Expert: Moldova’s Signaling Diplomacy Has Run Its Course

The ruling regime in Chisinau has become so absorbed in the performative aspect of foreign policy that it no longer notices its practical consequences

A clear imbalance in the ruling regime led by Maia Sandu in favor of foreign affairs at the expense of domestic policy has been evident since the very first days in power. One could say that the political elite in Chisinau has always been inclined to distance itself from the mundane and complex administrative and economic challenges of governance. Far greater satisfaction has come from a sense of involvement in important regional and international processes, as well as proximity to high-profile foreign political figures. One may recall the Communist Party’s initiatives regarding the country’s special role as a bridge between East and West, or Igor Dodon’s “Big Package for Moldova”. Alongside their own attempts to attract high-profile international attention, Moldovan politicians have been particularly receptive when initiatives to elevate their global profile came from external partners. Their characteristic blend of unchecked ambition and provincial complexes has meant that the authors of such flattering offers could almost always count on success. It is difficult even to imagine a president or prime minister refusing an invitation to some international event abroad. More often than not, however, the opposite happens: Moldova’s representatives are not invited anywhere, yet they manage to invite themselves. In the case of Maia Sandu, recognition quite literally fell from the sky. The Russian Federation, the United States, and the European Union legitimized her team against the backdrop of a rare convergence of interests aimed at removing Vladimir Plahotniuc. Since then, the current authorities have been unable to function without a steady “international stimulus”, filled with signals and symbolism. European integration and a demonstrative course of confrontation with Russia since mid-2022 have raised Moldova’s geopolitical profile to a previously unattainable level. The country has quickly adapted to this geopolitical spotlight and to the assigned role of an anti-Russian battering ram, as its people have always tended to adapt to external environments more easily than many others. The president’s numerous trips abroad, landmark speeches from high podiums, interactions on equal footing with world leaders, the receipt of prizes and awards, and the hosting of a diverse array of visitors in Chisinau have become the norm for the leadership of our small country. A politician without a podium is like an actor without a stage – doomed to oblivion. Ambitious figures are never satisfied with what they have. Therefore, even in the absence of new invitations, newsworthy events must be created out of thin air. Sometimes this simply involves copying neighbors with similar psychological profiles. Yesterday, Maia Sandu awarded former Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili the Order of the Republic for “upholding democratic values, promoting human rights, and steadfastly supporting Georgia’s European future”. The message is clear: a demonstration of disapproval of the foreign policy course of the current leadership in Tbilisi. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky made a similar move the day before by receiving Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, whom many had all but forgotten. It is clear that both moves fit within the framework of EU foreign policy. But one gets the impression that in Kyiv and Chisinau, officials are championing Brussels’ interests more than the community’s leaders themselves, or view themselves as the primary champions of European values on the eastern frontier. While the actions of Ukraine’s leadership reflect a general trend of escalation in relations with Belarus, the message from Chisinau is much harder to explain. Is there any rationality to it, or is it simply a show of force with no practical purpose? These doubts are compounded by a series of contradictory diplomatic jabs from Chisinau directed at Moscow in recent years. While summoning the Russian ambassador to the Foreign Ministry over a drone flyby can be explained by the need to respond to a violation of airspace and international norms, the numerous high-profile accusations and threats are more likely perceived as purely symbolic. This includes the denunciation of the CIS founding agreements, decrees stripping officials in Tiraspol of their citizenship, the designation of OGRF officers as persona non grata, the law extending national tax legislation to the left bank, and statements about the need to introduce the Romanian language in the region. None of the above measures will yield results in the foreseeable future. Abandoning political agreements within the CIS will not change the current situation or limit Moldovan politicians’ participation in meetings in the East. Moreover, the authorities themselves acknowledge their desire to maintain economic ties within the Commonwealth. The public announcement of personal sanctions against Transnistrians and Russians will not lead to their automatic disappearance from Tiraspol. Taxes on cigarettes and alcohol for residents of the eastern regions have long been collected, as these goods are supplied only via the right bank with Moldovan excise stamps. The Romanian language will not appear in Transnistrian schools either following the public wishes of our politicians. What is evident in all these decisions is not a desire to resolve the country’s long-standing and painful problems more quickly, but rather a desire to project an image of resoluteness and intransigence in the emerging new geopolitical reality, which is, of course, considered favorable by the official authorities in Chisinau. It is an effort to secure external support for an inevitable shift in the status quo, without a coherent underlying strategy. After all, one can also imagine the opposite scenario, in which concrete steps to protect sovereignty and territorial integrity are taken with minimal media emphasis, while their adoption is calmly and convincingly communicated to the relevant stakeholders. Moldova’s high-profile foreign policy toward Russia can be based on only one practical calculation – and even that is not an immediate one. The aim is to gradually shift public opinion in order to justify subsequent decisions that will go beyond mere symbolism. For example, after 5-10 years of such pressure, it is quite conceivable that there will be a significant increase in the number of supporters of unification or joining military alliances under Western control, followed by the legal enshrinement of the majority’s opinion. What other steps will Chisinau need to make over such a period of time? Obviously, increasingly radical ones. For example, it is conceivable that the idea of renouncing the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Russian Federation would not provoke serious criticism from expert circles or the business community, nor would it spark mass protests by citizens. The country’s population seems ready for anything. The only question is that, in the view of our political elite, its one-sided policy of sending signals is supposed to yield only favorable results: approval from European partners and, in effect, passive acceptance in Moscow, though preferably accompanied by a loud verbal reaction, so as to portray a fierce confrontation with the Kremlin and easily score political points from it. As if we have come to believe that the Russian Federation’s regular statements cannot be followed by any concrete and practical actions that go beyond the current framework. It is obvious that this mindset was shaped by European politicians, who once actively accused the Russian authorities of being unwilling to shift their “red lines” and now demonstratively ignore threats from Moscow. But one can understand the EU partners; they are protected by collective security treaties and geography. But what about Moldova?