Opinion: The Ruling Regime Faces a Steady Decline in Foreign Support

Foreign partners of Maia Sandu’s team, primarily Brussels, have secured the preservation of the PAS regime for the next three years, but their support is likely to weaken significantly due to major internal problems

PAS has secured a parliamentary majority and is now taking steps toward the final consolidation and full capture of power within the country. This process is aided by a carte blanche from the Western community, which has been eagerly praising the regime for its seemingly convincing election results (regardless of how exactly they were achieved) and for its so-called “victory over Russia”. In the near term, the ruling party will focus on domestic priorities – the complete dismantling of the Gagauz autonomy, strengthening its influence over the capital (including the possible removal of the current primar), distributing ministerial and departmental portfolios, managing financial schemes and resources, and attempting to increase the number of controlled parliamentary seats with the aim of achieving a constitutional majority. PAS now possesses ample time for exercising an absolutist, unchecked form of power to implement its governing program and advance the personal goals of its functionaries, given that central institutions are fully under its control and that three full years remain before the end of Maia Sandu’s presidential term. In theory, the current regime could also focus on normalizing the country’s economic life, improving citizens’ social welfare, and reviving certain sectors that have been neglected for years. However, due to their complexity, such tasks have never been a priority, even during the so-called “good times”. The security and functionality of Moldova’s power structure, as well as its ability to address domestic issues, now depend entirely on the external environment. PAS, having accumulated debts to finance its electoral campaign and cover budgetary gaps, is counting on the continued availability of donor and credit resources, as well as on informational and diplomatic support that diverts attention from its repressive, inefficient, and not always constitutional methods of governance. And along this perimeter Chisinau may face certain disappointments that will be difficult to avoid. Since the beginning of the year, Washington has lost its strategic interest in Moldova, reduced funding and support programs, has been in no hurry to appoint an ambassador, and remains deeply immersed in high-intensity conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. It is generally believed that Moldova has shifted its orientation toward Paris, London, and Brussels (in addition to its traditional ally in Bucharest), relying on these capitals for financial support and political legitimacy. However, the situation in the countries that “oversee” Moldova remains extremely unstable. This is particularly true of France and the United Kingdom, with which Moldova is bound by agreements on military and intelligence cooperation that bear clear features of direct external control. By the end of September, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer of the Labor Party had recorded the lowest public approval rating in the history of polling: only 13% of respondents expressed satisfaction with his government’s performance, while 79% disapproved – a negative balance of 66 points. For comparison, his predecessor Rishi Sunak left office amid a disapproval rating of 59 points. The situation is hardly better for Emmanuel Macron, who has long relied on questionable political tactics to preserve his course despite the will of the majority. On Monday, France’s Prime Minister Sebastien Lecornu, one of Macron’s closest allies, submitted his resignation after less than a month in office, having failed to secure a vote of confidence for the new cabinet in parliament. Paris now faces the real prospect of a constitutional crisis and early elections to the National Assembly, as Macron’s minority party struggles to reach agreements with representatives of either the right or left. The president’s domestic maneuvering and failed foreign policy strategy are provoking growing public resentment, manifesting in protests that increasingly require harsh police measures to suppress. In Germany, the economic engine of the European Union and Moldova’s main financial donor, the ruling parties continue to show dismal results in regional elections, while Chancellor Friedrich Merz maintains a record-low approval rating. The ongoing industrial and economic crisis, driven by soaring raw material costs and the ever-growing expenses of supporting migrants and financing military aid to Ukraine, has become an additional headache for the federal government, further narrowing its room for an active foreign policy. Brussels remains the main pillar of support for PAS, promoting the overarching narrative of Moldova’s imminent accession to the European Union, without which the inefficient and increasingly undemocratic rule of Maia Sandu’s team would lose its very rationale. Yet even here, challenges and inconsistencies persist. Hungary and Slovakia have already diverged from the EU’s mainstream course, openly criticizing Brussels and Kyiv, and they may soon be joined by the Czech Republic, where the weekend elections were won by the party of Eurosceptic billionaire Andrej Babis. Meanwhile, both left- and right-wing factions in the European Parliament have initiated discussions on a vote of no confidence against the current European Commission led by Ursula von der Leyen. The “EU government” will, predictably, survive Thursday’s vote, yet the ideological and strategic gulf between the needs of national states (and the peoples of Europe) and the interests of the European bureaucracy will inevitably continue to widen, regularly manifesting in conflicts and obstruction of specific decisions. This dynamic could also affect Moldova, whose accession bid may encounter difficulties due to its linkage with Ukraine’s EU membership process and the unanimity principle required for decision-making. Nicusor Dan and Ilie Bolojan have also been unable so far to stabilize the situation in Romania, that reflects the aftermath of costly electoral campaigns and a series of missteps in managing EU funds. For now, the ruling coalition has managed to prevent a social crisis and the expansion of protest movements; however, Bucharest’s budgetary and financial position remains precariously close to EU sanctions, prompting further spending cuts and growing concern. Both the President and Prime Minister of Romania are finding it increasingly difficult to justify their economic policies to the public and even to employees within the public administration, raising the risk of the majority coalition’s collapse as early as next year. One of the factors fueling pressure on Romania’s leadership is the continued financial and political support extended to Moldova and Ukraine. Thus, PAS currently holds a carte blanche, along with time and ambition, to shake up the domestic political landscape once again, consolidate the right-wing authoritarian trend, and centralize governance in Moldova. The only unclear question is which of the foreign donors will continue to foot the bill for simulated reforms and provide “clumsy assistance” for the republic over the next three to four years. Moreover, Chisinau has yet to fully grasp what Brussels, now focused on military-strategic containment of Russia, may demand from PAS in the medium term.