Moldova in the Face of a Potential Escalation in Ukraine

The armed confrontation in the neighboring country has reached a dangerous crossroads, with a high likelihood of a sharp escalation in mutual strikes and an expansion in the number of actors involved in the conflict. By strengthening its role as a military and logistical hub for Ukraine and NATO, Moldova is assuming security risks that are disproportionate to its size and capabilities

The conflict in Ukraine, which began in 2022, continues to serve as a major stress test for Moldova across a wide range of areas: refugee flows, the trafficking of weapons and narcotics, and the periodic incursion of drones, including those carrying explosive payloads, which, by a fortunate coincidence, have so far not resulted in any loss of life or significant material damage. The most serious risks, however, lie in the security sphere. The danger of the war spilling over onto Moldovan territory has existed virtually since the first days of the Russian invasion, owing to the unresolved Transnistrian conflict and the presence of Russian troops in the region. Persistent reports of alleged military activity by Transnistria against Ukraine, incidents involving explosions on the left bank of the Dniester, and periodic bursts of aggressive rhetoric directed at Tiraspol by Ukrainian figures close to the authorities, often resembling an attempt to build a casus belli, have all served to keep tensions at a consistently high level. It is worth acknowledging the responsible officials on both the Moldovan side and among the parties to the conflict, who previously prevented Moldova from being drawn into the war. However, as long as the war continues, risks undoubtedly remain, especially at critical turning points, one of which is unfolding right now. This refers to the fact that this year Ukraine has once again managed to shift the situation in its favor after more than two relatively difficult years in many respects. A significant role, as before, has been played by the achieved technological superiority over the adversary. We have already seen how the introduction of HIMARS systems, guided aerial bombs, fiber-optic drones, and similar technologies on the battlefield acted as game-changers for a period of time, forcing one side to adapt – a process that came at the cost of painful losses. At present, Kyiv has gained an advantage through the use of AI-powered drones, which allow it to strike Russian logistics with relative ease at considerable depth and have already led to supply problems for both Russian forces and even the civilian population in certain territories, particularly in Crimea. There has also been a noticeable increase in the capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in conducting long-range strikes, which are being carried out at ever greater distances and on an expanding scale (hundreds of missiles and drones daily), reaching regions of the Russian Federation that previously felt entirely secure due to their distance from Ukraine. It is evident that in recent months Kyiv has focused on systematically targeting Russia’s oil refining sector, and with considerable success, as certain areas in Russia are already experiencing logistical – and potentially soon physical – shortages of gasoline and diesel fuel. Ukraine has also achieved positive results on the battlefield. Although the Russian offensive has not been fully halted, the pace of its advance remains minimal, while the Ukrainian Armed Forces are successfully counterattacking in certain sectors. The situation with financing, which had previously been in a state of uncertainty, has become relatively stable. Despite a number of difficulties in budget execution and in the financial component of the long-anticipated military reform, the country is, in general, sufficiently funded for the near term. Moreover, the military gains achieved are encouraging its allies to be more generous in their support. The evolving situation has clearly intensified the plans of key European states (primarily Germany, France, and the United Kingdom) to continue the conflict with ambitious objectives. These and other countries are openly establishing production facilities on their own territory, either individually or jointly with Ukraine, which will operate exclusively for the needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. They are also allocating additional funding and weapons, stopping only one step short of becoming direct participants in the war. One should not attach too much importance to the news flow concerning EU efforts to establish a peace dialogue with Russia, appoint a single negotiator, and similar initiatives. It is telling that recent covert contacts between the office of the European Council and Moscow interlocutors have provoked criticism from leading European states. This once again demonstrates that they continue, as before, to count on the continuation of the conflict and Russia’s eventual defeat, followed by the imposition of onerous terms. The rhetorical commitment to negotiations and a swift ceasefire along the front line is nothing more than a tactical device, especially since it is deliberately framed in terms and tones unacceptable to the Kremlin. Its real target is not Russia but domestic audiences, a war-weary Ukrainian public, as well as Donald Trump, who still intends to secure a deal on Ukraine ahead of the midterm congressional elections, particularly following a highly unsuccessful campaign in Iran. At present, the main efforts of Ukraine’s