Is Russia Ready to Withdraw Its Troops from Transdniestria?

Sergei Isaenko Moscow can compromise for the sake of reaching an international consensus on the Transdniestrian settlement Last week, President of Moldova Igor Dodon met with member of the U.S. House of Representatives Mike Quigley in Chisinau. During the meeting with the congressman, the head of state said that he plans to make an official visit to the United States in September and deliver a speech from the rostrum of the UN General Assembly. Dodon also expects meetings with representatives of the state apparatus of the United States. The agenda of the American tour of the President is not yet known, however, it seems that the visit will be bi-directional. Firstly, Igor Dodon must be presented as one of the top Moldovan leaders, and secondly, a trip to the United States should give concrete results for Moldova itself. It is symptomatic that Maia Sandu decided to interrupt the long-term practice of participation of Moldovan Prime Ministers in the meetings of the UN General Assembly and refuse such an important event for the image-building. This may indicate that the presidential administration was able to give their coalition colleagues convincing arguments telling, for example, what Dodon is going to bring back from New York. It is important to understand that the factor of personal ambitions of the head of state has become largely decisive for the political future of the Party of Socialists, and for the Moldovan state as a whole. Since elected Dodon became a very inconspicuous figure in the international arena, without making, for example, any official visit to the nearest neighbors in Bucharest and Kyiv. The change of power configuration in Chisinau opens up new horizons for the President, which he will try to use to maximum practical advantage, with an eye to the upcoming elections in 2020. A friendly meeting and a firm handshake in one of the Washington offices can give a new impetus to the career of the President, who until then had only the reputation of a ‘pro-Russian politician’. Certain surprises, apparently, should also be expected from the UN Assembly in New York. Following the logic of the international processes around Moldova, Igor Dodon is unlikely to be able to evade the traditional Moldovan diplomacy topic of the Transdniestrian settlement and the Russian military presence. However, special relations with Moscow (even more strengthened after the expulsion of Vlad Plahotniuc from Moldova), as well as the soft rhetoric and contacts with Vladimir Putin can attach a completely different weight to the words of Dodon. In light of the recent political reset in Moldova, which has become fundamentally possible thanks to an external factor, RTA experts predict the next round of the geopolitical game in the region. Actively stressed by the Moldovan President, the thesis of Moldova’s ‘neutrality’ can become a very convenient cornerstone of the political future of Moldova, around which the main players – the West and Russia – will build their schemes and models. The ‘neutrality’ topic fits perfectly for the resolution of problems in the field of regional security under this euphonious sign. At the same time, all stakeholders will try to beat the partner completely, getting the maximum result. Given the many years of experience of Moldova’s interaction with NATO, we can hardly expect the United States to abandon the further development of numerous military programs aimed at gaining control of Moldova’s military command system. It is noteworthy that the pro-Russian rhetoric of the President and at the same time the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Igor Dodon and close to the socialists Defense Minister Pavel Voicu is not able to shake at least to some extent the long-standing policy of unification of the army of Moldova with the military systems of NATO and, in particular, Romania. The analysis of the first steps of the new government in the military sphere, prepared by Moldovan politician and journalist Dmitry Chubashenko, confirms the existence of systemic Moldova-NATO relations. Meanwhile, Russia continues to make success on the Moldovan track, actively joining in on the topic of the Transdniestrian conflict settlement. It is noteworthy that in his recent comment on Moscow’s vision of the settlement, chief diplomat Sergey Lavrov once again emphasized the principle of neutrality, suggesting as a model “the special status of the TMR, agreed with Tiraspol, within the Republic of Moldova, with the understanding that the Republic of Moldova retains its sovereignty, that is, it will not be absorbed by anyone as a state, and with the understanding that it will keep its neutral status, that is, it will not enter into military-political blocs”. Thus, we can predict that in the near future Moscow will be ready to listen to the long-standing calls of Chisinau to remove arms depots and Russian troops. However, the main target of this gesture must be Washington, which Moscow is, in fact, demonstrating the resolve to ensure the true neutrality of Moldova. To support this scenario there are new signals on the issue of depots in Cobasna the Western partners of Chisinau long dreamed to ‘deal with’. So, the Moldovan Defense Minister Pavel Voicu during his briefing said that the Russian side is ready to discuss the topic of ammunition in Transdniestria. According to him, there are discussions on inspections in the depots as well as the launch of negotiations on the removal and disposal of the most dangerous weapons. It is obvious that such bold statements of the Moldovan official could hardly be made without prior approval from Moscow. Apparently, Russia and its allies in Chisinau expect to encourage Washington to adjust its position on the future of the banks of the Dniester. As known, Moldovan politicians have recently made the achievement of an external compromise on Moldova a priority, considering it a key in addressing domestic problems, including on the Transdniestrian track. The current authorities of Moldova may intend to apply to Transdniestria the practice of ‘international consensus’, which worked so well during the liquidation of the Plahotniuc regime. In this context, Dodon’s attempts to persuade Moscow to compromise on the issue of Russian arms in the ‘TMR’, which will later become the starting point in the President’s talks in Washington, are understandable. The developments in the issue of military depots in Cobasna and in determination of the future of the Operational Group of Russian Troops in Transdniestria will be the main indicator that the long-term process of the Transdniestrian settlement is reaching the finish line.