“The New Gospel” from the EU for the Moldovan Voter

Sergiu Ceban

Brussels and the ruling party are trying to integrate the Church into the European integration agenda, minimize the influence of the Moscow Patriarchy, and at the same time expand PAS’s electoral horizons.

Political competition in Moldova is gradually moving beyond traditional campaign promises and street-level conversations with voters. The arsenal of tools for electoral influence is expanding, and in addition to intensive media campaigns, participants in the election race are beginning to appeal to the most sensitive layers of public consciousness. One of these is religion – a factor that has always been present in Moldovan politics but is now taking on new forms and dimensions. This concerns the ruling party’s decision to play the spiritual card, with the support of European partners. Notably, European officials are personally involved in the launched campaign, which appears to be an attempt not only to neutralize the influence of pro-Russian church structures but also to integrate the religious theme into the European integration project. In recent years, sociological studies in the country have recorded the church’s stable position, as it remains the institution with the highest level of public trust. In a country where society is divided along ethnic, linguistic, and geopolitical lines, the church is perceived as a symbol of stability and the “final authority.” For many believers, attending church is not only a religious act but also a form of social expression – a way to strengthen their connection to national identity and foster a sense of community amid division. Politicians, well aware of this phenomenon, increasingly aim either to secure the support of the clergy or, conversely, to limit its political influence. In the current campaign, both approaches have come to the forefront. We see both the active involvement of clergy in public and political life and an unprecedented interest from European representatives in Moldovan church affairs. The Central Electoral Commission has already noted instances of clergy participating in campaigning. Formally, this is illegal; however, in practice, it is extremely difficult to control – sermons in church are not easily interpreted as political activity. The ruling party and its European partners understand that it is impossible to prohibit religious figures from engaging in politics. Consequently, the only way is to take control of the agenda and demonstrate that support for European integration does not contradict Christian doctrines. Here, the recent visit to Moldova by European Commissioner for Enlargement, Marta Kos, appears highly symbolic. During her trip, she met with two metropolitans – Vladimir (Moldovan Metropolis, under Moscow’s jurisdiction) and Petru (Bessarabian Metropolis, affiliated with the Patriarchate of Romania). Judging by appearances, the meeting was primarily intended to hear both sides and establish a stable channel of communication. Kos’s official statements were extremely soft, containing appeals to unity, references to roots and traditions, and assurances that the EU does not threaten the spiritual life of Moldovans. However, the very fact that an EU official appeared in this field leaves no doubt that Brussels realizes: without working with the Church, it will be difficult to “sell” the idea of European integration to a significant part of our society. All this looks like an attempt to dispel the main fear among our believers – that Europe will erode the traditional foundations of the Moldovan people. In addition, it cannot be ruled out that Brussels has decided to try its hand as an arbiter in the long-standing dispute between the two branches of Orthodoxy in Moldova, each of which has long since turned into an independent political actor. The first continues to maintain loyalty to Moscow: Metropolitan Vladimir travels to Russia, some priests broadcast pro-Russian messages, and direct campaigning for the opposition can be heard in churches. The second, meanwhile, actively supports the course of European integration and has in fact become an ally of the current authorities. In return, the authorities facilitate attempts to transfer individual parishes from one Metropolis to another, which periodically results in localized conflicts. Given the strong external influence on the Moldovan Metropolis, it is quite clear that for the ruling party the presence of an ally such as the Bessarabian Metropolis is extremely important. This makes it possible to at least partially neutralize the influence of the Moscow Patriarchy, especially in rural areas, where parishioners are traditionally conservative and skeptical toward the EU. It is precisely against the backdrop of this dilemma that Kos’s visit fits into the electoral strategy of Chisinau and Brussels, which is framed as “European spiritual diplomacy.” In this sense, the Commissioner’s words about providing “the right information” for believers sounded almost missionary. The statement that “this information will help make a decision for the good of the country” was hardly accidental, as it can in fact be interpreted as an attempt to embed the European project into the religious worldview of the average Moldovan, presenting European integration not as a threat but almost as part of the system of spiritual values. Within this logic, integration into the European Union becomes something like a “new Gospel” that brings “true knowledge,” and the task of the faithful is simply to accept it and not resist. In parallel with Kos’s visit, Maia Sandu’s trip to the Vatican, where she met with the Pope, also drew considerable attention. From a PR perspective, such a move is understandable – the head of state visited one of the most influential spiritual leaders in the world. Moreover, this fully fits into PAS’s broader strategy of expanding its electoral base by attracting the sympathies of the Catholic community and demonstrating to the diaspora that the president is actively integrating Moldova into the global spiritual community. However, this episode also has obvious limitations. Moldova, as is well known, is a predominantly Orthodox country. For this reason, for the majority of deeply religious Orthodox believers, such a meeting with the Pope is likely to be perceived more as self-promotion than as a factor of Moldova’s spiritual unification, especially against the backdrop of division and conflict between the two Metropolises. Apparently, in PAS’s electoral plan, the religious bloc appears as one of the elements of the “mandatory program.” After the stages related to the economy, social policy, and European reforms, the time has come to turn to the spiritual sphere. From a political technology perspective, this is justified, because to ignore the Church in Moldova means to deliberately lose votes. Whatever personal attitude politicians may have toward religion or a particular Metropolis, the campaign cannot do without an appeal to traditional church narratives. However, excessive interference in spiritual life may also produce the opposite effect. Even the most attentive concern shown by European envoys for the needs of the Moldovan Church may be perceived by some parishioners as external pressure and an attempt to subordinate the Church to Brussels’ political interests. For the Moldovan voter, especially in rural areas, such a dilemma is far from simple. On the one hand, the familiar priest may directly or indirectly suggest that only Russia can guarantee the protection of traditional values. On the other hand, European officials insist that the Orthodox faith and European integration are fully compatible. Under such conditions, the Church can easily turn into an arena of political struggle, and believers into an object of electoral influence. The story of Kos’s visit and Sandu’s trip to the Pope shows that religious issues are part of PAS’s broader electoral script. Brussels and the ruling party are trying to embed the Church into the European integration agenda, minimize the influence of the Moscow Patriarchate, and at the same time expand PAS’s electoral horizons. However, the risks are also evident, since any careless word or overly explicit interference may provoke a backlash and further strengthen Euroscepticism among the conservative part of the electorate. However, in the already challenging context, our authorities have decided that this risky step is unavoidable and are actively bringing the so-called “spiritual front” into the electoral campaign. Within its framework, not only parties and politicians clash, but far more serious and fundamental issues as well: different civilizational projects offered by Moscow and Brussels, traditional faith, and modernized European Christianity. And most importantly, no one harbors illusions that there are people within the ruling party ready to engage in such a serious discussion and truly reflect on the country’s spiritual prospects.