A Point of No Return: Chisinau-Moscow Relations at a Breaking Point

Restoring fully fledged bilateral relations while Moldova maintains its current political course and the prevailing negative perception of Russia appears virtually impossible

Relations between Moldova and Russia are today experiencing, without exaggeration, the deepest crisis of the entire post-Soviet period. Both Chisinau and Moscow share an understanding that ties have reached a historic low, with virtually no visible prerequisites for improvement in the foreseeable future. Moreover, the combination of political, military, humanitarian, and ideological factors suggests that the current trends will continue to deepen, taking on an increasingly irreversible character. In this regard, recent statements by Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin are particularly telling, as they have publicly marked relations as having reached their “lowest point” since 1992. At the same time, Moscow openly accuses Moldova’s leadership of dismantling all formats of cooperation, as well as economic, humanitarian, and political ties. That said, Russia still appears unwilling to acknowledge that this state of affairs is also, at least in part, the result of its own long-standing failed policy toward Moldova. Official Chisinau has long either ignored rhetoric coming from Russian officials or framed it as part of political pressure. At the same time, Russian statements are by no means unfounded: this is not about one or two isolated episodes, but about the cumulative effect of decisions taken by the Moldovan authorities over the past decade as part of a strategic foreign-policy pivot toward the West. Undoubtedly, the decisive factor that accelerated the rupture was the war in Ukraine. For Moldova, located in immediate proximity to the combat zone and possessing a vulnerable security system, this protracted conflict has become one of the most acute challenges in its entire modern history. The increasingly frequent discovery of strike drones on our territory, even if only as a spillover effect of the war, is being perceived with growing anxiety. Even if one assumes the absence of deliberate intent, the very risk of tragic consequences, loss of life or damage to infrastructure, essentially makes a return to the previous model of Moldovan-Russian relations impossible, a model that had been marked by cold but pragmatic coexistence. Regrettably, in the public consciousness of a significant share of Moldova’s population, Russia is increasingly associated not with a historical partner, but with a source of instability and danger. The system of “filters” put in place in recent years by Moldova’s border and security services and applied to Russian nationals, which has already prompted the Russian Foreign Ministry to recently advise its citizens to take into account the heightened risks and, where possible, refrain from traveling to our republic, stands out as one of the clearest indicators of serious political cooling. As a rule, such measures tend to serve as a precursor to the introduction of a visa regime between countries. Moreover, as we have noted before, as negotiations with the European Union progress, Chisinau will, one way or another, be forced to erect a “migration wall” with the Russian Federation. Judging by the latest reports, there will be no shortage of irritants in bilateral relations this year. In this regard, the intensified activity of security services on both sides deserves particular attention. The ongoing detentions in Russia of Moldovan citizens accused of acting in the interests of Moldovan intelligence agencies likewise point to an extremely low level of mutual trust and indicate the presence of a latent confrontation manifested through covert operations. Historically, this kind of “shadow war” marks the crossing of a line beyond which the parties no longer view one another as partners, but instead operate according to the logic of confrontation and counteraction. Another potential hotbed of tensions in the near future is likely to be the situation surrounding Lukoil-Moldova. The company’s refusal to transfer the assets it operates to the state, combined with mounting pressure from the authorities, is creating the preconditions for a potentially hard-line scenario. Such steps, even if legally justified under Moldovan law, will inevitably be perceived in Moscow as hostile. As a result, what at first glance appears to be a purely economic dispute linked to U.S. sanctions policy is likely to become part of the dismantling of Moldovan-Russian relations. The expected shutdown by mid-year of the Russian representation engaged in cultural and educational projects also appears to be a symbolic endpoint in the process of interstate rupture. Humanitarian cooperation has traditionally served as an important bridge, preserving intersocietal ties even during periods of acute crisis. The final elimination of this structure would signify not only a rejection of the very idea of dialogue in the spheres of culture, history, and education, but also the destruction of the broader socio-cultural bond linking the two countries, including human connections, institutional contacts, and a shared space of memory. Therefore, Maia Sandu’s statements about adopting Poland’s experience in combating Russian propaganda and shaping a corresponding historical policy point to an impending intensification of anti-Russian ideological stances. As is well known, the Polish-Baltic model of representing Russia’s historical role places exclusive emphasis on traumatic experiences, occupation, and resistance. Applying such an approach in Moldova would mean not merely an attempt at an objective re-evaluation of the past, but the formation of a new national narrative in which Russia occupies a predominantly negative position. Based on the experience of Eastern European countries, such processes are almost irreversible and have a long-term impact on public sentiment and state policy. Another expressive signal was the announced launch of Moldova’s procedure to withdraw from the CIS. For Moscow, the practical implications matter less than the political-symbolic meaning of what is happening. Even in its weakened form, the CIS remained a geopolitical framework that linked post-Soviet territories within a single system of coordinates. Therefore, our country’s withdrawal will be perceived not merely as a diplomatic move. For Moldova, this represents a direct path toward a final break with the historical and civilizational space in which it has existed for more than two centuries. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that such a move, as history shows, rarely unfolds without pain and is often accompanied by internal and external shocks. After all, a metropolitan power rarely parts so easily with a part of its traditional geopolitical sphere of influence. Therefore, to some extent, the ongoing transformation of the global and with it the regional context could theoretically still introduce adjustments to the delineation between Moldova and Russia. The inevitable restructuring of Europe’s security architecture, the possible freezing of the conflict in Ukraine, and a change of our political elites – all of this together could influence the trajectory of these events, which are, in their scale, almost historical. However, under the current circumstances, Chisinau and Moscow have already passed the point of no return. Restoring full-fledged bilateral relations while Moldova maintains its current course and the prevailing negative perception of Russia appears virtually impossible. Any attempt to return even to a minimal level of trust would require significant political concessions, mutual acknowledgment of mistakes, and a change in political optics. There are no conditions for this right now. In the foreseeable future, the dismantling of the remaining elements of cooperation between Chisinau and Moscow is likely to continue, giving way to confrontation and further distancing.