Expert: PAS Is Adjusting the Terrain Ahead of Elections

The shaping of the electoral architecture is entering its final stage, and the authorities will spare no effort to ensure that everything aligns with their “master plan”

Last week officially marked the start of the electoral period in Moldova. From this point on, key campaign processes have accelerated, most notably, the registration of candidates. Until August 19, political parties, independent candidates, and electoral blocs have the right to submit the required documentation to the Central Electoral Commission (CEC). The formal election campaign will begin on August 28 and continue until the Saturday preceding election day. Only during this 30-day window will registered candidates be permitted to engage in open campaigning. Before then, they are limited to general political activity, such as public appearances and promoting ideas, but without directly soliciting votes. Based on the Public Services Agency data, out of 66 registered parties, only 25 have so far submitted all required documents. Data for another 14 parties is still under review. The fate of several parties: Chance, Power of Alternative and Salvation of Moldova, and Revival, remains uncertain, as court cases regarding possible bans or restrictions on their activities are already underway. The CEC has conditionally included them in the list of electoral participants, but clarified that if a court rules for their dissolution, or if the Public Services Agency denies approval, they will be excluded. Thus, the campaign is entering an active phase filled with intrigue and uncertainty. With so much at stake, both pro-European and “pro-Russian” forces are resorting to increasingly sophisticated methods to influence the electoral landscape. Central to this is the growing standoff between the ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) and a left-wing opposition that is attempting to consolidate. The ruling party, clearly, intends to maintain full control of the next parliament and concentrate all state power in its hands. Efforts are being directed at strengthening administrative and organizational control over the electoral process to eliminate any risks of defeat. A key task for the regime in the coming weeks is shaping a field of electoral participants that poses no real threat, excluding any serious political alternative that could upset PAS’ advantageous status quo. A wide range of tools is being deployed to this end: administrative, legal, repressive, and even foreign policy instruments. This reflects a strategic and deliberate effort to reshape the political field in the ruling party’s favor. The first to fall was the Victory bloc. After European sanctions were imposed, it became clear that the groundwork was being laid to remove the bloc from the race. Without waiting for the national implementation of the sanctions, the CEC rejected Victory’s registration last Saturday, citing documentation issues and legal non-compliance. It’s also unlikely that any co-founders of Victory will succeed in registering independently. This example sends a clear message to other opposition forces struggling to form a united left-wing bloc, potentially including the PSRM, PCRM, and smaller yet significant parties led by Irina Vlah and Vasile Tarlev. Despite cautious optimism, negotiations appear stalled. Two possibilities emerge: either they are tactically delaying to deny the authorities time to react, or some members are reluctant to sacrifice personal ratings for the sake of a possibly unelectable alliance. The main stumbling block may well be the criteria and principles for forming a joint electoral list, given the ambitions and complicated histories among the players. As such, a left-wing consolidation remains a conditional scenario. Still, a recent IMAS poll indicated that a broad left-wing coalition could capture 35% of decided voters, compared to 30% for PAS, though internal polling may show different results. Whether PAS resorts to specific pressure tactics will reveal how seriously it views the threat of such an alliance. The authorities have also “clipped the wings” of Chisinau Mayor Ion Ceban, a key figure behind the Alternativa bloc. Prompted by Chisinau, Bucharest publicly signaled disapproval of Ceban, and he may have been privately warned of a potential inclusion on the EU sanctions list. Perhaps for this reason, Ceban unexpectedly announced that he would remain mayor and not run for parliament, despite strong polling numbers. How this affects the Alternativa bloc will soon be reflected in public opinion polls, but some pro-European voters are likely to turn away from Ceban and his party MAN, weakening the bloc overall. One of the few opposition forces still expected to make it into the next parliament, and notably shielded from PAS pressure, is Our Party. Observers increasingly speak of a tacit endorsement from PAS, which is counting on Renato Usatii’s future loyalty and his willingness to lend a hand in forming a coalition. Usatii is actively leveraging media resources, including those affiliated with the government, and is organizing concerts featuring Russian performers in Chisinau’s central square, provoking public and political resonance and thereby attracting heightened attention. Evidently, the party is trying to mobilize the youth electorate, which has traditionally been apathetic and distrustful of politics. And with the disqualification of Victory and, reportedly, other left-wing parties, Usatii will likely gain new opportunities to expand his support base. As the construction of Moldova’s electoral architecture enters its final phase, the authorities are determined to make everything conform to their blueprint. PAS appears set to tighten its grip on electoral mechanisms and further filter the candidate field. Pressure on opposition forces, efforts to reshape the political landscape, and the creation of a comfortable playing field for the ruling party are all expected to intensify. Yet if the opposition somehow manages to set aside its differences and unite, these elections could pose a real challenge to the ruling party and a stress test for Moldova’s entire political system.