Political Crisis in Moldova: Are the President and Parliament Ready to Make a Deal?

Sergiu CEBAN Yesterday's events hint that there have been  major changes in the Moldovan political backstage which pave the way for emerging from the current crisis based on the consensus between the president and the largest parliamentary factions The consultations with parliamentary factions announced by the presidency for March 16 came somewhat as an unexpected turn of the political crisis in Moldova which had been developing quite linearly in recent weeks, smoothly approaching the next benchmark date, March 23. The parliamentary forces were obviously not happy about that state of affairs, and primarily the Socialist Party which spearheaded resistance to Maia Sandu's political plan. However, looking ahead, it should be noted that overcoming the difficult internal political situation required that the socialists show maximum flexibility rather than the "muscle-flexing". The first signs of this appeared the day before the consultations with Sandu. Experts close to the political formation began to prepare the Moldovan audience for the fact that Western diplomats have already "twisted the hands" of the Moldovan president, convincing her of the need to start negotiating with the parliament and make a painful compromise. The order of factions' appearance in the presidency was also peculiar, which was duly noticed by scrupulous observers. For example, the situational allies, the Shor and PSRM parties, were brought apart, with the maximum long interval between their reception. Shor/For Moldova was the first to be invited to the head of state, while the socialists  were the last to attend the presidential consultations. As a result, when the PSRM were in Maia Sandu's cabinet, the parliamentary majority candidate Mariana Durlesteanu unexpectedly reported on social networks that she was withdrawing her nomination. In that context, the president promptly announced the candidacy of one of her closest associates, Igor Grosu, to the prime minister. At first glance, the above events looked definitely like a tactical defeat for Igor Dodon, who seemed to have failed to figure out in advance all the options, as a result of which some forces, and possibly coalition partners, decided to strike in the back. The head of state's haste also fitted into this logic, since she rescheduled her press briefing to an earlier time obviously seeking to sign a decree on a candidate for prime minister's nomination as soon as possible. Thus, she seemed to be willing to take revenge on Dodon for his hastily formed majority a few hours before a no-confidence vote in the Natalia Gavrilita government. However, a deeper look at what is happening, together with the synchronicity of some episodes, indicates that much more serious changes have taken place in the Moldovan political backstage. Some fundamental agreements might have been reached that pave the way for overcoming the current crisis situation based on a general consensus among the majority holders of Moldovan political assets. First of all, it should be noted that over the past week, representatives of the PSRM and the PAS party loyal to the president had met quite frequently, which finally culminated in Maia Sandu's "irresistible desire" to hold consultations with parliamentary factions, which contradicted the logic of her previous intentions. And this is despite the fact that the President was deliberately waiting for the third decade of March planning to invoke a three-month period during which the parliament failed to approve the new government. Igor Dodon attending the meeting with Maia Sandu looks no less symbolic, which would obviously not have happened without her personal consent. Thus, there are sufficient grounds to assume that during the formal meeting of the president with the socialist leaders some fundamental decisions were reached, including Durlesteanu's withdrawal. They untied the president's hands and allowed nominating once again a loyal candidate for the prime minister's office without violating the constitutional requirements. The first statements by Igor Dodon regarding the poor prospects for the Grosu-led cabinet of ministers to receive the required 51 votes of deputies can only indicate that the parties are still in a state of interim agreement. Moreover, Maia Sandu's protégé can count on the socialists' support only if the PSRM maintains some influence in the system of public authorities and Igor Dodon personally will retain an important seat, political positions and guarantees of immunity. If PSRM and PAS fail to come to a common denominator, then, apparently, the socialists will try to return the situation to its initial state by reactivating Mariana Durlesteanu (or another candidate from the parliamentary majority), subsequently appealing to the Constitutional Court with a request to declare the presidential decree illegal. Under the present circumstances, both sides continue to proceed from their overestimated mutual demands. Although Igor Grosu has nominally 15 days to present to the people's representatives the draft of his program, as well as the personal composition of the government, the critical situation in the republic requires maximum responsibility and prompt clarity - whether Moldova will have a new cabinet of ministers or snap elections. It seems that such a complex compromise between the two opposing political forces amid their extremely high mutual mistrust became possible only due to serious external involvement, primarily American diplomacy. The latter have openly announced its priority in Moldovan affairs by outlining a vision of a possible power configuration in Chisinau. Although other key diplomats haven't showed activity in recent days, the Socialist Party will most likely try to present the possible investiture of Igor Grosu's government as another geopolitical compromise in Moldova. Clearly, the appointment of a new government headed by Igor Grosu is not the most ideal option for Maia Sandu in the current circumstances, since it imposes a colossal responsibility on the president and the PAS. This might give a little respite to the deputies who will definitely try to play the situation in their favor and weaken the presidential positions as much as possible. The only thing Maia Sandu and the government loyal to her can count on in such conditions is the most powerful external support that can improve the socio-economic and epidemiological situation. Most likely, the guarantees of such aid were already received, which made the president revise her principled positions.