Why Is Moldova Replacing Its Ambassadors to the U.S. and Turkey?

Moldova is reshuffling its ambassadors in two strategically vital countries – the United States and Turkey. These diplomatic appointments not only shed light on the ruling regime’s priorities, but also hint at growing unease over the outcome of the upcoming parliamentary elections

On May 30, the parliamentary committee on foreign policy gave its approval for the new ambassadorial candidates to the United States and Turkey. The posts will be filled by two former Deputy Prime Ministers for Reintegration – Vladislav Kulminski and Oleg Serebrian. President Maia Sandu is expected to sign the official decrees confirming their appointments and deployment in the coming days. Rumors of this diplomatic reshuffle had been circulating for months. From the outset, Serebrian showed little enthusiasm for overseeing the Transnistrian settlement, especially during such a turbulent period, and was eager to return to a diplomatic posting abroad. His tenure coincided with an objectively difficult chapter for the negotiation process. In recent years, the two sides of the Dniester have ramped up their information warfare, routinely exchanging criticism, while the number of official contacts steadily declined. At this point, the existing formal dialogue platforms are, by most measures, virtually non-functional when it comes to solving even the most basic issues. And the soon-to-be former Deputy Prime Minister has been unable to reverse that trend. Turkey, meanwhile, holds significant economic and political weight for Moldova. Back in the early 1990s, Ankara played a key role in integrating the Gagauz autonomous region into Moldova’s legal framework. To this day, it keeps a close eye on the region: on the one hand, pressing Chisinau with specific demands, and on the other, helping to contain centrifugal tendencies in this pro-Russian enclave as a counterbalance to Moscow’s influence. Bilateral trade has shown steady growth, especially following the 2016 free trade agreement, which fully came into effect five years later. This year, Turkey has accounted for roughly 14% of Moldova’s total exports, a figure that has doubled in the first quarter alone compared to last year, largely due to plummeting shipments to EU countries and Russia. Turkish imports are also on the rise, now making up about 7% of Moldova’s total purchases. Beyond trade, Turkey is a vital logistics hub for Moldova’s imports and exports and continues to be a popular destination for Moldovan tourists. In this context, Oleg Serebrian inherits a diplomatically intriguing portfolio, especially given Ankara’s “new-old” role in facilitating Russia-Ukraine ceasefire talks. This subject holds deep strategic weight for Moldova’s leadership, which has effectively tied the country’s prospects for both European integration and national reintegration to developments unfolding across its eastern border. Officials in Chisinau, including Foreign Minister Mihai Popsoi, have repeatedly argued that Moldova should be part of any broader settlement between Russia and the West over Ukraine. It seems the government believes Serebrian’s expertise and background could prove valuable in Istanbul, should his duties take him into the heart of that evolving diplomatic theater. For historical reasons, Moldova’s relationship with the United States remains a cornerstone of its foreign policy. Yet unexpectedly, a host of complications has emerged in this direction, largely triggered by the election of Donald Trump. Ambassador Valentin Ursu, known for his alignment with the LGBT agenda, proved entirely ineffective in engaging with the new U.S. administration, which adheres to more traditional values. It’s no coincidence that president Maia Sandu herself has acknowledged the absence of any meaningful contact with Trump’s team to date. Now, Vladislav Kulminski faces a daunting to-do list. He’ll need to address the U.S. trade tariffs imposed on Moldovan exports, revive funding for key initiatives in energy security, military reform, and civil society support, including backing for NGOs and so-called “free media”. Additionally, he must help navigate the future of the new U.S. embassy complex, slated to be built on the site of the former Republican Stadium in Chisinau. Since the start of EU accession talks, Moldova’s leadership has largely reoriented itself toward Brussels. Yet in the absence of clear guidance or intervention from Washington, the government now finds itself adrift, uncertain and inexperienced when it comes to independent military and political planning. Kulminski will need to deploy every possible diplomatic finesse and initiative to revive the stalled dialogue with the United States, carefully navigating between the globalist wing of the Democratic Party and Donald Trump’s isolationist inner circle. His previous experience and connections may offer little help in this new landscape, given the sweeping shake-ups within U.S. intelligence agencies and the State Department in recent months. Much of the groundwork will have to be laid from scratch. Interestingly, these high-stakes ambassadorial posts have been handed to diplomats who, one after the other, previously oversaw Moldova’s efforts toward resolving the Transnistrian conflict. Kulminski served as Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration from August to November 2021, and after a six-month gap, Serebrian stepped into the role. What’s more, Kulminski is rumored to have continued exerting direct influence over Chisinau’s policy toward Tiraspol even after leaving office, maintaining informal channels with key stakeholders and advising the president behind the scenes. Serebrian, by contrast, largely distanced himself from the portfolio, citing a lack of authority, an unfavorable political climate, and a clear interest in resuming his diplomatic career abroad. In this light, the government is sending a clear signal: talks with Transnistria are no longer a top priority, especially amid shifting international dynamics and the pressing need to strengthen ties with key global players. It’s entirely possible that the next move by the ruling PAS party will be to leave the post of Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration vacant, at least until the parliamentary campaign is over. Meanwhile, Oleg Serebrian and Vladislav Kulminski are receiving their diplomatic mandates just in time and making a timely exit from Moldova. With three months still to go before the parliamentary elections, they have a window of opportunity to establish functional ties in their host countries, securing their ambassadorial positions even if PAS suffers a setback at the ballot box in September. There’s a growing sense that both seasoned operatives have keenly sensed the moment when it’s wiser not to gamble their career prospects on the whims of Moldova’s unpredictable political scene. In this way, diplomacy becomes a form of escape from a gridlocked domestic reality. After all, doing good for the country may just be easier from across the sea or across the ocean.