Expert: Resignation of the Chicu Government Can Trigger Deep Political Changes in Moldova

Sergiu CHEBAN The political off-season in Moldova promises to be hot: neither the opposition, nor other stakeholders are interested in delaying systemic changes in Moldovan politics After Prime Minister Ion Chicu took responsibility for a number of bills, it seemed that the socialists could turn the tide for a while and send the parliament on summer holiday, while retaining a tactical advantage over the inevitable tough confrontation with the opposition at least until the fall. Meanwhile, the events of the past week have demonstrated that the nominal ruling majority will no longer have a “cakewalk” and the opposition is determined to act decisively regardless of all the risks. The events of the past week have vividly confirmed that no one plans to postpone the decisive battle and appointment of a new government, including Western partners. The latter, with their statements, further fuel internal political tension and increase pressure on the current government. It’s enough to mention Maia Sandu’s statement on July 16, when literally an hour before the start of the parliamentary session she announced that the deputies of her faction would sign a vote of no confidence initiated by the ACUM bloc colleagues. It should be noted that this decision was preceded by a meeting between Mrs. Sandu and Pavel Filip and, most likely, other foreign colleagues. These discussions might have delivered strong arguments prompting the PAS leader to sharply switch her attitude to the Chicu-led cabinet’s removal. Such a dramatic turn obviously came as a kind of surprise, spoiling game for many stakeholders, and the looming threat of government resignation raised serious concern among the country’s leadership and the Socialist Party. Mathematically, opposition lacks the nominal two votes to enable resignation, however, as the Moldovan experts believe, the required number will be found at the crucial moment. For fear of an internal split, the parliamentary faction of socialists at its extraordinary meeting hastily held a “session of coercion to loyalty”, during which PSRM deputies signed a declaration to support the current cabinet. An unexpected step by Igor Dodon and Ion Chicu to freeze the sale of the central city stadium territory, where the United States planned to build a new embassy as evidence of the Washington’s long-term interests in this regional space is unlikely to add to the political tranquility. Such attempts to draw the American side into intrigue or achieve goals through slight blackmail can only foster the United States to accelerate regrouping of political forces in Moldova. One way or another, the totality of circumstances allows us to say that the internal life in Moldova is approaching another inevitable reboot. Moscow, apparently, is also preparing for this, as evidenced by the interview with the Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia, Andrey Rudenko. He expressed the opinion that the internal political situation in Moldova looks unpredictable from the point of view of the parliamentary composition and the ongoing antagonism between the main political forces. At the same time, the Russian diplomat expressed hope for the major political forces of the country to be able to reach a consensus. At the same time, Moscow is ready to assist in the search for this compromise. As expected, such Kremlin’s helping hand was received by the Moldovan opposition with hostility, especially after the anti-oligarchic PSRM-ACUM coalition, on which great hopes were pinned, including in Moscow, eventually fell last autumn, with the tacit consent of the Russian side. It is possible that the statements of the Russian foreign ministry were addressed not only to the Moldovan side; however, such an invitation to the international dialogue regarding Chisinau’s further political fate hardly has any real prospects at the current stage. Relations with the left bank are getting less predictable after the Moldovan media and social networks started to circulate intentions of active-minded citizens, especially veterans of the war on the Dniester, to demonstrate their potential to liquidate illegal Transdniestrian posts. It cannot be reported with certainty that Tiraspol’s appeal to Moscow to take advantage of the situation and enhance its military grouping in the region has deescalated tensions, but obviously helped at least to refocus the “veteran riot”. Unexpectedly for many, the protest movement of combatants from a marginal group of disgruntled citizens evolved into the leading force of political resistance, joined by almost all the leaders of the Moldovan opposition. As a result, the notional “Party of Veterans of the Transdniestrian Conflict” has more and more supporters and, most likely, such an effective social and political activity will take shape of a specific political project in the near future. It seems that the concentration of internal and external factors in Moldova has led the general situation to the very critical point that will completely or partially break the back of the existing political system. This could be triggered by the resignation of the Moldovan government, whose fate depends on only a few parliamentary votes.