“Balance over the Dniester”: Are Washington, Brussels, and Moscow Seeking Common Ground?

Sergiu CEBAN

Over the past several years, the Transnistrian conflict has existed in a state of “controlled freeze”, a format that suited all involved actors. However, judging by recent developments, this pause in the settlement process is gradually coming to an end

Following the conclusion of the elections and the resolution of all staffing matters, long-standing issues with major implications for both domestic and foreign policy are again moving to the forefront. Among them is the Transnistrian settlement, which in recent years has remained in a state of “stagnation”. However, the strategic objectives facing us and our Western partners make it increasingly difficult to continue ignoring the conflict. Within this logic a new stage of negotiations is unfolding, as suggested by recent visits of Western diplomats to Tiraspol, statements from Moldovan and European officials, and indirect signals coming from Moscow. Statements made in Chisinau that link the prospects of European integration to the resolution of the Transnistrian issue also deserve attention. For example, the Special Envoy for European Affairs and Strategic Partnership, Nicu Popescu, said that accession to the European Union would take place “on the same day, for all citizens and all regions of the country”. This can be interpreted as a signal that Chisinau does not intend to become an EU member while having an uncontrolled zone on its territory. At the same time, it is striking that the list of ten priorities announced by the new government, which has set itself the ambitious goal of completing negotiations with Brussels by 2028, does not contain a single point that is in any way related to the Transnistrian settlement. For several years now, communication between Chisinau and Tiraspol has been taking place sporadically and inconsistently. One can look at this in different ways, but it is clear that this is not a break in dialogue, but rather a negotiating silence that masks the absence of mutually acceptable benchmarks. However, last week the U.S. Ambassador and the head of the EU Delegation visited the left bank almost simultaneously. Such coordination does not seem accidental. It is possible that Washington and Brussels are beginning to gradually bring the Transnistrian issue back onto the agenda. During the meeting with the American delegation, opinions were voiced that all disagreements must be resolved exclusively at the negotiating table, and that any resumption of a military scenario on the Dniester is unacceptable. The “5+2” format, which has not been functioning for six years, was also mentioned. A few days later, the American representative met with Chisinau’s chief negotiator, informing him about his trip to Tiraspol. The fact of such prompt contacts indicates Washington’s intention to play a leading role – that is, not only to be present in the process but also to steer it. European diplomacy operated in parallel, but in a softer manner. Setting aside the routine statements by Transnistrian leaders that the negotiation process must continue under any circumstances, Brussels was primarily interested in three key questions: how Tiraspol envisions the future of the settlement, what the region’s economic situation and needs are, and which areas of EU financial assistance could be in demand. Against the backdrop of active Western diplomacy, Russia last week confined itself to a single statement by a Foreign Ministry representative, declaring that, as a mediator, the Russian Federation is ready to facilitate the restoration of dialogue between the two banks of the Dniester. The vagueness of this remark creates the impression that Moscow currently prefers not to fall into step with the diplomatic momentum of the United States and the EU. Nevertheless, an unconfirmed report mentioned by a journalist from the online outlet Most remains intriguing – namely, that the Transnistrian leader recently spent an extended period in the Russian capital. If that’s true, Russia’s role may turn out to be more substantial than it appears on the surface. This is especially true given the still-real possibility of a Trump-Putin meeting in Budapest, which, under certain circumstances, could become a catalyst for unexpected shifts in the affairs of Eastern Europe. In recent years, the frozen equilibrium on the banks of the Dniester seemed acceptable to everyone. There was no war and that, in fact, was not bad. But the strategic reality is changing, and the current situation is becoming less and less satisfactory for the key actors. For the EU, it is important to demonstrate that it is capable of integrating a post-Soviet republic with a “long-standing conflict” and turning this issue into a diplomatic success. For the United States, within the foreign policy line of the Trump administration, there is a need to consistently showcase successful settlements in various regions of the world, reaffirming its own role as a global mediator. As for Moscow, which still retains a certain degree of influence over the Transnistrian conflict, it could use this issue to probe for a compromise with the West, that might even grow into a modest thaw in relations. At the same time, over the course of three decades it has become clear that neither the United States, nor the EU, nor Russia are capable of independently proposing a model for resolving the problem that would satisfy all parties at once. Likewise, Chisinau cannot implement its plans without the support and consensus of its external partners. Tiraspol, for its part, also cannot ensure its own security and economic stability without maintaining a balance in its relations with several power centers whose interests intersect in our region. That is why the current uptick in activity looks like a cautious attempt to probe the options for resuming a broader dialogue. This by no means implies that a major breakthrough in contacts between Chisinau and Tiraspol is about to occur. However, the very fact of the synchronized interest coming from Washington and Brussels, the absence of fundamentally negative signals from Moscow, and the understanding of the strategic pressure created by Moldova’s European course together form a situation in which “sitting idly by” is no longer an option. The developments we see now are likely just the preliminary alignment of positions and the setting of basic negotiation parameters. The parties are testing where interests might coincide, which mechanisms would be acceptable, and how far compromises could realistically go. Given all the circumstances, several key issues appear on the horizon, and the definition of each will determine the future scenarios. These include the revival of the “5+2” format in an updated format (possibly with a strengthened role for the EU and the United States), economic incentives for the left bank and expanded access to the European market, an intermediate model of status for the Transnistrian region, and finally, security arrangements and guarantees that would ensure stable progress along two simultaneous tracks – European integration and the settlement process. For many years, the Transnistrian conflict existed in a state of “controlled freeze”, convenient for all external actors but increasingly unacceptable for our state. Today, as the country moves steadily toward the European Union, the possibility of maintaining a static situation on the Dniester is rapidly disappearing. This is why the growing involvement of the United States and the European Union creates the impression that the period of diplomatic pause is gradually coming to an end. And although there is still no clear understanding of how exactly to move the process forward, it appears that a substantive discussion has already begun. In the coming months, the parties to the conflict are likely to focus on rebuilding a minimal level of trust and clarifying the boundaries of acceptable compromise. At the same time, external partners may push forward elements of a phased roadmap linking political concessions to economic incentives. One may also expect the emergence of new multilateral initiatives capable of formally relaunching the negotiations. How long and complex this “thaw” will be is difficult to predict, but it is precisely this process that will largely determine Moldova’s European future.