Maia Sandu’s Prime Minister Dilemma

In the current domestic political crisis, the ruling regime led by Maia Sandu has run out of good solutions

Cristian RUSSU, RTA: The current domestic political crisis, which is dealing painful blows to the public image of key figures in the ruling regime, has confirmed the regime’s inability to balance the system of state governance and ensure its proper functioning. Last September, we witnessed the emergence of a fundamental problem for the government: the need to align the “shadow government” with Moldova’s institutional structures. It has long been no secret that in our country, all sectors that generate any significant financial flows are controlled by certain influential groups. The current political regime, like all its predecessors, seeks to exploit these assets to the fullest for its own benefit. Much has been written about the existence of rival factions within the ruling party. They are constantly vying for power and resources, and one of the main tools in this struggle is control over state institutions. Following last year’s parliamentary elections, the authorities managed, with some difficulty, to divide spheres of influence and key posts among various factions, but the position of prime minister became a stumbling block. The departure of former Prime Minister Dorin Recean was supposed to bring banker Vasile Tofan to the forefront; he was expected to ensure continuity in maintaining preferential conditions for the banking sector and to implement a series of unpopular administrative and tax reforms. However, Tofan’s nomination was opposed by factions within PAS, who considered it unfair for the country’s top post to be given to a non-partisan candidate. The story that Tofan gave up his ambitions to become prime minister due to family circumstances seems like a convenient explanation that is often used in politics. This created a pressing need for the chief “overseer”, that is, Maia Sandu, to find an alternative “technical” candidate; in essence, it was a compromise based on the principle of “neither yours nor ours”. However, internal conflicts within the government have not gone away. Signs that the PAS factions were reaching the limit of their patience with Prime Minister Munteanu’s actions were already evident this spring, against the backdrop of the energy crisis, intensifying bureaucratic confrontations, and attempts to redistribute spheres of influence, including control over air transport. Even then, one of the factions began actively promoting the view in the media that only a party-affiliated prime minister was capable of effectively governing the country. The subsequent massive release of compromising information directly affected the president, who was effectively forced to shift the focus onto the prime minister in order to protect herself from the backlash. It could be said that Sandu was forced to indirectly acknowledge the error of the decision regarding the head of government that had been imposed last fall. Thus, the parties to the power struggle have once again returned to the situation of last fall, when a prime ministerial candidate must be selected from one of the rival camps that the clans will inevitably view as a victory for one side and a defeat for the other. Vasile Tofan’s so-called “public manifesto” on the need for radical reforms and his unequivocal willingness to take responsibility for Moldova, which is “at a crossroads”, is nothing more than a second attempt by Recean’s group to expand its influence and lay claim to assets controlled by the PAS “regional committee”. It must be acknowledged that this attempt has, on the whole, been successful. A group of young but already experienced PAS officials has not yet been able to openly oppose such a demonstrative move, which has received significant public support. They have neither an alternative concept, nor their own platform, nor a consensus leader, although Dan Perciun, Doina Gherman, and other members of the party leadership could certainly step into that role. It is quite possible that, following Vlad Plahotniuc’s methods, the “gray cardinal” Dorin Recean has gathered a sufficient amount of compromising material on the entire PAS leadership, and especially on the “mates”. This compromising material continues to be leaked selectively, exerting pressure to persuade everyone to agree to a non-partisan candidate. This likely explains the observable, demonstrative yet silent rejection of attempts to impose the supposedly “technical” Tofan without clearly putting forward a counterproposal. In the media, Moldovan political heavyweights such as Ion Sturza and other experts are still forced to take the heat on behalf of the ruling party. Apparently, within the party, they are merely continuing to blackmail opponents by threatening to withhold support for a non-partisan candidate, following the Romanian model. Apart from the purely political reason that Tofan’s opponents lack party membership, there are also perfectly understandable grievances against him. He represents the banking sector, which has reaped unimaginable windfall profits over the past four years. Our banks have become a major lending partner for the state, profiting from contracts with extortionate interest rates: ranging from 10 to 22 percent. Plans for radical reforms explicitly call for substantial cuts in budget spending while preserving the bankers’ comfortable position. And such plans by Tofan clearly do not fit well with PAS officials who benefit from financial flows from other sectors. The failure to confirm the nominee for prime minister could deal a painful blow to Sandu’s image as the country’s “chief arbiter”. She must not only decide on a replacement for Munteanu but also launch “Successor” operation, which further complicates the choice. Nominating someone from within PAS would mean ignoring the stance of the increasingly powerful non-partisan faction and dooming the country to open confrontation, in which Sandu’s own position would become increasingly precarious. At the same time, supporting Tofan, who has received a public mandate, would be a blow to the core of her own team within the party and would deprive the party of its political prospects. There is also a third path – to continue maneuvering by proposing alternative and relatively new figures who have already established themselves in the political elite. Deputy Prime Minister Eugen Osmochescu certainly falls into this category; he was left to serve as acting prime minister following the public humiliation of his predecessor. Osmochescu has already made it clear that he has mastered the basics of modern political culture and cynicism, and that he is not afraid to take responsibility for implementing unpopular reforms. In addition, he has managed to secure the support of officials in Brussels who directly oversee Moldova’s affairs – an argument that remains compelling to the domestic audience. Now all that remains is to present the competing clans with a fait accompli, given their inability to reach an agreement. However, such a compromise will once again prove to be temporary, failing to fundamentally resolve existing intra-government conflicts and merely postponing the moment when a strategic decision on the future course of governance must be made. In this case, the question will simply be whether a new balance of power will have formed by that time that would allow a way out of the current political zugzwang, or whether the ruling regime will finally go into a steep nosedive.