The Long Ordeal: Challenges of Uniting the Left Opposition

Cristian Russu

The much-anticipated unification of left-wing forces has finally been announced, but many difficulties remain on the path to legally formalizing the alliance and competing for parliamentary mandates

On July 22, leaders of four left-wing parties – two from the previous parliament (PSRM and PCRM) and two non-parliamentary ones (“Heart of Moldova” and “Future of Moldova”) – announced the creation of an electoral bloc to participate in the upcoming autumn elections. This event is eagerly awaited by part of the population, although somewhat belated. Igor Dodon, who is seeking leadership within the bloc, admitted that negotiations to form a “united front” had been ongoing for several months, and during meetings with voters, calls for unification were repeatedly voiced. It should be noted that all the prerequisites for launching integration processes on the left flank had already come together by the end of last year. Had Dodon put forward such an idea back then, many events might have unfolded quite differently. Perhaps Alexandr Stoianoglo wouldn’t have had to team up with Ion Ceban, Ion Chicu, and Mark Tkaciuk. The “Alternative” bloc might never have emerged. Over the past six months, the “graduates of Voronin’s nest” could have thoroughly prepared for the elections: setting up a campaign headquarters, mobilizing the electorate, and attracting other political forces. After all, it’s not the voter who should be persuading Igor Nikolaevich to unite with his former colleagues – he himself should have demonstrated a mature political approach to the public. As usual, things turned out the other way around. The Socialists rushed to exit the bloc with the Communists, further damaging the prospects of the entire left-wing opposition. The bloc’s overall rating stood at around 22–28%, while the PSRM’s individual rating was only 15–17%. Stoianoglo’s success in the presidential election was not only left unused to strengthen the anti-regime camp – it was outright squandered. Despite all this, the public demand for a pre-election anti-government coalition remained strong. One could say that civil society representatives, journalists, and sociologists critical of PAS’s actions effectively applied a defibrillator to the body of the left-wing opposition – in a determined attempt to revive a patient showing no will to fight for survival. The “For Moldova” platform was created, outlining the expected course of action from opposition politicians. It was a kind of public ultimatum. Sociologists presented convincing data showing that an alliance between Dodon, Voronin, Vlah, and Tarlev could not only compete with PAS, but even surpass it domestically. Only fools or the stubborn could ignore such arguments. An outright act of sabotage cannot be ruled out. Of course, one might also believe that the delay in forming the alliance was a forced tactic, taking into account potential retaliatory moves by the ruling party. After all, the announcement of a principled willingness to march together came immediately after the CEC refused to register another left-wing bloc made up of sympathizers and supporters of the fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor. But how long were the former and current Communists planning to drag out their decision? Until August 13, the very last day for submitting documents to the CEC? How can this group of four even claim to lead or win when every step they take is dictated by fear of the ruling party’s reaction? There’s no sign of principled conviction or readiness to fight here. Incidentally, this Tuesday, the leaders of the left-wing parties merely announced their intention to unite. In other words, the electoral bloc does not actually exist yet. There is no name, no written agreement – just an announcement, and even that was overshadowed by Vladimir Voronin’s pessimism. Wearing no suit, no expensive watch or designer glasses, dressed in sandals and an untucked shirt, the Communist leader made it visually clear that he had no desire to be there with his former protégés – those he believes betrayed him. Voronin spoke with irritation, accusing some allies of “pulling the blanket over themselves,” stressing that nothing has been decided yet, that a long and difficult road lies ahead, and that failure is still possible. It gave the impression that the former president has neither matured, nor forgiven, nor come to terms with his responsibility or the expectations of the voters – as if he’s stuck in a moment from twenty years ago. A wise politician in his position would have long ago named a successor and appeared on the stage only to offer words of support. Voronin has always had bright and capable individuals around him who could lead the party. He still does – for instance, Diana Caraman, who was present at Tuesday’s press conference. Yet Vladimir Nikolaevich seems unable to let go of the role of the “father of the nation.” There was another remark in the long and contradictory speech by the PCRM chairman that does little to help the new bloc – namely, that the opposition leaders are not against the course of European integration, and that more was done toward moving toward Europe during Voronin’s time than in recent years. Whether this was a gesture toward European officials or simply an acknowledgment of political realities on the ground, the effect is the same: with this statement, the supposedly “pro-Russian” left-wing bloc presents itself not as a force ready to take power, but as a constructive “Alternative 2” – essentially just another group of fans of the “correct” kind of European integration. The political prospects of the alliance between Stoianoglo, Ceban, Chicu, and Tkaciuk are already clear. No matter how hard they try, they won’t be able to attract supporters of the pro-European path. However, they could cover the entire protest electorate, the one that voted against the process in the referendum last autumn, but for some reason, they are reluctant to do so. It turns out that the still-unformed bloc of left-wing parties is stepping on the same rake, refusing to speak on behalf of the million citizens who said no to the European integration process as such. This conscious omission for the Communists and Socialists is also threatening to demotivate the most active voters, who were once under the banner of Ilan Shor, now settled in Moscow. The value of this asset lies in the fact that it is the only opposition group with an organizational structure and experience in street protests. This segment of the population will not hesitate to take to the streets to defend their interests. After all, it’s clear that if they are unable to vote for their own political structures, they will consider the left-wing party bloc, with the participation of Dodon and company, as an alternative option. But when, right from the start, the oldest and wisest leader of an ideologically similar formation criticizes the authorities for the failure of the European integration course and hints at his readiness to continue it, the protest electorate is effectively left behind. On a human level, one can understand each of the leaders of the potential electoral bloc. Their desire to avoid sanctions from the European Union, remain acceptable to the Western community, preserve the ability to travel freely, and see their children. Perhaps behind such controversial speeches lies a simple attempt to play nice with the authorities to avoid being banned by the CEC. However, in real politics, there is no room for compromise in the pursuit of victory, especially on fundamental issues, and even more so when the official campaign is just starting. The current opposition, including Vladimir Voronin, should understand this, but apparently, they never outgrew their adolescent period.