EU’s New Black Sea Strategy: A Perilous Geopolitical Gamble

The Black Sea region is gaining prominence in the European Union’s strategic thinking, serving as a bridge between Europe, the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East, and especially amid growing rivalry and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict. Last week, Brussels unveiled the European Union’s new strategy for the Black Sea. According to its authors, the strategy aims to “stimulate connectivity and economic growth”. To this end, the EU, together with its partners, plans to implement a number of initiatives to unlock the region’s economic potential and address pressing security challenges. The new doctrinal document focuses on six coastal states, including two EU members, Romania and Bulgaria, as well as Ukraine, Georgia, Turkey, and Russia. The economic foundation of this project is based on the fact that the countries of the region play a significant economic role, with a population of around 174 million and a combined GDP exceeding €2 trillion, particularly considering the volume of trade with the European Union, which currently amounts to €310 billion. In addition, vital routes for the supply of energy resources, food, and technology pass through the Black Sea basin, further reinforcing the region’s importance not only as a geopolitical hub but also as a zone of competition, exposed to hybrid attacks and subversive activity. It is clear that the EU’s primary objective is to solidify its own geopolitical presence. To this end, it sets an ambitious goal: to transform the Black Sea into a secure and thriving area. In order to achieve this, Brussels plans to combine measures aimed at deterring destabilizing actors, primarily Russia, with efforts to engage key regional partners, including Turkey and the Eastern Partnership countries. While the document does not outline a specific budget, it does provide for the coordination of existing funding instruments and international mechanisms, as well as close cooperation with NATO. Security lies at the heart of the European Union’s new strategy. The key innovation is a plan to establish a “maritime security hub” – a unified platform for continuous monitoring “from space to the seabed.” This hub will integrate satellite and drone systems, underwater sensors, early-warning modules for hybrid threats, and coordination channels with NATO and the coastal states. In the initial phase, the EU focuses heavily on demining operations, particularly in Ukrainian waters, where drifting mines pose a threat to both the ecosystem and transportation routes. As a result, cooperation with Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey is a top priority. Another important aspect will be the enhancement of military mobility through the modernization of ports, roads, and railway hubs. This will help boost the region’s defense infrastructure and ensure rapid deployment of forces in the event of a military crisis. What else does the EU strategy address? Cybersecurity, the fight against disinformation, and the protection of critical infrastructure, including energy facilities, undersea cables, and transport hubs. The document emphasizes that the macro-region has become a battleground for major powers competing to shape narratives and, by extension, to expand their geopolitical influence. Naturally, the paper also highlights cooperation in the defense industry. The EU aims to integrate Ukraine’s defense sector into the European Defense Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). This move is seen not only as a means of supporting Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against attacks, but also as a way to boost the EU’s own technological capabilities. A key role in this effort will be played by the ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 program, which provides funding to modernize the defense potential of both EU member states and partner countries. Another central pillar of the strategy is the pursuit of sustainable growth and economic integration. Brussels plans to establish a comprehensive connectivity program encompassing transport, energy, and digital networks. Importantly, this program is not limited to the Black Sea but extends all the way to Central Asia via the South Caucasus. Green energy is also a key focus. The strategy promotes the concept of a “green energy corridor” linking renewable energy production in the Caucasus region with European markets through underwater cables. This, notably, aligns with the EU’s long-term objective of phasing out dependence on Russian energy resources. In addition, the European Union plans to invest in cross-border energy grids, digital networks, and logistical infrastructure, especially as such assets in Ukraine and neighboring regions continue to come under attack. The Eastern Partnership remains the key framework through which the new connectivity strategy will be implemented. Programs such as the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova or the Ukraine Facility will support the gradual integration of these countries into the single European market. Undoubtedly, the Black Sea Strategy is closely tied to the broader EU enlargement policy. Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia (under certain conditions) are viewed as candidate countries for membership. Supporting their sovereignty, resilience, and reforms remains a cornerstone of Brussels’ foreign policy. Alongside this, the EU has stepped up efforts to normalize relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan (where a peace treaty is expected to be signed) and to foster ties between Yerevan and Ankara. The EU is bringing the South Caucasus into its sphere of responsibility not merely as a transit region, but as part of a stable and interconnected political space. Meanwhile, sanctions policy remains a key tool of pressure, including stricter enforcement of existing restrictions against Russia and Belarus and measures to counter sanctions evasion. By and large, the European Union is clearly signaling its ambition for strategic leadership. Much of its success will depend on its ability to coordinate efforts among member states, engage international partnerships, and consistently implement its ambitious agenda despite numerous challenges. And those challenges exist even within the bloc itself, where several countries have long questioned the need for a prolonged confrontation with Moscow. Our authorities, namely PAS and Maia Sandu, have undoubtedly welcomed this document with great enthusiasm. The strategy extends far beyond the scope of the Eastern Partnership and sets qualitatively different goals and objectives. It hardly matters that Moldova is not formally considered a Black Sea state. The country’s access to the maritime area through Giurgiulesti, as well as its close proximity to Ukraine and Romania, effectively places Moldova on par with those countries assigned a key role in the EU’s new strategy. Therefore, official Chisinau can expect increased resources for the rehabilitation of transport infrastructure and a potential revival of the Transnistrian settlement process. Naturally, Brussels is well aware that the Kremlin will be one of the main forces actively opposing any cross-border initiatives in a region where it holds its own strategic interests. Fifteen years of the Eastern Partnership have shown that unilateral actions by the EU, particularly those that disregard existing treaty frameworks and cooperation formats, provoke sharp irritation in Moscow. But such is the nature of geopolitical confrontation, which, judging by current trends, is likely to drag on for decades. In this context, it is crucial for us to recognize that the mounting tensions are steadily pushing EU-Russia relations toward a dangerous threshold, where the risk of military confrontation could escalate rapidly. Unfortunately, Moldova, as the most fragile and least resilient entity in the region, may well be among the first to face the consequences of such a scenario.