EU Sanctions as a Convenient Tool to Eliminate Electoral Rivals

Brussels has decided to make it easier for the ruling party to sideline electoral competitors and unwanted media outlets by assuming political responsibility for these decisions

Recently, the situation regarding the participation of several opposition forces in the elections has become clearer, including those linked to fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor. Under constant scrutiny and intense pressure from all sides, on July 14 the Central Electoral Commission published the list of parties admitted to the autumn elections. It includes 25 entities that submitted information about their structure and members to the Public Services Agency, as required by the asset declaration legislation. The list features nearly all potential contenders for seats in parliament – with the exception of the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) and three parties from Ilan Shor’s “conglomerate”: Victory, Chance, and Renaissance. Formally, none of them are barred from participating in the race, but the general direction of events is already clear. One of the most pressing questions for observers was whether a unified bloc of parties linked to Shor would emerge, and what strategy the ruling regime would choose in response. One of the logical options for PAS was not to prevent Shor-affiliated parties from entering the campaign – but to ensure they couldn’t secure or register their results. In other words, simply to steal their percentage of the vote. The benefit is obvious: if the election results for one of the parties are invalidated, their voters’ support will be redistributed among those who passed the electoral threshold – and the majority is expected to go to the frontrunner, which is projected to be PAS. There are plenty of options and pretexts for implementing such a scenario, and all of them have been prepared in advance. For example, courts are already reviewing cases regarding the possible suspension or dissolution of the Chance, Renaissance, and other parties. In addition, the restructured Constitutional Court is always ready to respond to the regime’s call. Under current circumstances, it’s easier than ever to declare any political group suspected of cooperating with Ilan Shor “unconstitutional”. Even the Central Electoral Commission itself is fully capable of making the “necessary” decisions. The deputy head of the commission and former human rights activist Pavel Postica often blushes at the actions of his institution – but always manages to find legal justifications. However, for the authorities, this can be called heavy artillery, and it is better to resort to it only at the stage of the final showdown. The potential victims of the authorities’ arbitrariness themselves were also slow to submit documents to the Central Electoral Commission, clearly calculating their options. Therefore, unlike the Alternative bloc, their colleagues from Victory submitted the necessary paperwork only a month later – on July 14. However, the very next day, a signal came from Brussels that regardless of the tactical calculations and plans of PAS’s political technologists, pro-Russian parties are fundamentally unwelcome in the upcoming vote. To leave no doubt, the new round of sanctions was officially justified as being “for attempts to destabilize, undermine, or threaten the sovereignty and independence of Moldova.” The forces considered pro-Russian are precisely those affiliated with Shor and who recently openly expressed their position in Moscow. The new sanctions list includes the leader of the Alternative and Salvation Force of Moldova party, Alexandru Beschieru, Victoria Furtuna, deputies Alexandr Nesterovschi and Irina Lozovan, Natalia Paraska, Alexei Lungu, Vadim Grozavu, journalist and critic Dumitru Buimistru, and Viacheslav Valko. In this situation, both the EU’s decision itself, made on Moldova’s behalf, supposedly in its best interests (though in reality a clear case of interference in the country’s internal affairs) – and the subsequent necessity for our leadership to join these sanctions are noteworthy. Of course, we should wait for the five-day period given to the Central Electoral Commission to respond to the Victory bloc’s request, but the outcome seems obvious. One could say that in this grand chess game, the sides have finally exchanged their first pawns. The most “openly pro-Russian” politicians are being taken out of play, but there are still many pieces on the board, and their moves remain unpredictable. There is still nearly a month left – until August 13 – the deadline for submitting registration documents for electoral blocs. Several possible configurations of the left-wing opposition remain on the table. For Igor Dodon’s Socialist Party, the optimal scenario would, of course, be to run the campaign independently. But to justify such a decision, all potential candidates for a broader alliance must be sidelined in order to convince decision-makers in the Kremlin to abandon the idea of forming a “megabloc.” If, for instance, Voronin’s Communist Party is ultimately pushed aside, the existing Socialist–Communist alliance would collapse, allowing Dodon to enter Parliament on his own – without risks. However, for now, both the Communists and Vasilii Tarlev with Irina Vlah remain in the game. Lately, the latter two have shown a strong willingness to fight, and if their campaigns continue successfully, they might force themselves into an alliance with Dodon – one he won’t be able to refuse. Given the attitude of Brussels officials, determined to prevent any strengthening of Russian influence, one might assume that the next candidates to be added to the EU sanctions list could be the PCRM, and the parties of Tarlev and Vlah. Accusing them of the same “attempts to destabilize” would be quite easy – especially considering Vlah’s recent protest actions in front of the presidential administration. If needed, their political activity could even be linked to the sanctioned Ilan Shor. Despite their apparent determination to engage in a prolonged political struggle, the EU entry bans paired with economic restrictions can easily demoralize Moldovan politicians used to unrestricted movement within the European community. The recent remarks by Ion Ceban, marked by a tone of wounded sarcasm, are a vivid testament to the effectiveness of such sanctions. The only viable alternative for all left-wing opposition figures may be emigration to Russia. Incidentally, that last option would suit the current authorities best of all.