Moldova’s Week of (In)Security

Sergiu CEBAN

The events of the past week have once again shown that Moldova’s security depends less and less on its own decisions and is increasingly shaped by external factors

A great many developments are now unfolding that directly or indirectly affect Moldova’s security. At first glance, they form a coherent picture of how the authorities are strengthening the country’s resilience amid an ongoing war, rising hybrid threats, and rapid geopolitical shifts. Yet a closer look reveals that the republic’s future remains uncertain, and its security fragile and exposed to the will of larger players. The central and in many ways symbolic event of the past week was the Moldova Security Forum 2025, which brought together in Chisinau politicians, diplomats, EU and NATO experts, analysts, and civil-society representatives. The organizers envisioned it as a platform for discussing all key dimensions of security: from propaganda and digital threats to economic dependence and the development of shared regional strategies. Speaking before the participants, Maia Sandu loudly announced the drafting of a National Resilience Plan for state institutions aimed at countering disinformation and strengthening both the judiciary and cybersecurity. In essence, the forum became a demonstration of Moldova’s ambitious aspiration to integrate itself into the broader European security framework, as well as an attempt to signal to international partners that the country is ready to structurally reform both its architecture and its profile in this domain. However, the followed events showed that pompous declarations alone are far from sufficient to genuinely protect the state. On 18 November, on the sidelines of the forum, the first meeting of the national coordinators of the “Odessa Triangle” format, established by Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine, took place. The central topic was regional security, once again underscoring our country’s dependence on the Ukrainian context. At the same time, it is clear that each participating state assesses the scale of its own risks differently and pursues its own interests, which do not always fully align. That same day, while in Brussels, our prime minister emphasized the importance of the country’s participation in the European Security and Defense Partnership. As is well known, Moldova became the first non-EU state to sign such an agreement. It is intended to strengthen our ability to manage crises, taking into account the volume of assistance received through the European Peace Facility for the modernization of the National Army. However, despite the importance of cooperation with the EU, it is crucial to understand how far we are prepared to go, given our official status as a neutral state. Notably, Foreign Minister Mihai Popsoi, commenting on the regional situation, once again brought up the issue of neutrality. According to him, against the backdrop of the ongoing full-scale war, neutrality can no longer be regarded as a sufficient security guarantee. Thus, on the one hand, the authorities are preparing the public for the idea that the traditional model of Moldovan security has exhausted itself; on the other, such statements serve as a political instrument that allows the state’s position to be adjusted to the needs of the moment. After all, discussing neutrality does not mean abandoning it – but it does allow for flexible maneuvering at a time when the regional security architecture is approaching a phase of rapid transformation. All these domestic developments were instantly overshadowed once a sharp shift emerged in the Russian-Ukrainian settlement process. The United States, seeking to bring an end to the hostilities, initiated negotiations that only a few months ago seemed highly unlikely. A distinctive feature this time, judging by the reactions of European politicians, is a notable departure from the previously maximalist demands toward Russia. And if we try to apply these emerging approaches to the Moldovan context, it becomes clear that many of the potential compromises would be entirely unacceptable for the current political leadership of our country. They fundamentally contradict the official course and the political narratives that have been promoted to the public over the past several years. For Chisinau, a worrying signal may also be how the United States has begun exerting pressure on the official authorities in Kyiv, combining political leverage with the exposure of corruption schemes involving top officials from the president’s inner circle. All of this demonstrates that Washington is prepared to employ a wide range of measures to achieve its diplomatic objectives. Therefore, if the White House’s diplomatic efforts are scaled up, it is reasonable to assume that all countries bordering Ukraine could come under this pressure, particularly Moldova, which is part of neither the EU nor NATO. One would have expected that, following the Security Forum, the Moldovan authorities would demonstrate a high level of readiness to respond to any threats. Yet, just a few days later, “as if on cue”, an incident occurred that undermined much of the optimistic messaging. At the Leuseni-Albtța border crossing, a Moldovan truck carrying smuggled weapons, including man-portable air-defense systems and anti-tank weapons, was intercepted. The incident caused a major public outcry, and several questions remain unanswered in the media. How could such a dangerous cargo have ended up on Moldovan territory? Why was it only discovered upon exiting to Romania? Where were the law enforcement agencies and intelligence services? A few days later, no clarity has emerged. Official statements remain scattered, often contradict one another, and reveal a clear sense of bewilderment within the authorities, who were unprepared for such a crisis. Moreover, the episode serves as a worrying indicator of the country’s security situation. Formally, Moldova is a neutral state, and its territory is not supposed to be used for supplying arms to Ukraine. In practice, however, tangible flows of modern weaponry have been passing through the country for quite some time. It can be assumed that what happened was merely a “trial balloon” aimed at assessing the reaction of our leadership. Only Western structures that control military supply channels, including classified ones, are capable of organizing such an operation. This raises the question of what the underlying intent of this incident was and what task has been assigned to the intelligence services that have both the resources and the motivation to monitor regional security in this manner. In any case, the weapons-related incident immediately exposed several weaknesses in Moldova’s security system. The lack of effective border control and oversight of logistical chains allows heavy weaponry to cross the country unnoticed. Vulnerability to external actors for whom Moldova becomes a convenient space to simulate crisis scenarios and test the resilience of state institutions. Communication problems on the part of the authorities, as the chaotic response only heightened suspicions and created an information vacuum. A serious risk of the country being drawn into diplomatic processes that it is objectively unable to control. Thus, the events of the past week have shown that Moldova’s security depends less and less on our own decisions and is increasingly shaped by external factors – the dynamics of the settlement in Ukraine, the strategic interests of the United States, regional cooperation formats, and the activity of foreign intelligence services. Given how the focus of international attention among major powers is gradually shifting toward our regional arena, it is reasonable to expect the emergence of new, non-trivial developments in the coming months, or perhaps even weeks: information operations tied to sensitive security issues, and attempts by external actors to continue testing our resilience. Therefore, if anyone believes that, following the parliamentary elections, we are smoothly moving onto a trajectory of European integration, this is a serious misconception. Unfortunately, our country remains in the “firm embrace” of Ukraine’s gravitational field, and much will now depend on the pace of the settlement process with active U.S. involvement, as well as on how decisively external actors seek to shape a new security architecture in the region, that will inevitably affect our strategic position.