The Struggle for Spoils Within PAS

Under today's conditions of minimal economic growth, the struggle among clans within the ruling party is becoming particularly intense, while the state's strategic assets are turning into their primary centers of attraction

The PAS congress held on 14 June became a kind of demonstration of the political resilience and internal discipline of the country’s leading political formation. We deliberately refrained from covering the event, taking some time to observe subsequent developments. And that proved to be the right decision. Formally, the key objective was achieved: the party preserved an image of unity, and Igor Grosu was re-elected as party leader, running unopposed. For an external observer not immersed in the specifics of Moldovan politics, the entire performance appeared to be evidence of PAS’ manageability and monolithic structure, as well as of a stable course toward European integration. However, behind the glossy facade carefully constructed by political strategists since the party’s parliamentary victory, clear signs of intensifying internal struggle are becoming increasingly visible. To balance different groups of influence within PAS and bring them together around common tasks and objectives, the congress elected members of the new Permanent National Bureau and approved the political strategy for the next four years. However, beyond public speeches, processes have noticeably intensified that are likely to define the internal logic of the current government in the years ahead. Thus, the congress did not eliminate the fundamental contradictions within PAS. Moreover, events of the past week have shown that the party congress has rather become a starting point for the activation of those actors who prefer to exert influence on processes in an “informal” manner. On the one hand, Grosu’s re-election to some extent strengthens his personal influence. On the other hand, it signals that other centers of influence both within the party and among quasi-party actors are still not inclined to step into the open. It is more advantageous for them to operate through Grosu, using him as an operational manager while preserving their own positions within the party’s shadow structure. Therefore, the lack of alternatives to the leader in such a system is by no means a sign of unquestioned authority (Grosu’s real approval rating is no secret), but rather a symptom of the real struggle being waged not for formal positions but for something far more tangible. Over five years in power, PAS has gone from a movement of political activists, predominantly drawn from the non-governmental sector, to a complex structure controlling not only state institutions but also a significant part of the governance system down to the lowest administrative levels. This evolution has inevitably led to the formation of various competing groups, united under a common brand but driven by their own interests and ambitions. Some of them rely on the ideological image of European modernization and institutional reform. Others focus on administrative control and the management of state resources. A third group seeks to consolidate influence through the economy, where state decisions, major contracts, and strategic infrastructure intersect. In the current conditions of limited economic growth, the struggle between these clans is becoming particularly acute. When opportunities for expanding resources are increasingly scarce, the importance of control over sectors where financial flows are concentrated grows significantly. For this reason, the state’s strategic assets are becoming focal points of attraction. No sooner had the party celebrations ended than one of the main lines of long-standing intra-party confrontation came to the surface – the struggle for control over Chisinau International Airport named after Eugen Doga. The facility, which was returned to state ownership in March 2023 after the termination of a long-term concession with “Avia Invest”, has turned into an arena of confrontation between groups, each of which sees it as a source of steady financial flows. The history of airport tenders is perhaps one of the most illustrative examples of how forces invisible to the public eye compete with one another. Tenders for the lease of commercial spaces were announced several times, but without success. The first competition for the leasing of sterile zones and Duty-Free areas was launched back in 2024; however, it was later cancelled by then Minister of Infrastructure Andrei Spinu, who cited sabotage. Subsequently, the company AEROFOOD, which manages several establishments at the airport, announced the suspension of operations in the Plai restaurants, Air Cafe, and the Business Lounge, claiming that it had offered a rental price higher than the tender price but had received no response from the administration. As a result, from 1 March 2025, the capital’s airport switched to self-management of its commercial facilities. In the logic of bureaucratic competition, this temporary solution meant that none of the competing groups had managed to prevail. Domestic politics has historically often been structured around control over economic resources. Parties, slogans, and foreign policy orientations have changed, but the question of access to key assets has remained constant. At one point, interest in the airport was associated with various external and internal structures, including those linked to Ilan Sor. Today, this asset has come into the orbit of a fundamentally different actor – former Prime Minister Dorin Recean. In December of last year, he was appointed Special Envoy of the President on development and resilience issues, with a highly vague mandate that effectively allows him to cover virtually any strategically significant sector. In practice, a person with such powers, relying directly on the presidential apparatus and possessing informal networks accumulated over years in the security sector, gains the ability to intervene in the management of key infrastructure facilities under any convenient pretext, whether national security, reforms, or anti-corruption efforts. Interest in the airport is entirely clear. The airport complex, which handles millions of passengers annually, is one of the few genuinely profitable state-owned enterprises in Moldova. Against the backdrop of a shrinking economic space, control over such assets becomes particularly important for those seeking to strengthen their political influence through access to concrete financial flows. An additional factor is the negotiations with the EU, which open up prospects for substantial European funding, a significant part of which will be directed toward infrastructure projects. In this context, those who secure control over strategic assets today will be in a more advantageous position when it comes to accessing external resources. According to experts, the current escalation of the confrontation around the airport is linked to the legacy of Andrei Spinu. His name has often been associated with a wide range of decisions in the infrastructure, energy, and transport sectors, which contributed to the formation of a major center of influence within the ruling party. Thus, the open intervention of one of the groups led by Recean, which has begun to alter the personnel configuration within MoldATSA (the State Enterprise for Air Traffic Services), signals that, following the congress, significant shifts in the internal balance of power within PAS have begun to take shape. In essence, what we are witnessing today is not only a crisis within PAS itself, but also a crisis of a model in which political power functions primarily as an instrument of economic redistribution rather than as a mechanism for governing the country. This system operated relatively smoothly as long as the “pie” appeared large enough for all major “eaters”. Now it is no longer sufficient for everyone: economic growth is minimal, state resources are limited, and external financing is increasingly filtered through a narrower “eye of the needle” of Western conditionalities. It is therefore unsurprising that clans are beginning to act pre-emptively, seeking to secure assets for themselves before they are taken over by competitors from the same party “corridor”. The airport case is only one example, and others will follow, possibly even more high-profile ones. However, there is nothing extraordinary in this: behind the “takeover” lies an entire architecture of relationships within the party and the state, built around control over tenders, personnel appointments, administrative decisions, and mechanisms of state regulation. This shadow model of managing material and institutional resources existed long before PAS and is unlikely to disappear after it as well.