European allies are focused on persuading Trump to move away from the Anchorage understandings with Vladimir Putin, to portray the latter as the main ideologue and proponent of prolonging hostilities, and thereby to push the United States back into the camp of Kyiv’s sponsors. These efforts appear to have some success: EU leaders, such as Emmanuel Macron, for example, claim that they have managed to convince Trump that Ukraine’s defeat is by no means inevitable, and that Russia is gradually approaching a point of internal breaking strain. At the same time, statements from the American president’s own administration, previously uncharacteristic of it, are also emerging regarding the strengthening of Ukraine’s military capabilities, including the establishment of production facilities for interceptor missiles for Patriot systems. In sum, the resulting situation can be described as follows. Ukraine has gone through a difficult period, is successfully conducting long-range strikes, and, according to some reports, is preparing its own major offensive on the front line. The EU is ready to increase its level of involvement in the war and, as before, to torpedo any attempts to reach an agreement with the Kremlin on a more or less compromise basis. The United States seeks to bring the conflict to a settlement, but possibly on new terms that are hardly acceptable to Moscow. In such circumstances, Russia finds itself in a rather difficult position – economic problems are mounting, the front line is reaching a deadlocked impasse, and an increasing number of cities are coming under attack, with strategic facilities located there being taken out of service. At the same time, ahead lies the strengthening of Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities with the support of EU countries, the threat of cutting logistics in the “new” and border regions of the Russian Federation, as well as the complete isolation of Crimea. As is well known, a wounded animal is the most dangerous. And no one can predict Russia’s actions if it loses hope of reaching what it considers a fair settlement on Ukraine and is pushed to the brink of a strategic defeat. Within Russia, voices have long been growing stronger calling for “starting to fight for real”, implying the use of the full range of available weaponry – including nuclear capabilities, an expansion of the geographic scope of strikes beyond Ukraine, and the undertaking of unconventional actions capable of disrupting the trajectory of the conflict as defined by its adversaries. If peace is not achieved by the end of the year and the situation develops along such an escalation trajectory, Moldova also finds itself in a particularly high-risk zone. The country has already been integrated for a considerable time into the military supply system of Ukraine. However, the ruling party, apparently at the request of its European partners, has gone further. It is no longer a secret that the military airfield at Marculesti has been reactivated, with Ukrainian and NATO aircraft regularly arriving there. In addition, it has recently emerged that Moldova is developing its own drone production capabilities and conducting testing for allied countries – primarily Romania and Ukraine. Western states are willing to invest in this sector, and PAS has already announced plans to expand drone manufacturing capacities, with some units reportedly already being discreetly transferred for the needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Overall, my colleagues and I have been writing for several years that the country’s political leadership is deliberately strengthening the Republic’s air defense capabilities through the procurement of expensive radar systems, anti-aircraft complexes, as well as domestic assembly and foreign supplies of drone interceptors. This is a reasonable direction from the standpoint that the main adversary identified under PAS governance – the Russian Federation – can realistically attack Moldova only from the air (the Russian grouping in Transnistria lacks offensive potential due to its limited size and insufficient armaments). Another question is why, in the first place, the situation should be allowed to develop into scenarios in which military confrontation with Moscow could become a real possibility. However, it appears that for the Moldovan authorities, even if risks are being assessed, there is already no way back. At the same time, the threats may be existential in nature. What if the voices of the hawks in Moscow prevail and a decision is taken to carry out a demonstrative strike on sites producing such drones in Europe? In such a case, Moldova would become a highly attractive target: it is not protected by NATO’s security umbrella, nor is it even a member of the EU. Candidate status provides no defense guarantees. Undoubtedly, such a strike would also be highly risky for Moscow, as it could lead to the unfreezing of the Transnistrian issue. However, strategic considerations could outweigh these risks, especially since there always remains the “last resort” in the form of a nuclear ultimatum. It is unfortunate that we have reached a point where discussions of such scenarios are shifting from a purely hypothetical plane into a more practical one. At the same time, the ruling regime continues to act rather recklessly in the field of security, undermining Moldova’s constitutionally enshrined neutral status and placing it at the epicenter of a potential new wave of geopolitical confrontation between the West and Russia.