Moldova Between Geopolitical Heavyweights

The confrontation between Brussels and Moscow over Moldova is approaching a boiling point and is being fueled by the aggressive political line of the PAS party

Geopolitical competition around Moldova has intensified over the past few weeks. Each actor that views the region as part of its historical sphere of influence is laying its cards on the table. Even the United States, which under the Donald Trump administration has shown only limited interest in Moldova, has unexpectedly announced the nomination of a new ambassador that has remained vacant since May 2024. The nominee is Joseph Mark Burkhalter, previously engaged in politics, real estate, and law, primarily in the state of Georgia. The government quickly responded with a reciprocal gesture, announcing on Wednesday the preparation of land on the site of the former Republican Stadium for the construction of a new U.S. embassy complex. An increased American presence in Moldovan affairs is highly necessary for PAS as a balancing factor against one-sided ties with Euro-bureaucracy and as an additional element of deterrence against Russia. However, it is Moscow and Brussels that have been the first to step up their activity. The Kremlin invited a delegation of Moldova’s parliamentary opposition to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, with former President Igor Dodon as its main speaker. He traditionally stated that in order to restore trade and energy cooperation with Russia and reduce pressure on the Transnistrian region, a change of government is necessary in Moldova. He also expressed support for the peacekeeping mission, distinguishing it from the operational group of Russian troops, which, in his view, should be withdrawn. According to Igor Dodon, Moldova’s withdrawal from the CIS, encouraged by PAS, will lead to economic difficulties. The Russian ambassador to Chisinau, Oleg Ozerov, who was present at the forum, stated bluntly that withdrawal from the CIS foundational documents would lead to the termination of agreements on the free trade zone and the preferential regime for Moldovan labor migrants. In other words, the coordinated message was intended to reach the widest possible audience. The overall framework of confrontation is similar to Russia’s tough stance toward Armenia, which was explicitly told that membership in the Eurasian Economic Union is incompatible with a parallel course toward integration into the European Union. In addition, the Kremlin has taken a rather firm position regarding drone overflights of Moldovan territory and the incident involving a drone crashing onto the roof of a house in Galati, Romania. Russia is signaling that pro-Ukrainian rhetoric and the military-logistical support provided to Kyiv by Chisinau and Bucharest will lead to increased security risks for these countries. Russia has also taken an active approach to the Transnistrian file. President Vladimir Putin issued a decree introducing a simplified procedure for acquiring citizenship for residents of Transnistria, effectively enabling large-scale passportization of the local population regardless of whether they hold other national documents. It is reported that around 40,000 applications have already been submitted (according to Ozerov, “mostly from young and middle-aged citizens”), which came as an unpleasant surprise to the Moldovan leadership, which has failed to formulate a clear crisis-management plan and has instead responded with rather flippant remarks in the media. Meanwhile, the so-called “foreign minister” of the Transnistrian region, Vitaly Ignatiev, has already requested the opening of a “Russian House” there, as a counterbalance to the one that is set to be closed in Chisinau this summer. Ambassador Oleg Ozerov also recently visited Comrat, where he met with the region’s elites and outlined concrete plans of support amid Chisinau’s perceived attack on the status and powers of Gagauzia. The situation is entering a phase of decisive confrontation, which Moscow and Comrat are likely to lose. However, Russia’s positions on the left bank of the Dniester remain extremely strong and, judging by a number of public events, including the May 9 celebrations and Vadim Krasnoselsky’s initiative to mark days of remembrance of the beginning of the fascist occupation in all localities, are being further consolidated. Brussels, for its part, is not standing still. The main spokesperson in this regard has been Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos, who awarded Moldova a rather condescending (though, from the perspective of Brussels’ high-handedness, complimentary) title of “its best student”. She has pledged to secure the opening of negotiations on the first cluster within the current month. And last night, the Cypriot presidency of the Council of the EU confirmed these plans regarding Moldova and Ukraine. Overall, from Kos’ statements it is clear that the European Commission will remain a strong advocate of Moldova’s membership, while resistance will have to be overcome at the level of national states, including Germany, where Chancellor Friedrich Merz has proposed certain accession options for Kyiv and Chisinau involving a limited set of powers and reduced access to funding. The EU is also paying attention to the Transnistrian issue – Marta Kos, perhaps for the first time, clearly ruled out a “Cyprus scenario” (i.e. Moldova joining the Union without the Transnistrian territory, at least at the initial stage), stating that such an option is not being considered at all. Moreover, she has hardened her rhetoric regarding the enclave, explicitly praising Chisinau’s actions aimed at reintegration through economic instruments. It is clear that Brussels and Moscow are not yet ready for negotiations or for a division of spheres of influence. This remains the case despite the unofficial visit to Russia by Gerhard Schröder, whom Vladimir Putin himself once described as a preferred interlocutor. As long as the trajectory of the military confrontation in Ukraine, and the hybrid one in Moldova, remains uncertain, each actor continues to bring out new cards in an effort to unsettle the opponent. PAS is not attempting to balance the situation, act as a bridge for peace negotiations, or maintain cooperative (at least trade-based) relations with all sides. On the contrary, the regime itself is raising the stakes – denouncing agreements that have defined relations for decades, introducing sanctions, participating in information warfare, and accelerating the dismantling of Gagauzia while increasing pressure on Transnistria. In effect, Chisinau has aligned itself with the EU in its confrontation with Russia. There is nothing fundamentally new in this, although as Russia’s response becomes increasingly volatile, this kind of strategy is becoming ever more dangerous. The “novelty” in this context is the playing of the “Romanian trump card”, i.e. the coordinated and artificial amplification of the “unirea” agenda by politicians on both banks of the Prut. Chisinau raises this issue because focusing on the hybrid threat from Russia, largely, in this interpretation, either provoked or constructed by PAS itself, is no longer sufficient to secure clear guarantees of EU membership within a timeframe convenient for Maia Sandu, namely by 2030. The authorities are directly signaling to Brussels that Russian aggression could soon lead to the destruction of Moldova through military means and/or to the loss of control by the ruling party as a result of hybrid political influence. PAS signals that if Brussels does not protect the ruling elites in Moldova (the same elites it helped bring to power) by integrating the country into the EU, it may turn to Bucharest for assistance. Maia Sandu is fully aware that EU membership within the next four years, with full compliance with all requirements regarding adaptation of legislation and meritocracy, as also noted by Marta Kos, is not realistically achievable. Moldova would require a separate assessment framework with an unlimited number of compromises, exemptions, and minimal transparency. Therefore, as part of the broader strategy, the “smokescreen of unirea” is being used. Such a game bears all the hallmarks of classic brinkmanship under extremely high stakes, and in this game the risk of outplaying oneself is significant, which would once again result in the erosion of Moldova’s citizens’ interests.