Opinion: “The Opposition Has No Choice Left but to Join Forces”

This week, the ruling regime effectively outlawed almost all opposition forces with a real chance of entering the new parliament. If PAS’ main challengers fail to present a united front and overcome past differences, they are doomed

Semyon ALBU, RTA: Almost every election is preceded by calls for Moldova’s center-left opposition to unite, or set up joint electoral blocs, nominate common candidates, and so on. And yet, it never happens. Old grudges, inflated egos of political leaders, an unwillingness to compromise, and, above all, mutual distrust get in the way. Opposition leaders often question each other’s true intentions, whether there is a real desire to confront the government, rather than to strike a deal with it at the right moment. This skepticism is understandable, especially when we see PAS cooperating quite effectively on the local level with some of its supposed ideological opponents. But this year is different. Over five years in power, the ruling party has failed in nearly every area, except for the one that matters most to it: consolidating power and establishing an authoritarian system of governance. PAS has turned parliament into a rubber-stamp body, monopolized the government and justice institutions, and seized control of key entities like the Constitutional Court, the Central Election Commission, and major media. What’s even more significant is that PAS enjoys complete legitimacy in the eyes of European partners. Unlike Kyiv, which recently dared to tamper with the West-designed anticorruption structure and was promptly punished, official Chisinau stays within the permitted boundaries. Corruption schemes and looting Moldova’s limited resources are tolerated. Cracking down on “pro-Russian” political opponents is fine. But foreign policy maneuvering? Absolutely not. Hence, despite the country’s objective economic interests, Moldova aligns with sanctions against Russia and rejects cheap energy supplies. Backed by full external protection, PAS has been steadily pushing the narrative of a Russian hybrid war against Moldova and Moscow’s interference in the electoral process. This week, the rhetoric hit a new peak. In several interviews and during a briefing following the Supreme Security Council meeting, President Maia Sandu personally warned of an “unprecedented” effort by the Kremlin to interfere in the autumn parliamentary elections. According to her, the interference will include voter bribery (up to €100 million allegedly transferred in crypto), disinformation campaigns, paid protests, cyberattacks, criminal networks, hybrid involvement of Gagauzia and Transnistria, and the spread of extremist ideologies. Sandu’s most dramatic move was publicly naming political projects allegedly backed by Moscow. First, the “sovereignists”, clearly referring to the recently formed leftist bloc including the Socialists, Communists, and parties led by Irina Vlah and Vasile Tarlev. Second, the so-called “false-flag projects” aimed at moderate pro-European voters, meaning the “Alternativa” bloc. Third, various political outfits associated with Ilan Sor. And, just to cover all bases, Sandu claimed the Kremlin is even behind some independent candidates, though she never bothered to name any. Let’s take a brief look at which forces could realistically enter parliament after the September 28 vote. According to recent polls, only a few: the ruling PAS, the Socialist bloc, the “Alternativa” bloc, and Sor’s “Victory” bloc. Just below the threshold is Renato Usatii’s “Our Party”, gaining support with populist rhetoric and crowd-pleasing stunts. The latter is now being viewed by the ruling party’s strategists as a potential junior or situational partner in case PAS falls just short of securing a parliamentary majority. That’s why Usatii’s political formation is left alone, untouched by administrative or law enforcement pressure. It’s essentially being kept in reserve – a kind of “canned good” the authorities can open and consume if needed after the elections. Other competitors, however, have effectively been declared enemies of the state. Sor’s “Victory” bloc was predictably banned. But now, the same treatment is being applied to the two main challengers for parliamentary dominance. We don’t yet know exactly what PAS is planning, but it’s clear they’re willing to use any and all dirty tactics, without shame. Even pro-government NGOs are starting to admit to widespread abuse of state resources and the merger of party and government structures. So, it’s easy to imagine the real scale of the abuse.  One top PAS speaker even openly threatened to cut off funding for local primars unless the party gets the “right” result. So, for now, we can only guess whether the authorities will limit themselves to strong-arm tactics: arrests, searches, endless fines, or go further and try to disqualify individual candidates from the two main opposition blocs, thereby disrupting their campaigns. Just recently, Ion Ceban stated that he expects exactly such a move after Romania imposed sanctions on him as part of a behind-the-scenes deal with Chisinau. Or perhaps the authorities will grow bold enough to ban both the “alternatives” and the sovereigntists from participating in the elections altogether. As we can see, this scenario can no longer be ruled out. After all, what would stop PAS from going down this road? Brussels will support them no matter what, and the protest movement of recent years has hardly given the ruling party any real reason to fear street demonstrations. That’s why, this time around, the consolidation of the left-centrist opposition is not just a means of winning the election – it may be the only way to avoid being wiped out politically before the vote even begins. I’m not saying Dodon and company should merge completely with the “Alternativa” movement, let alone form a single electoral bloc. But at the very least, these forces need to establish ongoing and meaningful coordination. The potential for such cooperation is significant. As a first step, the two blocs could sign something like a non-aggression pact, not to tear each other apart with mutual accusations, but to channel all criticism exclusively at the ruling party. And there’s certainly no shortage of reasons to do so, enough to fuel ten opposition platforms. Next, they should agree on what we might call collective defense: any attack against one of the parties or its frontmen, say, Ceban or Dodon, must be met with an immediate and large-scale response. That means mobilizing the largest protests they can manage, flooding key embassies with appeals, and so on. It’s also crucial to establish the strictest possible oversight over the diaspora vote, to prevent PAS from padding its numbers through falsifications or “ghost voter” ballots, something it has been repeatedly accused of. Let’s hope the opposition realizes how much there is to gain from close cooperation and how much they stand to lose by confronting PAS alone. The fact that Igor Dodon has already mentioned talks with the “Alternativa” about joint action is a good sign. But words and good intentions are no longer enough. It’s time to turn them into real, coordinated steps.