Can the Opposition Stand Up to PAS?

Last week once again fueled doubts among skeptics about any scenario where the ruling party might end up in opposition. With relentless determination, worthy of better cause, PAS is executing its pre-election strategy on a broad front, unashamedly resorting to “low weaponry”. These include the use of administrative resources to sway voters, the reinforcement of control-and-repression mechanisms aimed at monopolizing and cleansing the media landscape, and, of course, an all-out media propaganda. Take, for example, the strategy of recruiting well-known and respected public figures into the party list. Writers, musicians, and other entertainers are always welcome as extra “background dancers” for PAS. Just as during the era of Vlad Plahotniuc’s unchecked power, the creative intelligentsia, largely dependent on state funding, is politely but firmly encouraged to contribute to preserving the status quo. In practice, however, the effort is stumbling. Writer and journalist Constantin Cheianu openly revealed that he had been approached personally by Maia Sandu, while composer and conductor Nicolae Botgros has long been discredited by similar requests from Filat and Plahotniuc. Yet voters are learning of these compromising details not from the regime’s political opponents, but from journalists and bloggers, who still have both the courage and, for now, the means to speak out. PAS’s move into Gagauz territory, by bringing Komrat businesswoman Maria Akbas into its party ranks, also makes sense from a political marketing standpoint. The goal is clear: to create a dedicated mouthpiece for the autonomy’s population, which has shown little enthusiasm for Sandu and her protégés. The idea of cultivating a comprador class of Gagauz loyalists, who, like Natalia Davidovici, would energetically defend the party’s line even more zealously than some native Bessarabian Romanians, has long been part of the president’s political technologists. But why was it not Sandu’s former ally and founder of the Civic Congress, Mark Tkaciuk, who first raised the alarm about this new “Mihail Sirkeli”? As bloggers unearthed the less flattering sides of Akbas’ past, Tkaciuk limited himself to a polite social media comment. And as for the respected Marcel Spatari – one can’t help but feel sympathy. It seems that a persuasive envoy from Bucharest, likely at the request of Sandu’s counterpart across the Prut, managed to convince the former Minister of Labor to return to Chisinau. The authorities are well aware of who is exposing the unflattering reality behind their Potemkinism, mocking their clumsy propaganda, and shining a light on the mess they’re creating. Hence the obsessive drive to “shut the mouths” of all disloyal writers and journalists by regulating and sanctioning anything and everything. The controversial overhaul of the Audiovisual Code required considerable effort from the ruling “yellows”. The dubious and at times outright absurd proposals by PAS deputies were challenged not only by civil society at public hearings, but even by government ministries in their official feedback. Yet during the review process, responsible officials ignored all substantial objections, including the critical assessment from the Venice Commission. The government easily issued a favorable opinion, clearing the way for parliamentary approval. Still, even these draconian measures against the media are deemed insufficient by PAS, which is now once again pushing the crude idea of blocking “undesirable” platforms in Moldova – Telegram, for instance. The political bribery of the electorate continues. Since the Easter handouts were well received and triggered no real backlash, why not keep the momentum going and promise money to other vulnerable groups – for example, to parents of schoolchildren ahead of the new school year? The fact that this very initiative had been consistently rejected by the ruling party in previous years, only to be suddenly embraced in an election year, is, of course, just a coincidence. As is the decision to distribute the payments not in August, the logical time for buying school supplies, but in September, conveniently closer to the election day. Each of these clumsy initiatives, shaped by the rigidity of top-level thinking and the ineptitude of its implementation, presents the opposition with a golden opportunity to go on the offensive against the ruling regime. Even better would be to consolidate forces in a united front against this “Captured State 2.0”. But nothing of the sort is happening. Criticism, where it exists, lacks conviction. Civil society’s calls for unity vanish into the void. Left-leaning and centrist political forces continue to promote their own isolated agendas, waging a kind of mock-conflict with the authorities from the comfort of their entrenched positions. PAS, for its part, actively contributes to maintaining this division, for example, by attempting to introduce new Central Electoral Commission regulations on how electoral blocs are registered. Members of the “Alternativa” movement immediately saw this as a targeted risk to their formation: a ban on using in the bloc’s name any words already found in the name of one of its constituent parties. Some in the group rallied their supporters for a protest outside the CEC, while Ion Ceban found himself preoccupied with a different issue – hearings in the Chisinau Court of Appeals over alleged violations uncovered by the Integrity Agency. At the same time, the primar was stripped of a portion of his revenues, forcing a revision of the city budget. With all this going on, there’s little space left for a robust nationwide campaign or any meaningful coordination with fellow opposition figures. On June 15, left-leaning political forces in Chisinau had an excellent opportunity, at least situationally, to unite in support of traditional family values. Yet even in this context, total disorganization was on full display. While the capital’s mayor took administrative steps to obstruct the LGBT march, his political allies were nowhere to be seen at the parallel events staged separately by the parties of Igor Dodon and Vasile Tarlev. The prospect of a formal alliance among opposition forces still technically remains. Setting aside the “Alternativa” bloc, which managed to defend its right to run independently before the Central Electoral Commission, there is still a chance for its former allies, many of whom split from the PCRM at different times, to unite with the communists themselves. Igor Dodon, Vasile Tarlev, Vladimir Voronin, and Irina Vlah could form a single political structure and potentially enter the next parliament with a respectable result. As has happened before, the impetus for consolidation might again come from the outside. The St. Petersburg Economic Forum, where Moldova had a single joint exhibition stand, couldn’t come at a better time. The problem, however, is that these alliances often lack real viability when put into practice, and under current circumstances, the chances of forming one are vanishingly slim.