RTA expert Sergey Cheban believes that the calm in the Moldovan-Russian relations is not only a prologue to the elections on February 24, but also a proof of the positional war for Moldova between Moscow, Brussels and Washington.
Turn of 2019
By 2019, relations between Moscow and Chisinau has narrowed to contacts between President Igor Dodon and the Party of Socialists of Moldova. Other political forces in Moldova just keep talking about the “Russian threat” and emphasize their commitment to the pro-European policy. Sometimes it reaches the point of absurdity – through the efforts of the Democratic Party of Plahotniuc, the main pro-Europeans of Moldova Andrei Nastase and Maia Sandu have been almost accused of ties with the Kremlin. They were allegedly funded by the Kozlovskaya foundation, which is surely connected with the “hand of Moscow”. The fight for the loyalty of Brussels is in full swing, which allows the Socialists to monopolize contacts in the East.
The Kremlin openly supports the PSRM and makes it clear that it expects from the Socialists to win the parliamentary elections, form the government and ensure some warming of relations with Russia. The support that Moscow renders to Igor Dodon at the highest level seems unprecedented: since January 1, Russia has abolished import duties on Moldovan goods for six months and announced an amnesty for migrant workers. Citizens of Moldova who have exceeded the period of stay in Russia will be able to return home without penalty until February 23, just before the elections.
Then there was a lull which was broken only by a confusion with anti-Ukrainian sanctions: Russia seems to have removed customs duties on Moldovan goods, but they immediately fell under the ban to import goods into Russia through Ukraine. The situation has not been resolved so far and has become a cause for irony towards the Moscow agreements of Dodon.
Even with this unfortunate incident, there is a loud silence on the Russian track – even attacks against Russia by the PDM have stopped, although Plahotniuc could again play geopolitics and seek the West’s support of the good old song about the “hand of the Kremlin”.
Game or deal?
Many colleagues in the expert community notice that the participants in the election race have stopped public rhetoric about Europe, the United States, Russia and Ukraine. There is a feeling that the leaders of political forces are afraid to stumble, to make an image mistake, criticizing the wrong persons in the wrong time. Such caution is somewhat surprising – earlier in Moldova all political formations clearly knew friends and enemies and used strong language for shock value and sympathies of the voters. In 2019, the situation is more complicated.
The possible reasons for this lull are already described on the RTA – the European Union
is changing its approach towards Eastern Europe and primarily Moldova. Apparently, Brussels is no longer ready to extend the credit of trust to the narrow circle of Moldovan leaders and will not make such a mistake in the future. The EU is turning its attention to technocratic politicians and mid-level officials, trying to avoid a new “capture” of Moldova.
Having received a black spot from Europe, the current government is looking for an opportunity to negotiate with all centers of power, so heavy criticism of Moscow in last December was stopped by a loud statement of Deputy Prime Minister Lesnic. The Kremlin, obviously, already knows about the shaky positions of the Democratic Party and therefore joined the positional war for Moldova. At the same time, it is not necessary that the bargaining is with political forces inside the Republic of Moldova. We may assume that consultations have already begun on the future of the entire region between Moscow, Brussels and Berlin. This indirectly explains the restrained geopolitical rhetoric of Igor Dodon: no one knows for sure whether a chess game or a pragmatic deal goes behind the scenes.
Policy across Eastern Europe is shifting from “support of elites” to new “market policy” mechanisms. Moscow has made enough mistakes supporting the leaders of Moldova, Ukraine and even Belarus. Similarly, the Europeans got burned on the local mentality and gave rise to a new class of “Eurooligarchs”. Therefore, any agreement between the West and Russia on Moldova at the current stage may be bad news for the future leadership of Moldova: if Chisinau loses its importance as a geopolitical trophy, the government will have to solve the problems on its own.
