Transdniestrian Impasse: What Happened in Bratislava and Who’s Setting Up the Sandu Government?

Dorin Mocanu Last week, in the capital of Slovakia, the 5+2 meeting on the Transdniestrian settlement ended in failure. German diplomat Claus Neukirch, Head of the OSCE Mission in Chisinau, tried to avoid a scandal and commented on the results of the failed round alone, without the negotiators of Tiraspol and Chisinau. It is interesting that the Moldovan media carefully evade the Bratislava failure, and numerous interpretations by experts do not help to understand who is actually to blame for it. It is also interesting that Moldova itself and its international allies can easily deflect blame onto Tiraspol, but this is not happening yet. There are suggestions that the right bank of the Dniester is where the shoe pinches: it is no coincidence that Chisinau got off after the meeting with a brief press release, and Deputy Prime Minister Vasile Sova does not appear in public and is silent. What happened at the talks in the Slovak capital? Let’s use reverse logic. For many years, international participants in the Transdniestrian settlement have been building their official position on the situation on the Dniester based on declarations of the OSCE Ministerial Council. The latest was adopted last year in Rome and was already traditional in content: since 2016, with regard to the Transdniestrian issue, mediators and observers have insisted on output-oriented negotiations, as they write in the statement. Thus, each meeting in the 5+2 format in recent years ended with a specific outcome: a protocol, which confirmed the intention of Tiraspol and Chisinau to reach the next practical solutions in non-political issues. It is obvious that someone in Bratislava did not agree with this logic of recent years, and it is easy to guess who. Moldovan Deputy Prime Minister and veteran of the Transdniestrian settlement Vasile Sova, apparently, came out with a radically different position, contrasting Moldova with all the other participants of the meeting. At the same time, the demarche of the Moldovan delegation, apparently, came as a surprise to international partners, who followed the logic of recent years and expected particular output. Given that the meetings of the 5+2 format are held no more than once a year and are carefully prepared in the OSCE, no one expected a negative outcome of the meeting in Slovakia, otherwise it would have been prevented in advance. It is no coincidence that many experts tend to believe that the negotiation process between Chisinau and Tiraspol has again become unpredictable, and the risk of another freeze in relations between the two banks looms on the horizon. The unclear points do not end there. Against the demarche of the Moldovan negotiators, Igor Dodon’s usual rhetoric about the need for active rapprochement with Tiraspol seems absurd, especially if we assume that the Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration was instructed from the presidential office to torpedo the negotiations. Ignoring the long-term approaches of international partners, who are seriously helping Moldova in the Transdniestrian settlement, Vasile Sova reduced to absurdity the idea of a ‘big package’, which is based on the idea of a broad international deal on Moldova. The situation looks all the more absurd if we recall that in this August Vasile Sova, without consulting the government, proposed to international partners to adopt a “common declaration” on supporting Moldova towards the final settlement of the Transdniestrian issue. Leaking this behind-the-scenes idea to the media almost caused a scandal, but it all worked itself out. However, a month later in Bratislava, the Moldovan negotiator masterly upset international actors – the European Union and the United States, which until recently were expected to support and even sign the declaration on the unification of the country. Experience suggests that the ‘main capitals’ were not entirely satisfied with the results of the Bratislava meeting, and requests to explain and assess the behavior of the Moldovan delegation in Bratislava have already reached the high offices in Chisinau. Evidence that the Moldovan government has to answer uncomfortable questions may be the newest interview with the Foreign Minister of Moldova Nicu Popescu, who tried to cut off the Cabinet of Ministers of Maia Sandu from the incident, placing the responsibility on the Dodon’s protege Vasile Sova (who was arrogant enough, I suppose). Mr. Popescu eloquently argues that the new coalition agreement between ACUM and the PSRM expresses a commitment to the small steps tactics in contacts with Tiraspol and a focus on concrete results to build confidence between the banks of the Dniester. In addition, according to the Moldovan Minister, the document says nothing about the close reintegration of the country, the negotiations with Transdniestria on the political status and international recognition of the neutrality of the Republic of Moldova. The Moldovan government directly makes it clear that the failure of the negotiations in Bratislava entirely belongs to the President Dodon’s protege, who promotes the ‘alternative’ agenda of the Transdniestrian settlement, ignoring the positions of the other participants of the 5+2 format. It is interesting to see how in practice the Sandu government will react to the demarche of the Moldovan negotiators, which seriously upset Chisinau’s political and economic partners in the West. So far, we can only say that the situation will not improve without a consensus on Transdniestria in Chisinau, as well as without understanding the true intentions of the Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration. Vasile Sova, being an old school official, may be seeking a speedy political settlement of the Transdniestrian issue – that is, trying to finish what he started in the early 2000s. However, what was good then today drives Chisinau into a very dangerous trap, because of which Moldova will not be able not only to achieve external consent, but also to maintain the existing consensus of the key players on the future of the left bank.