kyiv and Chisinau. So, for the first time in a long time there are reasons for optimism in the settlement in Donbas. Although Moscow reacted coldly to the election of Volodymyr Zelensky, the fact is that they began to communicate with the Ukrainian leader. Poroshenko at the end of his presidency complained that no one takes his calls to the Kremlin at all. Telephone conversation between Putin and Zelensky gave impetus to negotiations on the exchange of prisoners, which happened in a fairly short time. Thanks to this, after a long hibernation, the Normandy format came to life. Russia put forward adequate demands to Kyiv to unblock its activities, which were supported by France and Germany. Now that the Ukrainian authorities have met the Kremlin’s conditions by agreeing to sign the Steinmeier Formula, the way is open to a meeting of the Normandy four, where Putin and Zelensky will meet for the first time. Relations between Russia and Moldova have undergone even greater changes. Moscow played a crucial role in creating the current ruling coalition and liberating the country from the oligarchic regime. The meeting of the special representative of the Russian President Dmitry Kozak with both opposing camps made it possible to bring the positions of the PSRM and ACUM closer. At the same time, in the mission to deprive Plahotniuc of power, Russia cooperated with the EU and the US, which was the first such case in a long time. After the ‘anti-oligarchic coup’, the Kremlin is actively charging the agenda of Russian-Moldovan relations with positive emotions: removes trade restrictions and barriers, gives a big gas discount. Breakthrough was the initiative of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu on the disposal of ammunition on the territory of the Moldovan left bank in Cobasna. For many years Chisinau has been looking for international support for the elimination of Russian arsenals in Transdniestria, and now Moscow is ready to do it on its own. Despite warming of relations, the Sandu’s government is suspicious of Russia. Moscow’s benevolent attitude frankly scares it, and pro-European forces see a catch behind every gift. People from the ACUM bloc in the Moldovan government and pro-European forces in the Parliament were in opposition during many years, but generally shared the anti-Russian policy of the Democratic Party of Moldova. In this sense, on the contrary, they criticized Plahotniuc and the PDM for imitating the pro-European policy and being insufficiently pro-Western. In the horror stories of the then separate PAS and DA the Democrats secretly collaborated with Dodon’s socialists, and Dodon’s socialists almost represented the ‘hand of the Kremlin’ in Moldova. In such political frame Maia Sandu and Andrei Nastase felt quite comfortable. And then Vladimir Putin’s special representative Dmitry Kozak became one of those who literally led by the hand both Sandu and Nastase in power. The whole scheme of things was shaken for the ACUM bloc for the first time. They continued to criticize Russia for its military presence on the Left Bank and participation in the 1992 conflict, but said that they are ready for pragmatic cooperation. For the second time, the political compass of the pro-Europeans showed a crack in August, when Sergei Shoigu arrived in Chisinau and offered to start disposing of ammunition in unrecognized Transdniestria. Russia is usually criticized just for the reluctance to solve the problem of depots in Cobasna, and then Moscow itself took the first step. Just before the visits of the government delegation of Sandu, and then President Dodon to the United States. For the third time Chisinau received another gift from the Kremlin in the form of a gas discount, which will be active already this fall. Since the new year, natural gas for Moldova will be even cheaper, in addition, Vladimir Putin announced a sensation: Moscow is ready to maintain transit through Ukraine almost unilaterally. That is, Russian gas will not only be cheaper, but it will be in general. Experts draw attention to the fact that the Sandu government is actually confused in terms of policy in the Eastern direction. In just a few months, the Kremlin has dramatically changed its geopolitical mood about Moldova and Ukraine, and this clearly appeals to the residents of Moldova, since the Putin’s image as a politician and national leader is very popular among them. For Sandu, the popularity of the ‘Dodon’s friend’ equals to the electoral success of Dodon, but the ACUM bloc cannot yet find reasons to resist Russian steps towards it. There is also a fear of falling out of favor in Europe – the outgoing leaders of France and Germany, obviously, want before completing their tenures to the maximum settle relations with Moscow and go down in history of European politics marked by a positive sign.  Chisinau’s attempts to resist this process are unlikely to please its European partners. In the end, there remains the main concern that the Sandu government is most difficult to deal with that is the fear of a trap, a smart ‘Putin plan’ that is unfolding right now in Eastern Europe. Years of propaganda and fostering of fear of the ‘Russian threat’ have done their job, so the ACUM bloc considers every step of the Kremlin as a prologue of a great hoax, a deception which will make Moscow a triumpher. No matter how compromise the Kremlin’s steps are, some politicians in Chisinau will always see them as a bluff. The answer to the question of what the conditional ‘Putin’ actually intended in Moldova is important only for those who are accustomed to building a policy with a constant nervous look at the actions of the the high and the mighty. In fact, a real window of opportunity opens for Moldova to take a comfortable and for many years unattainable position on the fence, to which Brussels, Moscow and Washington literally pushed Chisinau in June this year. However, the Sandu government will not be able to grab the chance of today if it does not get rid of phobias and stereotypes. And in the current consensus on Moldova, Chisinau hardly has to choose as in the end no coalition of the PSRM-ACUM would exist without the efforts of external partners, including Moscow.