The new political crisis in Moldova which experts interpret differently has become a follow-up of the long preparations for the pre-election race, which should start in Moldova next autumn. A difficult electoral scenario that arose in the conditions of a split Moldovan society (some for rapprochement with Russia, others for integration into the EU, some for unification with Romania, others for the preservation of the Moldovan state) will be beneficial for the one who will control most of the political levers – both internal and external. Ultimately, the actual winner in the parliamentary elections will be the power that will occupy the dominant heights of the socio-political space even before the elections. It’s like Sun-Tzu wrote: “Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win.” Cancellation of the election results of the Chisinau mayor illustrates this approach.
Following the results of the June 3 elections of the mayor of the Moldovan capital, Andrei Nastase (52.08%), candidate from 3 opposition pro-European parties, outperformed the candidate from the Party of Socialists Ion Ceban (47.43%) by about 5%. But on June 19 the court decided to cancel the results of the elections with a reason that Nastase agitated on the voting day.
This provoked a new wave of protests in Chisinau: for two weeks on Sundays Nastase’s supporters have come to the center of the capital criticizing also the pro-European Democratic Party and its leader Vlad Plahotniuc, who, according to local politicians, public figures and experts, controls the country’s power (parliament, prosecutor’s office, courts and law enforcement agencies). Despite civil protests, the local CEC, referring to the court decision, still annulled the election results and completed the electoral process. The next election of the mayor will be held next year, that is, after the parliamentary elections. Until then, Ruslan Codreanu, the representative of the European People’s Party of Moldova (which has weak electoral support) will head the capital; he previously participated in negotiations with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund on receiving foreign financial assistance for the Republic of Moldova.
Meanwhile, the leaders of the opposition pro-European forces, Andrei Nastase (Dignity and Truth Platform Party) and Maia Sandu (Party of Action and Solidarity) scheduled a National Assembly of citizens from across the country and from abroad on August 26. In addition, they are going to complain to the European Parliament on “dictatorship” and “lawlessness” in Moldova.
The West (US Department of State, European External Action Service) still “expresses concern”, “closely follows the situation” and “expresses hopes for compliance with the principles of democracy.” Apparently, the EU and the US specifically use expectant tactics, although for the sake of appearance they talk tough.
Moldova has long been a field of political clash between regional and global players – the US, EU and Russia. This election year further exacerbates this struggle. Each side understands that the country is almost 50/50 split on geopolitical issues. There is even greater fragmentation observed between the main political forces.
The Democratic Party, which controls the parliament and the government, declares the European course, but its actions are closely linked to US policy in the region (anti-Russian rhetoric, cooperation with NATO, attacks on the Russian language, and so on). Against its supremacy are the oppositional pro-European Dignity and Truth Platform Party, Action and Solidarity Party and the Liberal Democratic Party. Their competitors are the Socialist Party and Our Party, which declare a course toward improving relations with Russia. The latter, in turn, are also in antagonistic relations: the leader of Our Party, Renato Usatii accuses the socialists and their leader, President Igor Dodon, in cooperation with the Democratic Party and Vlad Plahotniuc. In addition, there are small political formations that enjoy, even if micro, but nevertheless support from the electorate. All these powers are actively using the geopolitical agenda and are preparing for the upcoming parliamentary elections.
Washington, Brussels and Moscow realize that no party can get a parliamentary majority in such a polarized and confused political environment to get control over the key instruments of power. Accordingly, the coalition is inevitable, and what it will be depends on the current tactical actions.
The divide and rule principle is often used by the Democratic Party, turning its political opponents against one another. At the same time, the democrats promote their profitable initiatives by cooperating with their opponents. For example, last year, thanks to the socialists and the president Igor Dodon, the Democratic Party managed to reform the electoral system, which will provide it with additional seats in the parliament through independent candidates and administrative resources.
Moreover, Igor Dodon, who in a word is against Vlad Plahotniuc, supported the Democrats’ candidacies for key governmental posts. At the same time, the Democratic Party is being too voluntarist when things occur that can strengthen the positions of its opponents (temporary removal of the president from power, abolition of elections in Chisinau, and so on). Moreover, the Democratic Party still controls about 600 of the approximately 850 mayors in Moldova.
