Moldova’s Journey Under Sandu: From Neutral Ground to “Willing” Partner

The latest meeting of the “coalition of the willing” saw Moldova and North Macedonia join for the first time – two countries with a keen interest in securing special treatment for their European ambitions

The “coalition of the willing” has met in Paris for the second time this year. According to the Ukrainian president, the next round of consultations for this grouping, which now numbers over 30 states, will take place in Kyiv. Although France and the United Kingdom first floated the initiative back in 2024 to create a coalition of countries ready to provide the organizational and financial backing for deploying their troops to Ukraine after a ceasefire, Maia Sandu is attending such an event for the first time. For our president, taking part in this forum is, above all, the usual demonstration of loyalty to the pan-European course, very much in the spirit of Moldova’s 88% alignment with EU anti-Russian sanctions. The decision was inevitable against the backdrop of the multiple scandals that have convulsed the country’s political class in recent weeks that have already triggered a government reboot. External legitimacy helps paper over PAS’ governance failures, corruption, and inability to deliver effective reforms, but it requires constant diplomatic replenishment. For Brussels, such gestures carry more weight than even the nomination of the liberal and Russophobic and therefore EU-acceptable Vasile Tofan as prime minister. The president’s trip to Paris came at an opportune moment, allowing for a radical shift of focus away from a deeply embarrassing domestic political agenda and toward a discussion of neutrality, militarization, and Moldova’s potential entanglement in the conflict surrounding Ukraine. This is geopolitical terrain on which Sandu’s team feels entirely at home. In the French capital, she called for greater support for Kyiv, particularly in air defense and economic pressure on Russia that could, in her view, deprive Moscow of the resources to wage war. Personal attendance was also necessary in the sense that Chisinau walked away from the “common table” with a pledge of 120 million euros to cover air defense needs( a modest sum compared to the 70 billion dollars promised to Kyiv at the NATO summit in Ankara by year’s end”. Notably, Moldova refrained from signing the declaration and joining the so-called “anti-ballistic coalition” formed by Ukraine and nine European countries (the United Kingdom and eight EU member states). Yet it still managed to “extract” a promise of another tranche from the European Peace Facility, a feat greatly facilitated by a suspiciously well-timed drone incident, this time in the village of Copanca. On Tuesday, the Russian ambassador was once again summoned to the Foreign Ministry and handed a note of protest. What remains absent, for now, are answers to the rational questions posed by the Russian representative, such as why the device did not detonate, or why the residents of Copanca heard no telltale sound of an engine. Chisinau has also, for now, made no statement of intent to send military peacekeepers to Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire. Moldova already participates in numerous international missions abroad and maintains a contingent of over 400 troops as part of a peacekeeping operation on its own territory. At the same time, of some interest are the military exercises near Ukraine’s neighboring countries, recently announced by Emmanuel Macron. It is highly likely that Moldova will serve as one such training ground, especially since military drills with NATO and EU countries are already a regular occurrence here. Likewise, National Army personnel take part in international exercises abroad roughly ten times a year. Should Moldova end up hosting military personnel from the “coalition of the willing” states, that would mark a new stage of entanglement in the Ukraine campaign and trigger an asymmetric response from Russia, which maintains its own contingent in the Transnistrian region. This is especially true given the country’s ongoing militarization: an expanding army, rising defense spending, and the transformation of military doctrines that now designate Russia and Transnistria as the primary security threats. Moreover, Chisinau is acquiring offensive weaponry – the German Piranha vehicles being a case in point, clearly excessive for the task of dispersing peaceful opposition protests. The fact is that the Kremlin views the formation of the “coalition of the willing” in sharply negative terms, branding it both a “coalition of yappers” and a “coalition of warmongers”. Moscow’s logic is simple: it categorically objects to the presence of NATO contingents in Ukraine, whose neutral and non-bloc status was declared one of the goals of the “special military operation”. The intention pushed by France, the United Kingdom, and Germany to deploy forces in the country neighboring ours, including in areas along the line of contact (and European states insist on a ceasefire along the current frontline), is thus seen by the Russian command as an obstacle to any agreement on halting hostilities. For as long as the “coalition of the willing” exists with its stated aims, the Kremlin is unlikely to agree to a ceasefire. Tellingly, European states appear to understand this as well, yet they persist in escalating the situation. Moldova’s involvement in the “coalition of the willing”, particularly the provision of its territory for military exercises, automatically places us in the category of Moscow’s military adversaries. Not political and diplomatic adversaries, as before, but military ones with all the consequences that follow. The negative effect of these plans is compounded by the PAS regime’s own initiated discussions about hosting drone production facilities on Moldovan soil to supply Ukraine’s needs. Such sites would become what Russia terms “legitimate targets”. After all, striking the territory of Moldova that is not a NATO member and enjoys no security guarantees under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty would be a relatively straightforward decision for Moscow, not least as an effective signal to those the Kremlin regards as “warmongers”. Maia Sandu’s flirting with the “coalition of the willing”, driven by a desire to curry favor with Brussels and thereby shore up the flagging prospects of EU membership, will absolutely not make our country any safer. The risks of escalation on such a small and unprotected territory could, almost in an instant, translate into catastrophic damage. Yet Maia Sandu, who rarely sets foot in the country she still serves as president, persistently ignores all warnings and plays her own political game, heedless of either the opinion or the genuine needs of the population. And so today, rather than returning to Moldova, she headed to Kyiv to take part in yet another international forum.