Sergiu CEBAN
There are a lot of signs that the war between Russia and Ukraine will end soon, as a result of a military or diplomatic breakthrough
A few months remain until the end of the 2024 military campaign, which may become the culmination of the military-political confrontation between Russia and Ukraine and push it into a new phase. Predicting what exactly awaits us all in 2025 is a rather thankless job. Nevertheless, it is possible to form at least an approximate idea of the further trajectory of this slaughterous conflict based on the totality of signs.
Since the beginning of the year, the Russian army has seized the initiative and confidently retains it to this day, probing almost the entire front line in search of weaknesses in the Ukrainian defense. According to experts, one of the key tactical tasks of the Russian armed forces now is to divide Ukraine’s defending forces and cut off the main supply routes of the Ukrainian armed forces.
Although no tactical or operational breakthroughs have been observed so far, the Russians’ six-month creeping advance by August is taking on rather distinct geographical shapes. Taking over the Avdiivka fortification has allowed them to build on their military success for months. In addition, Russia has purposefully repelled virtually all of Ukraine’s already small gains from the counteroffensive last year, thereby lowering the morale of its soldiers and officers.
One of the most painful things for Kyiv is the fact that its troops are unable to stabilize the front, which can be seen in the weekly reports listing lost settlements. In turn, the Ukrainian army itself has not been able to recapture a single village or town in 2024, indicating that it has no offensive capabilities at the current stage.
At the same time, some observers agree that the Russian Federation plans to take advantage of the overall weakening of its adversary and conduct one relatively large operation in the near future. The point of such an event would be to demonstrate the possibilities of a deep breakthrough and the readiness to solve political problems militarily. We cannot rule out that a successful offensive on one of the front lines could be presented as the “final nail” in Joe Biden’s failed policy on the Ukrainian issue.
One of the most likely directions of the offensive is the Zaporizhzhia oblast, as it has even more strategic and symbolic importance for Ukrainians than Donbass or Kharkiv oblast. Therefore, a successful Russian military campaign in this region may turn the tide of the war and markedly change the mood of Ukraine’s allies, who could then push Kyiv more assertively to negotiate.
At the same time, it seems that the Ukrainian armed forces will not be able to make their impactful counteroffensive push, which, presumably, was demanded by the outgoing Biden administration. The expected arrival of the first F-16s in August will not fundamentally change the situation on the front, except for the strengthening of one of the sagging areas. There is still no minimal clarity on where the squadron of new aircraft could be stationed. By the way, after news reports about the possible deployment of Ukrainian aviation on our territory, Moscow for the first time officially threatened that Moldova risked being hit by a retaliatory strike by the Russian Federation.
The period of peak diplomatic efforts in June and July, when a series of major international summits took place, was, to be honest, a failure for Ukrainian diplomacy. None of them brought the prospect of peace any closer, and all attempts to unite the globe around Ukraine initially seemed like a very bold but not particularly realistic bet. Nor did the anniversary meeting of the North Atlantic Alliance in Washington produce any encouraging signals for Kyiv.
Against this background, the change in the rhetoric of the Ukrainian leadership and the softening of the country’s public opinion towards the start of negotiations and possible territorial concessions to Russia are not surprising. The hurried trip of foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba to China is not accidental in this regard. This suggests that the neighbors are starting to balance between global centers of influence and are trying to find common ground, including with Beijing, trying to align the conditional Chinese plan with the “Zelensky formula”.
The emerging political shifts in the countries of old Europe, as well as Biden’s withdrawal from the electoral race, have provided ground for public debate, consultations, and numerous peace projects popping up in the press. Of course, much of it is needed to monitor reactions in belligerent capitals, and to draw red lines for a future White House administration. The fact that Donald Trump’s party associates have early on begun formulating plans that don’t quite match his personal views on the Russia-Ukraine conflict hints that Trump, if elected, will face serious intra-party resistance before offering anything tangible to Moscow and Kyiv.
The general uncertainty that is gradually permeating the Ukrainian government’s backstage is aggravated by internal factors. We are talking about systematic attempts to provoke a parliamentary crisis in order to make it more difficult for the President’s Office to adopt certain legislative decisions. The most experienced opposition forces see some confusion of the ruling groups, trying to force them to negotiate and thus incorporate themselves into the system of state governance.
The economic climate in Ukraine is not encouraging either. Quite recently, Fitch downgraded the country’s long-term foreign currency default ratings. Last week, Kyiv agreed with a committee of bondholders to restructure part of its domestic debt. But the international agency still qualifies this situation as, in fact, a technical default, believing that a compromise with creditors was possible thanks to strong political involvement. Another pessimistic factor is the decision of the US Special Representative for Ukraine's Economic Recovery, Penny Pritzker, to step down from her post in a month.
Based on what the parties to the conflict publicly voice as their desires, one would think that neither Kyiv nor Moscow are ready to negotiate at the current stage. Russia presented its conditions through Putin back in June, and in case of significant gains on the front line, they are likely to be even more demanding. Nevertheless, a trend is slowly changing, one way or another, and the ground for new developments is definitely being laid right now.
The confrontation between Kyiv and Moscow will sooner or later enter the path of settlement, and the war will end with agreements that will predetermine the fate not only of Ukraine, but also of our entire region. Of course, Chisinau is closely watching where the center of gravity of the post-Soviet geopolitics will eventually be located, since this is what determines both the process of European integration and the prospects for resolving the Transnistrian conflict.