OSCE’s Signal. Are There Any Perspectives for the Transdniestrian Settlement in 2020?

Dmitry ASTAKHOV The visit of the Special Representative of the new Albanian OSCE Chairmanship to Moldova hinted at how the organization sees the Transdniestrian settlement this year Last week, Thomas Mayr-Harting, a newly appointed Special Representative of the Albanian Chairmanship of the OSCE, visited Moldova. He held a series of meetings with the Moldovan leadership and resident ambassadors involved in the Transdniestrian conflict settlement process, and also paid a visit to Tiraspol. The Austrian diplomat is one way or another aware of the Transdniestrian issue - for several years he represented the European Union in the settlement process. Nevertheless, the experience of being involved as an observer differs significantly from that of a mediator, since the latter includes the tasks of both the presiding Albania and the OSCE as a whole. The visit itself was largely of an exploratory and familiarization character. Apparently, it was important for the Special Representative to understand the general atmosphere on the Nistru banks, as well as to find out what problems, out of the numerous existing in their relations, are considered by Chisinau and Tiraspol as their own priorities. Upon that, the OSCE will most likely begin to develop an approximate trajectory for further movement of the entire negotiation process in 2020. According to Thomas Mayr-Harting, the main guideline should be the example of 2017, when Chisinau and Tiraspol achieved great success in several directions at once. Then, we recall, it was possible to resolve issues related to the recognition of the Transdniestrian higher education diplomas, functioning of the so-called “Romanian” schools on the left bank, using disputed agricultural land and opening a bridge across the Nistru between the villages of Gura Bicului and Baciok. A little later, the transport issue was settled (as it seemed at that time) – the Transdniestrian cars were able to move abroad. In Chisinau, the Austrian diplomat was again informed of the plans and priorities of the Moldovan side: free movement, Latin-script schools, and customs and tax harmonization. The OSCE Special Representative, in turn, reaffirmed that the key approach remains the one agreed by international mediators in 2015 and aimed at “tangible results and improving life on both banks of the Nistru”. In Tiraspol, the main Transdniestrian negotiator told Mayr-Harting that the negotiation process is “degrading” at the current stage, since it is not possible to reach agreements on transport, telecommunications and criminal cases. For his part, Special Representative confined himself only to a concise diplomatic language and assured everyone that the OSCE would continue to provide support to the parties in finding a final solution to the conflict. Obviously, the Albanian chairmanship, which made the Transdniestrian settlement one of its priorities, does not have much time to achieve any tangible results. The main reason for this is the continuing difficult domestic political situation in Moldova, where in addition to the scheduled presidential elections due in the second half of the year, there is a high probability for early parliamentary elections. In this regard, any dynamics in relations with Transdniestria, whether negative or positive, will in any case be put into the electoral context. A vivid example is the recent road transport confrontation, which ended, in fact, with “zeroing” the situation. Despite this, Igor Dodon had been heavily criticized for a week by his political opponents, who charged him with “weakness and pliability” towards Tiraspol. Interestingly, the final OSCE press release said that Thomas Mayr-Harting urged the parties to use their involvement in the process not only to fulfill the commitments under the Berlin + protocol, but also to develop new confidence-building measures. It seems that the Austrian diplomat is nevertheless carefully pushing the parties to think about the need to prepare the next package agreement, which would include recent pressing problems. In this sense, it is appropriate to recall that the “Berlin Protocol” was also developed during 2016 amid a deep crisis in relations between the parties and in view of a great amount of accumulated problems. Theoretically, to implement such a task seems quite real. But first, the parties need to close all questions from the Berlin + package, but currently there are no prerequisites for this. Therefore, this year’s success in negotiations will primarily depend on whether the international mediators are ready to assist in the talks between the parties without regard to Moldova’s domestic political context. If so, then Chisinau and Tiraspol really have a chance for something more than another “lost settlement year”.