Sergiu CEBAN
Despite the fact that the prospects for negotiations to end the war in Ukraine seem to have receded since the start of fighting in the Kursk oblast, the current events are in fact the final preparatory phase to get them started
Two weeks have already passed since Ukrainian forces entered the territory of the Kursk oblast and immediately seized several dozen small settlements and the city of Suja, district center. The initially quite high pace of the offensive has gradually slowed down, but, if we are to believe the daily reports from Kyiv, the bridgehead continues to expand. At the same time, Russia’s attempts to localize the hotbed and halt the advancement of Ukrainian armed forces have failed so far.
As of today, the Ukrainian command has hurled all efforts into suppressing the resistance of the Russian army, as well as increasing the zone of control by disrupting logistics and disengaging Russian defense units. This expeditionary sortie is probably just a first or diversionary strike, and in the future Ukraine will try to attack other sections of the Russian-Ukrainian border in the Bryansk and Belgorod oblasts.
Whatever Kyiv’s plans, it is obvious that henceforth the entire border between the two states has become a single frontline, which will force everyone to seek mobilization resources and stretch the available forces and means. Hypothetically, in a prolonged confrontation, Moscow has the resource advantage. But the Ukrainian authorities are apparently placing their main bet on the fact that the Kremlin is not ready for a protracted conflict and is determined to resolve everything through negotiations as soon as possible.
Military experts still do not fully understand the strategic goals of the AFU’s offensive breakthrough into Russian territory, while political analysts could see the general outline of this extraordinary venture plotted to change the persistently negative political and media trend about “a weakening Ukraine doomed to be defeated”. Also, such a rapid breakthrough into Russian territory can be construed as an attempt at internal destabilization in Russia, the Kremlin and Russian society amid hopes that new discontent will force Moscow to moderate its demands. The “Kursk operation” is expected to soften Russian positions recently outlined by Vladimir Putin, which can explain the official statements of Ukraine about the desire to reinforce its negotiating basis.
Moreover, one cannot rule out attempts by the Ukrainian leadership to strengthen its position in the dialogue with Washington and to demonstrate to the new American administration that, despite all the challenges, Ukraine is still strong and capable not only of effective defense, but also of promptly attacking the “old” territories of the Russian Federation. It is clear that the main purpose of the invasion of the Russian Federation was not to solve military-political tasks but to implement a broad political and propaganda maneuver.
By the way, Ukraine’s critics, who try to look at the entire frontline picture as a whole, continue to claim that the situation is not in Kyiv’s favor, especially in the main areas of contact. In particular, we are talking about the Pokrovsk area, where Russian troops are seizing Ukrainian settlements on a daily basis and are already 10 kilometers away from Pokrovsk, the key logistics center of south-western Donbas and the only town where Ukraine is still mining coking coal for its metallurgical industry.
Meanwhile, attempts to reverse the negative trends were also made on the internal perimeter. To overcome the political crisis, the President’s office was seemingly forced to strike a compromise with the opposition forces. The Verkhovna Rada resumed its activities with adopting a law actually leading to the banning of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (as previously demanded by Petro Poroshenko’s political faction).
Agreements with opposition forces reveal a serious parliamentary problem for the Ukrainian president, who can no longer rely solely on the Servant of the People party. The process of passing laws has become much more complicated, and the necessary decisions are no longer pushed through as in previous years, a sign that the presidential vertical is weakening. As a result, Zelensky’s team has to reckon with other parliamentary groups and engage in rather unpleasant political bargaining with them.
At the same time, Ukraine’s financial and economic indicators continue to cause concern after the international agency Fitch downgraded the country’s credit rating from ‘C’, which means imminent default, to ‘RD’, which means limited default. The S&P agency did the same. The decision was explained by Kyiv’s plans to restructure its foreign loans and suspend bond payments. The $750M 2026 Eurobond was also downgraded from ‘C’ to ‘D’.
Therefore, if we abstract from the euphoria surrounding the “Kursk epic”, which, according to all military laws, will one way or another begin to fade away in a few weeks and turn into a routine story, we can see an unpleasant prospect for Kyiv. Apparently, the totality of inevitable catastrophic trends forced the Ukrainian authorities to decide to undertake such a large scale operation without clear military objectives. It is possible that, unable to reverse the situation on the main front, Ukraine will continue to implement such limited but high-profile actions to enable further non-linear escalation and prevent the conflict from ending under unfavorable terms.
In the next few months, all the actions of the parties on the line of contact, tentatively speaking, will fit into the logic of forming their position in dialogue with the new American administration. The operation in the Kursk oblast is a kind of ball to the Democrats and personally to Kamala Harris. She, unlike Donald Trump, is not talking about the intention to end the war instantly and is ready to continue supporting Kyiv if the AFU demonstrates offensive gains and the will to resist.
Furthermore, such a sharp escalation before the US presidential election can be construed as Kyiv’s desire to return the peacekeeping initiative to the White House, which China and even India are actively trying to seize. As a result, Beijing has received a painful slap from the Ukrainian authorities, who have been ‘flirting’ with it all summer. The visit of the Ukrainian Foreign Minister to China, telephone conversations and discussions about negotiations under which China began to mobilize the Global South, in fact turned out to be just a diplomatic cover, which was followed by the high-profile Kursk operation.
It has undoubtedly changed the nature and configuration of the Russian-Ukrainian war. There is a great deal of speculation about how exactly the Kremlin will respond, but so far the Russians have acted with restraint, as if this local crisis is of secondary importance. Kyiv was probably expecting a swift and disproportionate response from the Russian Federation that it could use as a pretext to mobilize Western countries once again and increase the flow of financial and military aid. But the Russian capital understands this as well.
Despite the fact that the negotiation prospects have receded over the past two weeks, the current situation is just the final preparatory phase to get them started. Various capitals will offer mediation to Kyiv and Moscow, but only the new White House administration is likely to be able to resolve this protracted conflict.