Senior Democrats’ leaders often visit the US and actively use foreign policy resources. Skilfully maneuvering between political forces, unionists and supporters of Moldovan statehood, and also broadcasting rhetoric about the ‘Russian threat’, the PDM manages not only to remain in power, but also to achieve loyalty of the US and the EU. Today, Washington and Brussels are more than ever interested in Moldova: the US – as a battle front against Russia, the EU – as a market and sphere of influence.
Moreover, protests against the Democratic Party in Moldova itself, as history shows, are not so much an instrument of social struggle as an outlet of social discontent.
Mass demonstrations in the Republic of Moldova began back in the summer of 2014, when Moldovan roads were blocked by farmers, embittered by the authorities’ ignoring of the problems of the agricultural sector. A year later, people went to rallies against tariff increases, and in the autumn opposition pro-Europeans, socialists and supporters of Renato Usatii emerged as a united front, setting up tent cities in the center of Chisinau and demanding resignation of the government. The culmination of civil protests was in January 2016, when the protesters broke into the parliament building, demanding cancellation of confirmation of the Democratic Party candidate, Pavel Filip, as Prime Minister.
Nevertheless, Pavel Filip heads the Cabinet today, while the opposition from the united “patriotic front” broke up into warring factions. Socialist leader Igor Dodon became president, and sometimes he criticizes the Democratic Party, but, on the contrary, cooperates with it, as in the case with the electoral system reform. His former ally, Renato Usatii, at the mention of Dodon now utters only curses, calling him “Plahotniuc’s puppet”. The right-wing European opposition, the Dignity and Truth Platform Party (DA) and the Action and Solidarity Party (PAS), use the same metaphor and their leaders call the form of government in the country “tandemocracy” of Plahotniuc and Dodon.
Since then, the protests have not subsided, but they have become less crowded. Each political force gathers a maximum of several thousand people in the central square, whereas a large mass meeting with a proactive ardent attitude is required for a serious influence on the authorities. Cancellation of the election results of the mayor became possible just because of electoral atomization: only supporters of the winning side came out for protest, the remaining citizens preferred to remain aloof, despite the cynical disregard of their rights by the authorities.
Meanwhile, in Russia, they continue to bet on Igor Dodon, despite the president’s complete lack of real powers to influence the country. Thus, the ‘pro-Russian’ head of state became a tool for the PDM in achieving its goals, ‘a scarecrow with the hand of Moscow’ and an element of the leftist opposition split.
For all three years, the West has never supported protests against the Democratic Party’s supremacy, as it was in other countries with orange scenarios. Moreover, in January 2016, the then representative of the US Department of State, Victoria Nuland, declared that the US government supported Filip, thus ensuring strengthening of the PDM positions.
It could be assumed that even now the cancellation scenario in Chisinau was agreed with Washington, whose support PDM seeks to secure. Even before the scandal, analysts claimed that the Democrats would not make sharp movements and risk the patronage of external curators. However, the cancellation of election results did happen. Beforehand (before the cancellation), its leader Vlad Plahotniuc expressed his approval of the electoral results, stating that “the voter confirmed that Moldova remains a European country”. Thus, he distanced himself from the political scandal and took the position of non-interference in the affairs of the branches of government. At the same time, it is unlikely to prove his interference in the court’s decision. Most likely, this time the Democratic Party did not coordinate its actions in Washington, but, on the contrary, took the initiative demonstrating its independence, or rather, willfulness in the domestic policy.
Apparently, now Washington is reviewing political powers in Moldova to determine future configuration of an imminent parliamentary coalition. Quite possibly, the core of this pro-Western coalition can be the current “opposition pro-Europeans”, one of whose leaders Maia Sandu previously held a high-ranking position in the World Bank. Moreover, a request for a change of elites has long been ripe in the Moldovan society that is tired of corruption.
However, most likely the democrats decided not to allow strengthening of their opponents’ positions and played in a pre-emptive manner, realizing that the West in any case will only work with those who really control the power. So, there will be no consequences, because the parliamentary elections are not far off, and it’s unlikely to take risks in Washington and Brussels, as the pro-Russian sentiments in Moldova are still weighty (as presidential and capital elections show). In early June, the US ambassador to Chisinau, James Pettit, said that regardless of the results of the parliamentary elections, Washington will support any government.