“Game of Shadows”: How Plahotniuc’s Extradition Revived Moldovan Democrats

Sergiu CEBAN

The potential return of Vladimir Plahotniuc has seemingly breathed new life into the ranks of his former allies, who have begun mobilizing to fight in the parliamentary elections

After Vladimir Plahotniuc fled in 2019, his entourage found itself in a political vacuum. Some tried to integrate into new projects, others preferred to stay in the shadows to avoid drawing attention, and many left public politics altogether. The absence of a power center and resources led to the marginalization of the former Democrats, which is why, with few exceptions, they showed almost no activity either in the 2023 local elections or during last year’s campaigns. The anticipated extradition of the former DPM leader has become a sort of stress test for our political landscape. The figure of the oligarch, who has long been outside the country, has the potential not only to reshape the dynamics of the election campaign but also to revive major political structures that previously seemed to have faded into oblivion. This very factor has breathed new life into the circle of his former allies from the Democratic Party. After a long period of silence, they began showing signs of revival last week. Plahotniuc’s supporters, previously fragmented and cautious, have now received a signal to take active steps, as the very prospect of their leader’s return – even if only in the context of an expected extradition – is perceived as an opportunity to reenter the political arena. The media experience, business connections, and regional networks once controlled by Plahotniuc give his close circle a sense that the time for a fresh start has come. His return to the country, even as a suspect, could indeed become a game-changer. PAS is fully aware of the potential threat posed by the oligarch’s reappearance. Even baseless statements without supporting evidence could deepen public doubts and sow chaos during the election campaign. Given these circumstances, all indications suggest that the authorities will seek to keep Plahotniuc outside the country until the parliamentary battle is over – at least until October. Such a tactic is expected to minimize the oligarch’s direct involvement in the electoral process while simultaneously limiting the room for maneuver of his allies within the country. Nevertheless, the “opening salvo” seems to have already been fired. Former DPM members and regional party structures have begun hastily reorganizing and leaving other projects where they had been forced to lie low for several years. As a result, the Modern Democratic Party of Moldova (MDPM) has emerged, announcing its readiness to participate in the elections. It is quite possible that in the coming days, other electoral platforms led by former DPM members will also appear. The main intrigue, however, lies in the potential inclusion of Plahotniuc himself on the electoral lists – a move that, under favorable circumstances, could see him once again standing directly at the parliamentary rostrum. Local initiatives also serve as an important indicator. For example, in Causeni, a group of mayors and councilors has officially announced their decision to join the MDPM. Similar processes are being observed in other districts as well. At first glance, these may seem like isolated cases of political migration. However, they could set an example for others and ultimately lead to the revival of the Democratic Party’s regional infrastructure. For a long time, the disoriented and dormant network of Democrats may now provide an organizational base to mobilize support for the MDPM in the upcoming election campaign. In reality, the local level serves as a springboard for advancing political ambitions on a national scale. Mayors and councilors are not merely local figures but a key tool for influencing voters in small towns and villages, where the DPM traditionally held strong positions. All this creates the impression that the return of the old team could evolve into a full-scale restoration of structures capable of shaping the country’s political agenda. On the other hand, the scale of preparation should not be overestimated. At this stage, all actions appear to be more reactive in nature, serving as a response to rapidly evolving events rather than forming part of a carefully crafted strategy. The main bet, it seems, is on uniting the majority of representatives of the once-dominant political force around emerging political centers and party structures coming out of the shadows. However, much still points to the continued fragmentation of the former Democratic Party establishment, which is not yet ready to act as a unified front. The question of public perception also remains crucial, as Plahotniuc’s allies’ return represents both a challenge and an opportunity for the electorate. Some see it as a chance to restore the previous order, with its mix of positive and negative aspects, while others perceive it solely as a threat of reviving corrupt methods of governance. Consequently, the success of efforts to revive the Democratic Party will depend not only on the organizational work of its supporters in towns and villages but also on their ability to position themselves in the eyes of citizens who have grown accustomed to the new political realities. Thus, the chances of the former DPM achieving strong results in the parliamentary elections remain moderate for now. Despite the activation of regional structures and the emergence of new political projects, no significant unifying effect has yet been observed. Additional time may be needed, but do the Democrats have it? However, if Plahotniuc returns to Moldova in the coming weeks, it could serve as a powerful catalyst for consolidating fragmented groups and bringing greater coordination to their actions. It remains something of a mystery why Plahotniuc’s arrest in Greece and the rapid developments surrounding his extradition have occurred precisely now, on the eve of the most intense phase of the election campaign. One possible explanation is that keeping the oligarch out of the political process was part of an informal agreement: Plahotniuc would not interfere with PAS, while the authorities, in turn, would stage a show of diligence in pursuing him abroad. Presumably, this balance suited both sides until the arrest, after which some parties may have concluded that they were no longer bound by any obligations and now had legitimate reasons to return to high-level politics. For the opposition, and especially for Igor Dodon, Plahotniuc’s return also poses serious risks, given the old scores that remain between them. The former Democratic leader may still believe that Dodon betrayed him at a critical moment. Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that Plahotniuc possesses additional compromising materials against the Socialist leader. The release of new “tapes” could not only further discredit Dodon but also deal a blow to the recently formed bloc, undermining its internal cohesion and eroding the trust of part of the electorate. Thus, Vladimir Plahotniuc’s return to the public sphere, even in the form of an as-yet unrealized extradition, has become a factor gradually shifting the tone of the information landscape ahead of the elections. Even without physically appearing in his homeland, the oligarch’s figure is already a source of uncertainty for both the authorities and the opposition. As for the former Democrats, the coming weeks will reveal whether they can seize the moment and turn this initial stir within their ranks into a coherent political strategy – or whether it will remain merely a minor episode, driven by an emotional reaction to the potential return of their former leader to Moldova’s informational and political reality.