On the Final Stretch of the Parliamentary Race

Some notes on the final stretch before Sunday’s vote – in comments from RTA experts Anton ŠVEC, RTA: An intriguing feature of the upcoming elections is the record level of vainness of sociology, both in shaping and in forecasting terms. The function of opinion polls as a tool for managing public sentiment “is faltering” due to public distrust of figures commissioned by biased clients. The accuracy of forecasts is particularly weak given that polls do not cover the diaspora or the population of Transnistria, and also due to the unprecedented number of undecided voters who still intend to turn out on election day. On the one hand, the inapplicability of sociology, especially given the impossibility of conducting exit polls, opens the door for falsifications and the outright theft of the vote by the ruling party. All conditions have been created for large-scale ballot stuffing among the diaspora, the use of administrative resources, and the physical restriction of participation by residents of the Transnistrian region. If PAS manages to retain its single-party majority in parliament, it will mean only one thing: the regime succeeded in stealing far more than the 5-10% of votes that constitute the conventional “administrative surplus” in Eastern Europe. In this sense, analyzing the distribution of diaspora votes will be an intriguing exercise, as the authorities are unlikely to show restraint. A more subtle approach would be to stuff ballots abroad not only in favor of PAS, but also for Renato Usatii’s “Our Party”, the most likely coalition partner, or for so-called “tactical voting”. Yet this scenario seems improbable; more likely, the authorities will act according to the principle: “I won’t shortchange myself – Western observers will write it off anyway”. The diaspora vote could indeed become the decisive factor, legitimizing any excesses, even in the absence of irrefutable evidence, and perhaps even despite it. It is also intriguing to gauge to what extent the authorities will restrict voting by Transnistrians. By all indications, the number of those willing to vote will be much lower than in previous elections, not to mention how many will actually manage to “make it” to the right bank on Sunday, especially given that polling stations for them are being relocated deeper into the country. On the other hand, the local crisis in polling data directly hints at possible surprises in the election results. Two political forces could emerge as “dark horses”. First, Victoria Furtuna’s Greater Moldova party could potentially enter parliament with 5-6 seats if it manages to mobilize a substantial portion of voters from the barred Victory bloc and other projects affiliated with Ilan Sor. Second, the Alternativa bloc should, by default, win more seats than current polls suggest. Indeed, Alexandru Stoianoglo’s potential has not been fully leveraged by the bloc, but the 750,000 votes he received in the second round of the presidential election could not simply vanish into an unidentifiable pro-European segment of the electorate. There is a sense that, assuming a relatively honest vote count, the Alternativa bloc could hold the “golden share” in terms of forming a future parliamentary coalition. However, the bloc’s internal structure may crack due to sharply diverging views on the limits of acceptable political cooperation. However, the baseline scenario assumes that the parliamentary elections will serve as a prologue to a political crisis, driven by numerous falsifications and violations through, for example, a judiciary controlled by the authorities. Anything is possible here, including the disqualification of favorites before or after September 28, recall the Heart of Moldova and the Patriotic Bloc in general, or the annulment of the voting results if PAS finds them unsatisfactory. The likelihood of entering a new round of political struggle, now with an increased number of variables, Filat, Plahotniuc, Costenco, and even the unionists, is certainly no lower than it was a decade and a half ago, on the eve of the “social media revolution” that toppled the communist administration. Sergiu CEBAN, RTA: The final stretch of the parliamentary campaign has predictably been packed with events and contradictory moves by the ruling party. As election day approaches, the nervousness and tension within the government ranks become increasingly evident. Consequently, it is forced to improvise and make hasty decisions, rendering the electoral agenda progressively more chaotic. The original scenario devised by the PAS headquarters apparently envisioned a spectacular finale to the election campaign, with the centerpiece being a “political play” surrounding the extradition of Vladimir Plahotniuc – a prominent symbol of the country’s oligarchic era. This move was intended to demonstrate strength and resolve, while highlighting the unique ability to achieve results where predecessors had failed. However, the carefully crafted plan ran into harsh reality. Instead of sending a focused signal, the authorities launched a series of divergent initiatives that, most likely, not only failed to strengthen their position but also created a sense of chaos. The “Plahotniuc effect” was diluted, and the response from a significant portion of voters was cautious. One of the most notable measures taken by PAS was the decision to effectively “split off” one of the participants from the Patriotic Bloc – the party Heart of Moldova. This maneuver can be viewed not only in terms of a straightforward logic aimed at weakening competitors, but also as an indicator that PAS’ internal polling detects a significant rise in the opposition bloc’s rating, which already poses a serious threat to its electoral prospects. Another contentious