Moldovan Port to Be “Moored” to Romania?

Just under a year ago, the Romanian Prime Minister publicly expressed his country’s interest in acquiring the port in Giurgiulesti. At the time, our government tried to downplay the situation, emphasizing the small part of the port complex that belongs to the state and stating that it had no intention of selling it. However, that portion has never been the most desirable “lot” anyway. A different matter is the Giurgiulesti International Free Port (GIFP), which handles petroleum products, grain, container cargo, and metals, and serves as a key logistical link in the export chain of Moldovan agricultural goods. Despite the low capacity of the access roads, the poor condition of the railway line, limited territory, and the specific challenges of the Danube (such as shallow waters and seasonal navigation), the port remains consistently profitable and therefore attracts interest from international investors. In recent weeks, our river port has once again come into the public spotlight, especially after the government approved, last Friday, the request from the Romanian state company “Maritime Ports Administration” to acquire 100% of the capital of Danube Logistics SRL, the current operator of the Giurgiulesti Port. This move prompted a sharp reaction from a representative of a Turkish company that also took part in the bidding process, accusing officials of a lack of transparency and political bias. Let’s try to understand the reasons behind the latest scandal. Located at the crossroads of the borders with Romania and Ukraine, Giurgiulesti is Moldova’s only access point to international waters and global trade routes. Despite its small size, the port plays a crucial role in the country’s supply system, making it an object of heightened interest – and frequently, a source of various disputes. Moreover, in light of the war in Ukraine and the blockade of its seaports, the role of other routes grew dramatically. Kyiv has begun actively using the Danube ports of Izmail, Reni and Kilia to export grain and other goods. Against this backdrop, Giurgiulesti has also emerged as one of the key hubs for alternative logistics. In addition to purely economic aspects, control over the asset is also tied to strategic, energy-related, and military-logistical dimensions. At a time when the area stretching from the Caucasus, across the entire northern Black Sea region, and up to the Danube has become a zone of intense competition among the interests of Russia, the UK, the US, the EU, and Turkey, the Giurgiulesti Port is viewed not merely as an infrastructure facility but as a point of geopolitical concentration and a factor of regional influence. Additionally, Turkey has been significantly strengthening its economic and political presence in the Black Sea region, aiming to expand its spheres of influence. For Ankara, a port in Moldova could serve not only as a logistical hub but also as a soft power tool. At the same time, the European Union is also interested in ensuring transport resilience in the Danube region, particularly in the context of Moldova’s integration into European economic and infrastructure networks. As a result, the final stage of the battle for the port came down to two contenders: Turkish industrial group Yildirim – a conglomerate operating in metallurgy, port logistics, energy, chemicals, and finance – and the Romanian “Maritime Ports Administration” of Constanta, a state entity managing the largest port on the Black Sea. Although the Yildirim Group offered an investment of 50 million euros – twice the amount proposed by the Romanian side – our government chose the Romanian candidate, prompting a sharp and quite understandable reaction from the Turkish side. There is no doubt that when it came to deciding who should take over the port, geopolitical considerations clearly outweighed economic logic. Transferring control of port infrastructure to Turkey was obviously not part of our leadership’s plans – for a variety of reasons. One of the main ones is Ankara’s foreign policy, particularly its stance toward Russia, which, to put it mildly, differs significantly from the current approach taken by Chisinau. That is precisely why the integration of the Giurgiulesti Port into Romania’s unified management system appears logical – both from a political standpoint and in terms of strengthening the transit link with pan-European logistics routes. The energy factor must also be taken into account. One of the port’s key features is its oil terminal – the only facility in Moldova capable of receiving petroleum deliveries by water. At present, a significant portion of the country’s fuel is imported through this terminal. Therefore, any change in the port’s operator could, in theory, affect Moldova’s energy security. Critics of the deal are raising concerns about whether national interests were adequately safeguarded during the transfer of control to a particular investor. According to some experts familiar with the situation, the state has, in recent years, virtually lost its levers of influence over the port’s operations. As a result of the lack of strategic vision and political will in Chisinau, the fate of the harbor ended up being decided in the offices of private investors rather than within state institutions. Amid this, there are emerging proposals for introducing state regulation, revisiting the terms of the land lease on which the port is located, and even bringing part of the assets back under state control. More radical voices are calling for partial or full nationalization of the port’s strategic infrastructure – similar to measures taken by some Eastern European countries in response to national security threats. However, in Moldova’s current political reality, even the strongest proposals aimed at (re)sovereignizing key sectors of the state often face powerful resistance from elites accustomed to profiting from external dependencies. Therefore, the future of the Giurgiulesti Port will be shaped by the regional balance of power and economics – as well as by broader geopolitical circumstances. Romania’s interest in our maritime gateway stems from its regional ambitions and its desire to position Constanta as the dominant trade hub of the Black Sea, supported by auxiliary capacities. For our country, however, maintaining strategic control over the port – even under foreign management – is of vital importance, as this asset is essentially Moldova’s only (albeit limited) direct access to global markets. The way we handle its future will determine the fate of our external economic independence, our ability to integrate into international logistics chains, and our capacity to minimize vulnerability to transit-related risks. Despite the unfolding scandal, it is highly likely that the Giurgiulesti International Port will soon come under Romanian control. And, as is often the case, this sell-off – along with the transfer of critically important infrastructure under Bucharest’s oversight – is being carried out under the banner of European integration. At the same time, the developments surrounding this asset clearly reflect the government’s inability not only to formulate but also to defend a firm stance that aligns with national interests in matters of strategic importance. This is precisely why the authorities, acting behind closed doors and without broad public debate, have once again demonstrated their willingness to sacrifice national sovereignty in exchange for short-term loyalty to foreign partners.