What Do Constitutional Changes in Russia Mean for Moldova and Ukraine

ANTON SHVETS Another strengthening of the top-down governance in the Russian Federation is directly related to the awareness of threats to their interests in the post-Soviet space, including in Moldova and Ukraine The “constitutional spring” in Russia turned out to be rich in a variety of plot twists and unexpected domestic political initiatives. The fragmented and populist, at first glance, manner of drafting amendments to the current Constitution of the Russian Federation did not hurt the predictable outcome - the formulation of proposals to strengthen the powers of the president and reset the deadlines for Vladimir Putin. The Federation Council has already approved the amendments proposed by the working group (to be read as – the Administration of the President of Russia). The success of popular vote for these amendments on April 22 in practical terms will mean that the incumbent head of state will be able to be in power, if he is allowed to by his state of health, over the next 16 years. At the same time, his powers in the field of foreign policy and in security issues will be significantly expanded, primarily due to the competencies previously owned by the Prime Minister. The changes which are planned to be approved by means of a nationwide plebiscite will allow Vladimir Putin to practically manually guide Russia's policy in the near abroad. Previously, many processes were somehow tied to government departments, security agencies, individual politicians, representatives of large capital and interested parties.  Particularly, government officials together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and several well-known public figures such as Sberbank’s chairman German Gref and the son of Russia’s Prosecutor General Igor Chayka dealt with the Republic of Moldova. This historically established model of relations with the CIS countries is recognized as not effective enough and will be reviewed. Now all the reins of government will be in the Presidential Administration and personally controlled by Vladimir Putin, and the status of numerous lobbyists beginning with politics and business will be carefully analyzed and reviewed. The Russian leader will take personal responsibility to form the “neighborhood belt”, which will allow the country develop in a long run without serious shocks and direct threats to border security. Recent political shifts in Ukraine have confirmed the readiness of the elite of Russia's main western neighbor to dialogue and build more stable balanced relations. The meeting of the representatives in the contact group at the level of Dmitry Kozak and the head of the office of the President of Ukraine Andriy Yermak on March 11 demonstrated a certain attitude towards a gradual decrease in tension. In Russian-Ukrainian discussions, which will be fundamentally held at the level of authorized representatives of the heads of state, key attention will soon switch from the issue of the exchange of prisoners to the issues of ceasefire, sustainable ceasefire and the restoration of economic ties. Moreover, in economic terms, it will be not so much about relations between Ukraine and unrecognized entities in the Donbas as about trade and the lifting of mutual sanctions between Russia and Ukraine. Similarly, increased attention will be paid to politics in the Moldovan direction. Moscow is categorically not satisfied with its current role, since even the fact that Moldovan government is formed by pro-Russian president Igor Dodon does not allow talking about strengthening or decisive influence of Russia on regional processes. Moreover, the domestic political situation and geopolitical context compel Igor Dodon to radically revise the doctrinal foundations of his program and choose the vector of the previous Moldovan authorities towards  NATO cooperation, the United States and the IMF, and to fulfill its obligations under the Association Agreement with the European Union. Recently, the Moldovan president spoke out against the presence of Russian troops and arms depots on the territory of the Republic of Moldova, and the Moldovan parliament, despite the emerging coalition of socialists and democrats, failed to vote for the country's status of permanent neutrality which was previously designated by the Moldovan president as reverence to Moscow and a precondition for the Transdniestrian settlement. Correction of previous miscalculations and the strengthening of instruments and channels of influence on Moldova, including through the Transdniestrian region, is an important task of the Russian government, which is undergoing a conservation process in order to preserve the country's main development path. Moldova in the very near future may feel a change in approaches and a much stronger hug of Moscow. Igor Dodon in this situation is only a temporary tool for solving the problem of maintaining the presence and canalization of efforts to consolidate in Moldova. Once it is resolved, it is not necessary to exclude substitutions and / or definitions of new key persons among the conductors of Russian interests in the republic. The time for resources consolidation and the subsequent expansion to Moldova was chosen very opportune. The United States is strengthening its own autarchy, increasingly guided by pragmatic economic interests and the maxim «Make America great again». During the election campaign, Washington will definitely not have time for a showdown in Eastern Europe and the likely victory of Donald Trump will only enforce the trend of recent years to leave regions that are not vital for the United States. The European Union, in turn, is undergoing a difficult process of reforming and stopping the consequences of Brexit and runs the risk of facing another migration crisis due to the cooling of relations with Ankara. In these conditions, Moscow expects to quickly regain the lost ground in the Moldovan and Ukrainian directions and thereby strengthen its national security by means of protecting the legacy of Vladimir Putin.