Expert: Moldova Remains on the Brink of an Energy Cliff

Against the backdrop of the “grand energy construction” and mounting regional threats, Moldova remains in an extremely vulnerable position. The revocation of Moldovagaz’s license to supply natural gas, intensified Russian strikes on energy infrastructure near our border with Ukraine, and our critical dependence on cross-border power lines – all of this forms an alarming picture in which the country’s energy security begins to resemble a house of cards

Last week, while once again touring the country’s regions, Speaker Igor Grosu posed against the backdrop of the Vulcanesti-Chisinau high-voltage power line. The striking photo was accompanied by lofty statements about the upcoming victory on the path to energy independence. The shots were clearly designed for electoral impact: sunny weather, rolled-up sleeves, steel-like confidence – straight out of the election PR playbook. Yet all this pre-election gloss barely conceals the objective picture of a far less inspiring reality. Since the early 2020s, the authorities have been steadily pursuing a course toward breaking ties with Russian energy structures. A key milestone on this path was the recent ousting of Moldovagaz from the domestic market. This was preceded by protracted disputes over the historical debt to Gazprom, during which both sides rapidly moved away from seeking compromise, increasingly leaving the door open to legal, administrative, and, if necessary, coercive measures. The forced reorganization of the Moldovagaz group, restrictions on managing its assets and revenues, the increase in purchase prices, and, consequently, in tariffs –these measures were publicly justified by the need for “diversification and energy sovereignty.” In reality, however, they resulted in the dismantling of the previous gas supply model, which not only destroyed long-standing supply arrangements but also sent a clear signal to Moscow: the mutual energy link is being permanently severed unilaterally, regardless of investments, contracts, and commitments. In response, Gazprom warned it would defend its interests by all available means. And while many here dismiss this as empty threats, recent developments in the Ukrainian conflict suggest that things may not be so simple. On August 6, Russian drones struck the Orlivka gas compressor station in Ukraine’s Odesa region, located near the Ukrainian-Romanian border. This piece of critical infrastructure plays a key role in the reverse transit of gas through the Trans-Balkan corridor to Moldova and Ukraine. According to experts, the choice of target was no accident, as shortly beforehand Kyiv and Baku had agreed to begin test gas deliveries along this route. The Kremlin clearly decided to nip these attempts in the bud with a preemptive strike. Although Moldova was not directly affected by this strike, its location and the accompanying signals are cause for concern. First, it shows that the energy infrastructure in southern Ukraine is within the reach of Russian drones and, even more so, ballistic missiles, which are almost impossible for Ukrainian air defenses to intercept. Second, it is effectively the first case of deliberate destruction of facilities ensuring the transit of gas of non-Russian origin (Azerbaijani and American). And third, it coincided with a peak in Moldova-Russia tensions against the backdrop of Moldovagaz’s removal from the supply and distribution schemes for natural gas in our country. First and foremost, the following circumstances should be taken into account. After the cessation of electricity purchases from the Moldavskaia GRES power plant, the bulk of supplies to the right-bank part of Moldova now comes from Romania. The Isaccea-Vulcanesti-Dniestrovsk power line, which carries most of this imported electricity, has become a key element of the new energy supply model. The problem, however, is that this route is not fully sovereign, as part of it runs through Ukrainian territory. And although Kyiv is making tremendous efforts to protect its energy infrastructure, it clearly cannot guarantee the safety of the line in the face of Russian aerial strikes. In other words, it cannot be ruled out that other nodes of the power grid in this geographical area – including those serving Moldova’s energy system – could well become the next targets. This means that now, when we purchase almost all of our electricity from neighboring Romania, a single precision strike could plunge our country into darkness. Broadly speaking, this supply channel is functioning today. But how resilient it will remain after the launch of the Vulcanesti-Chisinau line, in the event of an escalation in southern Ukraine and a potential desire by Moscow to put pressure on Moldova, is a big question. If the power line were to be damaged and repairs became impossible due to force majeure circumstances, Moldova’s energy system could face a serious shortage with corresponding socio-political consequences. As is well known, until 2025, Chisinau purchased the lion’s share of its electricity from MGRES. The plant, though currently operating at a loss, is still functioning. Its capacity is primarily used in the left-bank districts and also helps maintain stability in the regional energy system. If the Isaccea-Vulcanesti line were to be put out of service, the authorities would have no choice but to return to emergency purchases from the left bank. Should any crisis occur before the parliamentary elections, it would put Dorin Recean’s government in an extremely uncomfortable position, shattering the entire myth of energy independence and forcing a return to supplies from the Pridnestrovian region – and, by extension, from Moscow. Since 2022, Moldova has synchronized its energy system with ENTSO-E (the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity). This is, of course, a significant achievement in terms of rapprochement with the European Union. In practice, however, it has not solved the key problem of the lack of diversified energy infrastructure. In reality, Moldova’s system is connected to the EU through only a single high-voltage line, the passage of which is controlled by a third country currently engaged in a large-scale war. Therefore, it is clearly premature to speak of Moldova’s real energy integration into the broader European energy space. Brussels promises investments in new power lines, the construction of additional infrastructure, and the creation of reserve capacities, but for now these projects are only at the planning and early implementation stages, while energy threats are growing here and now. The situation is further complicated by the fact that, in the event of a shutdown or damage to the power line from Romania, even a brief interruption could trigger a collapse of the entire energy system. The lack of sufficient gas reserves on the left bank of the Dniester, combined with the limited generation capacity on the right bank (insufficient to fully meet domestic demand), exposes Moldova’s extreme vulnerability to potential energy shocks, for which we have been left entirely unprotected in recent years. Therefore, despite the reassuring statements from our politicians, Moldova faces a difficult choice with no simple solution. On the one hand, the course toward energy independence is logical from a long-term strategic perspective. On the other, it has in practice turned into the outright dismantling of the old energy supply model, with complete disregard for Moscow’s interests – something that has sharply increased the number of risk factors. In the context of regional war, mounting pressure from Russia, and the absence of protected infrastructure, PAS, Sandu, Grosu, and Recean must answer the key question: how do they plan to ensure the country’s energy security today?