Still Waters on the Dniester: A Temporary Calm?

Two months ago, the Joint Control Commission, the governing body of the peacekeeping operation in the Transnistrian region, held its first session since June 2022 that ended with the signing of a final protocol. The trigger for this modest “breakthrough” was Tiraspol’s decision to dismantle several police checkpoints on the left bank of the Dniester. These had been installed unilaterally, without the JCC’s approval, in the wake of the so-called “red code of terrorist threat.” For several years, Chisinau, including through its delegation in the JCC, sharply criticized the installation of these checkpoints and refused to acknowledge the existence of threats following a series of incidents in Transnistria, which the local administration labeled as terrorist attacks. Our authorities, along with international organizations, ignored calls for joint investigations into the 2022 assaults and therefore considered Tiraspol’s actions to be excessive. During the fuel and energy crisis at the beginning of the year and the formation of a new gas supply scheme, the Transnistrian authorities were forced to accept certain conditions set by the central government and ultimately dismantled all previously installed checkpoints. This step made it possible to acknowledge several dozen reports from the Joint Military Command concerning the situation in the Security Zone, in which these checkpoints had been mentioned, and to relaunch the commission’s work in full accordance with its founding documents. At one of the April sessions, the commission also approved a package of reports concerning Transnistria’s quarantine checkpoints. This allowed the Joint Control Commission to significantly streamline its agenda, bringing it to a more or less standardized format, including organizational matters, weekly reports from the Joint Military Command, and roughly a dozen long-standing issues for discussion. At the upcoming meeting, several more “pending” reports are expected to be considered, which could effectively eliminate a significant portion of the disagreements that had previously hindered the commission’s work. In addition, the operation of two working groups within the Joint Control Commission, moderated by representatives of the Ukrainian Embassy and the OSCE Mission, were automatically resumed in April. At the same time, the composition of the commission saw significant renewal, with new members appointed from Russia, Moldova, Transnistria, and Ukrainian observers. The normalization of the JCC’s activities, despite the tense reactions from Moscow and Tiraspol, was not hindered even by the declaration of the Russian co-chair Alexander Andreev as persona non grata. Moreover, the appointment of a new head of the Russian delegation, Ayrat Abdullin, was already agreed upon by April 10. Against this positive backdrop, last week the JCC co-chair from Transnistria reported to the region’s leader that there were no signs of escalating tensions or preparations for military action. This allowed Vadim Krasnoselsky, in an interview with Russian media, to state that Chisinau is currently not pursuing a course aimed at dismantling the peacekeeping mechanism: “The situation, as far as the military component is concerned, is stable. The peacekeepers are working.” This week, Russian Ambassador Oleg Ozerov even mentioned the theoretical possibility of withdrawing Russian troops, but only in the event of progress in negotiations toward resolving the conflict: “The parties have repeatedly come close to agreeing on the parameters of a final settlement, which, in principle, could have resulted in the withdrawal of the Russian contingent. But this must be the outcome of a political process involving all interested parties and within internationally recognized formats, such as the 5+2.” Although the diplomat used language quite typical for Moscow, subsequent commentary on the topic proved to be far from unambiguous. The return of peacekeeping mechanisms to a “normal” state in recent months is directly linked to Transnistria’s steps to dismantle its unauthorized checkpoints. Chisinau saw these actions as long-awaited concessions that made it possible to resume work based on a balance of interests, while also justifying calls for further measures to eliminate barriers and foster rapprochement between the two banks of the Dniester. It can be said that the broader political context has had a favorable impact on the course of the peacekeeping process. Crucially, much of this dynamic stem from the current government’s temporary interest in maintaining calm and avoiding headlines about problems in the Security Zone in the run-up to the autumn parliamentary elections. In other words, this factor may shift considerably depending on the ruling party’s projected numbers and strategic plans by September. Moreover, such an evident linkage to the political situation on both banks of the Dniester poses an obvious risk to the functioning of the JCC, as relations between the sides may develop unpredictably. For instance, Tiraspol has yet to issue any concrete response to Moldova’s recent acquisition of 100 Lithuanian drones or to Prime Minister Dorin Recean’s controversial statement, in which he referred to the local authorities “not as an administration, but as criminals”. It is possible that Tiraspol has taken a pause in search of an appropriate response, perhaps to coordinate positions with Moscow. Today, the stable functioning of the JCC highlights a glaring lack of political dialogue between the two banks. At the same time, Chisinau’s demands for the withdrawal of Russian troops as a prerequisite for settlement have not disappeared. On the contrary, in recent weeks these demands have been reiterated repeatedly by the president, the prime minister, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In other words, the Moldovan authorities view the Russian military presence as an obstacle to conflict resolution – a stance that sharply contradicts the positions of both Russia and, especially, Tiraspol. This contradiction is bound to escalate sooner or later, becoming a significant factor affecting the operation of the peacekeeping mission. Nevertheless, at this stage, the mission once again illustrates just how deeply it has become embedded in the political and social plane of all parties involved. So much so that it ensures the stability of the very process of monitoring the situation in the Security Zone – even at times when the commission itself faces difficulties. But will the current relative “calm” surrounding the operation on the Dniester prove lasting? The answer to that question is most likely negative.