35 Years Between the Two Sides of the Dniester

Sergiu CEBAN

It’s been three and a half decades since a separate entity emerged on the left bank of the Dniester, yet the prospects for Moldova’s reintegration remain highly uncertain

Today, public events were held on the left bank of the Dniester to mark the 35th anniversary of the self-proclaimed “Transnistrian republic”. The celebration of this date, coming almost simultaneously with the 34th anniversary of Moldova’s independence, once again underscored a fundamental problem: within the territory of a single internationally recognized state, two completely different historical and political projects continue to coexist. Over the past three and a half decades, the conflict surrounding the rebellious region has long since moved from a “hot” phase into a “frozen” state, but this does not mean it has lost its significance. On the contrary, amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, the transformation of the European security architecture, and new geopolitical shifts, the Transnistrian issue still remains part of the international agenda and cannot be perceived solely as Moldova’s internal affair. The creation of the so-called “PMR” in 1990 was largely the result of the leadership groups on both banks of the Dniester being unable to find common ground. The intensification of uncompromising rhetoric and the pursuit of interests solely along their own lines led to an escalation of the confrontation, which ultimately erupted into an armed conflict. Even after that, the region did not gain international recognition, yet it managed to establish its own institutions – from the army and intelligence services to the educational system and local government bodies. The anniversary events in Tiraspol were held with the usual symbolism: a parade, concerts, and official speeches emphasizing the “steadfastness of the course” and “loyalty to the memory of defenders”. Yet behind the facade of routine celebratory rhetoric lies growing tension, directly linked to the forthcoming Russian-Ukrainian resolution. Today’s Tiraspol, of course, positions itself as an independent decision-making center, although its actual capabilities largely depend on Moscow’s will, which, it seems, is currently undergoing another phase of reassessing its role and position in Moldova’s internal affairs. Negotiations on Transnistria’s future have for many years been conducted within the “5+2” format, in which, alongside the parties to the conflict, Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE act as mediators, while the United States and the EU serve as observers. Today, this format is effectively in a “coma”, with no full-scale meetings taking place since 2019. Nevertheless, no party has officially withdrawn from it. Even in the context of the Ukrainian crisis and the complete rupture between Moscow and Kyiv, the “5+2” group continues to exist legally. This means that, should current circumstances change, the international actors essentially have a ready-made platform to resume dialogue. All claims to the contrary bring to mind the most recent example of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Just days ago, it became known that the two countries had effectively dismantled the international mediation mechanism – the OSCE Minsk Group, engaged in the Karabakh conflict for more than three decades. Formally, it existed for over 30 years, but by September 2022 its activities had effectively ceased, and the parties have now legally ratified the dissolution of this format. Chisinau still assumes that one of the key obstacles to resolving the conflict is not the negotiation framework itself, but the presence of Russian troops in the region. This concerns two entities: the peacekeeping contingent and the operational group of Russian forces guarding the ammunition depots in Cobasna. Kyiv and a significant portion of Western diplomats believe that this factor alone makes reintegration of the region impossible. However, it should be understood that under current geopolitical conditions, the prospect of dismantling the depots and the voluntary withdrawal of Russian troops in the near future is minimal. Moreover, at a time when Europe is discussing hypothetical scenarios for deploying Western contingents on Ukrainian territory, Moscow is unlikely to reduce its presence in the Transnistrian region and will likely seek to exploit this factor to the fullest. This is evidenced, in particular, by the unambiguous military signals coming from Moscow. A recent demonstration of a map by the Russian General Staff, showing access to Odesa and the borders of Moldova with Romania, sent a clear message to external audiences. The underlying subtext is more than obvious – despite ongoing consultations with Washington, the Kremlin still views the entire Ukrainian Black Sea coast as part of its long-term strategic planning. Other processes within the Russian administration should not be underestimated, as significant changes are underway and new structures are being established to strengthen its influence across the post-Soviet space. These developments align with a broader strategy of preserving spheres of influence and creating instruments of pressure on the former Soviet republics. At the same time, decisions taken by politicians in Chisinau also play a considerable role in shaping and reinforcing separatist sentiments on the left bank of the Dniester. The recent threefold reduction in the number of polling stations for left-bank residents in the upcoming parliamentary elections was perceived there as a demonstrative “rejection”. For the younger generation, raised within the framework of a “Transnistrian identity” and local narratives, such measures by the central authorities only deepen the sense of alienation. As a result, we once again lose the opportunity to cultivate among the region’s inhabitants a sense of belonging to the shared political space, effectively pushing our own compatriots into Moscow’s embrace. Such a strategic miscalculation could prove costly, as new generations of locals will no longer perceive Tiraspol, from a political standpoint, as a temporary anomaly but rather as a proximate and legitimate center of authority. The other day, the leader of the Transnistrian region, Vadim Krasnoselsky, once again revived the idea of a political restructuring of the Republic of Moldova. In his view, if Moldova can exist as a single state at all, it would only be in the form of a federation or confederation; otherwise, it is doomed to disintegration. Chisinau is traditionally regarding such proposals as a threat to sovereignty and as a tool for Moscow to cement its influence. Yet, in essence, the root cause lies elsewhere: today, our political elites are fully focused on European integration. Under these circumstances, any domestic reforms involving the re-foundation of statehood, even minimal, are entirely excluded. One way or another, the Transnistrian issue is closely tied to Moldova’s foreign policy trajectory. In the coming years, Chisinau’s primary objective will be to advance accession talks with the European Union, and within this logic the Transnistrian problem is likely to remain marginalized: it is neither seen as a priority nor, indeed, as compatible with the European perspective, but rather as a potential threat to it. This implies that the conflict may be postponed indefinitely, and the question of reintegration will become acute only when Moldova is ultimately forced to choose, so to speak, between European integration and territorial integrity. The likely scenarios for the coming years can be outlined along several lines. The first is the preservation of the status quo: the conflict remains frozen, and occasional bursts of negotiation activity fail to produce tangible results. The second is the “Cyprus model”: a gradual movement of Moldova toward European integration while keeping the Transnistrian issue in limbo, without any final resolution. Finally, the third scenario involves state restructuring, which in theory could open the way to a new coexistence framework, but in practice would only be possible through a radical transformation of the political elites and a fundamental change in the country’s policy course. Regardless of any forecasts, one fact remains: 35 years after the self-proclamation of a separate entity on the left bank of the Dniester, the prospects for resolution remain uncertain, as they depend on a broader context, including the outcome of the war in Ukraine, the future of Russian-European relations, and the overhaul of Europe’s security architecture. Consequently, Moldova’s territorial integrity continues to remain hostage to global processes, with a final resolution of the conflict deferred to an indefinite future.