move was yesterday’s decision regarding polling stations for residents of the Transnistrian region. Literally a day before the end of the campaign, measures were taken to relocate nearly half of these stations farther away from the administrative demarcation line. This objectively complicates access to the voting process for citizens living on the left bank of the Dniester. The official explanation emphasizes security concerns, but the true intent is almost universally understood – to deliberately cut off left-bank voters. Such poorly considered actions, lacking a convincing argumentative basis or justification, naturally provoke irritation among a significant portion of society, which has traditionally viewed abrupt maneuvers by the authorities at the end of a campaign negatively. Especially since these moves reveal a clear attempt to administratively tilt the situation in their favor. Less than two days before the start of voting, three potential scenarios can be outlined. The most realistic scenario appears to be a fragmented parliament, comprising four to five parties and blocs without a decisive majority. In this case, coalition formation would become a long and painful process, gradually pushing the country toward new snap elections. The second scenario envisions a coalition involving PAS and one of the political forces, requiring some compromises from the ruling party but allowing the current course to continue with minor personnel adjustments. The third, least likely scenario involves an opposition comeback and the formation of a nationally oriented coalition. In this case, Moldova’s political landscape could change dramatically. It is also worth noting that the ruling group still retains a set of “covert” options, involving measures on the edge of legitimacy and limited legality. These may include both legal experiments and the maximal use of administrative levers. The implementation of such measures will largely depend on the stance of external actors, primarily the EU and the US, as well as the willingness of Moldovan society to voice its protest against obvious attempts at usurping power. Christian RUSSU, RTA: One of the tensest election campaigns of the past decade is drawing to a close. Its intensity stems not from a so-called “historic moment”, as proclaimed by the regime’s heralds, but from PAS’ sheer fear of losing power. In recent weeks, extreme nervousness has been observed within PAS’ camp, manifesting both in public statements and measures against opposition politicians. One might logically expect that speeches by parliamentary candidates from the ruling party and by Maia Sandu herself would convey to voters a sense of unity and determination to win. Supporters of PAS may indeed perceive their leaders’ addresses in this way. However, for external observers and the majority of citizens, these speeches come across as signs of uncertainty. Excessive emphasis on external threats, a focus on negativity, and the identification and condemnation of “enemies” among their own citizens provoke irritation and a desire to bring the unfolding drama of the 2025 parliamentary elections to a swift conclusion. Much has already been said about how radically the rhetoric of PAS leaders has changed compared to the campaign four years ago. Back then, unifying slogans and promises of “better times” harmonized organically with the party’s name – Action and Solidarity. Today, however, “action” is perceived as pressure on dissenters, while “solidarity” is seen as a demand for unconditional obedience. Just as these lines are being written, reports have emerged about restrictions on the activity of Irina Vlah’s party Heart of Moldova and yet another step to limit residents of the country’s eastern districts from accessing polling stations. Signs that the authorities were preparing a strike against the main competitor, the Patriotic Bloc, became apparent when Poland joined Latvia’s and Lithuania’s sanctions against Irina Vlah. Lawyers, including the well-known Fadei Nagacevschi, attempted to challenge the Chisinau Court of Appeal’s decision to restrict Vlah’s party in the Constitutional Court, but to no avail. Now the Central Electoral Commission is forced to act as executioner: either disqualify the entire bloc or demand replacement of the lists without Vlah’s participation. And all this happens in the final stretch of the campaign, when ballots have already been printed. For former human rights activist from Promo-LEX, Pavel Postica, who tried to play the role of an “honest arbiter”, this has become a symbolic turning point in his career. It is also noteworthy that the ruling authorities continue to ignore the opinions of citizens from the Left Bank. The shift from a strategy of maximizing their involvement in the national political process to a policy of isolation began several years ago, when the “Cyprus scenario” ceased to be perceived in Brussels as unacceptable. This path suits the current regime, even if it comes at the expense of the country’s interests. Meanwhile, Tiraspol receives another reason on the impossibility of coexisting within a single state. Another notable feature of this campaign from PAS has been not only the division and polarization of society but also a split within the party itself. Radical measures and authoritarian leadership methods have alienated a significant portion of the population and disappointed many supporters, as they merely masked the party’s previously ugly practices – pervasive corruption and “cronyism”. Yet the ruling party does have one undeniable “achievement”: once again, elections in our small country have become an arena for geopolitical confrontation among key regional actors. Therefore, regardless of the voting outcome, one should not expect calm or stability in the near future.