Military Parade Marks 35th Anniversary of Independence – A Demonstration of Strength and New Capabilities

Military parades featuring military equipment are not traditional events for the people of Moldova. While public celebrations marking significant historical events or special holidays – such as Wine Day – have become an integral part of national identity and a hallmark of the country’s image on the international stage, the clanging of weapons mostly evokes fear and anxiety among citizens. So we haven’t had that many parades. The first one took place in 1999, and the first large-scale one in 2001, under President Vladimir Voronin. At that time, following a signal from parade commander Victor Gaiciuc from a Soviet “Volga,” 1,700 military personnel, police officers, and border guards marched across the Great National Assembly Square. Roughly the same number of Chisinau residents and visitors watched the event. In 2011, marking the 20th anniversary of independence, military vehicles accompanied the military march for the first time. The successors to the Communists carried out a sort of rebranding at the time, allocating a colossal sum of 14 million lei for the event. This money was used to prepare 65 pieces of equipment, sew new uniforms for soldiers and officers, and transport the banner of Stefan cel Mare on a Romanian military aircraft. The participation of a group of veterans of the 1992 Nistru conflict was also significant. Five years later, at the 2016 military parade, another first took place. On that occasion, in addition to 60 pieces of military equipment and 2,000 Moldovan servicemen, contingents from Romania, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, Lithuania, and Poland marched through the center of the capital. The representation of foreign diplomats and military personnel was even broader, including Germany, Belarus, Turkey, Hungary, and France. In 2021, marking the 30th anniversary of independence, there was another parade; however, at the start of Maia Sandu’s term, it was not as large-scale. However, five years later, the ruling regime intends to showcase its achievements in strengthening military capabilities and cooperation with Euro-Atlantic partners: over two thousand Moldovan military personnel, more than one hundred pieces of equipment – including self-propelled artillery and anti-aircraft systems, as well as airspace monitoring and defense systems – and the participation of military personnel from Romania, Ukraine, Lithuania, Italy, Poland, France, the Czech Republic, the United States, and other countries. Demonstrating air defense systems is one of the main objectives, given the EU funding received for these purposes, including the recently allocated 120 million euros through the European Peace Facility. It is difficult to say with certainty to what extent citizens’ attitudes toward such events have changed on a national scale. On the one hand, public opinion polls show support for measures to strengthen the country’s defense capabilities; on the other hand, every time military equipment appears on the roads, it tends to cause anxiety rather than pride among residents. Despite announcements by the Ministry of Defense – led by the Russophobe Anatolie Nosatii and by Maia Sandu herself – there has once again been a flood of questions that have stirred public concern, requiring a response that involves activating crisis management mechanisms. The authorities themselves are partly fueling public fears with statements that the arrival of foreign military personnel for the parade is linked to Moldova’s involvement in Western military partnerships and the resulting obligations. The president explicitly states that we “have something to show” as a result of investments in the military sector funded by foreign support, while at the same time assuring the public that peace is the most important thing and that the safety of citizens is the government’s top priority. However, it appears that this peace-loving rhetoric is being backed up by a display of military force, echoing the revanchist sentiments found in the memoirs of the first president, Mircea Snegur. It is therefore quite understandable that the most popular joke among the people in recent days is the hope that foreign military personnel will not remain in the country after the parade. In our official and expert discourse on the age-old topic of “guns and butter,” the trends are different. There, the talk is of actively reforming the military sector, changing doctrinal approaches, and accelerated militarization driven by increased spending. In addition to the construction of new military bases, the main focus, of course, is on Sandu’s drone initiative, which is set to be implemented by 2027 without any legislative restrictions. Traditionally, the government’s main opponents are a diverse group of experts, former military officials, and independent media outlets. The latter actively criticize the ruling party – not for its stated goals regarding militarization, but for its sluggishness and lack of ambition in this area. The debate centers on whether increasing military spending to 1% of GDP and expanding the armed forces to 8,500 personnel is sufficient. There are also doubts about the actual capability to produce military drones here and now. The republic’s leadership is being urged to increase the military budget to 7% of GDP, expand the army’s strength to 12,500-18,000 personnel, and immediately launch private initiatives to produce weapons, following Ukraine’s example and with Ukraine’s participation. The threefold increase in military salaries over the past decade is also not considered sufficient. There are, of course, grounds for such demands. In their policy documents, the authorities state almost explicitly that the country has an external enemy and that this assertion gives rise to immediate threats to national security. A tactic already familiar in our political arena is at work here, in which it is not the authorities but, as it were, “civil society” that plays the role of the “hawks,” while the “doves” are supposedly forced to become increasingly radicalized against this backdrop. Meanwhile, these debates make it clear that, in addition to traditional financial problems, the real obstacle to large-scale militarization and the immediate ramp-up of unmanned aircraft production in the country is the high demand for military products in the region, as well as protracted and indefinite delivery schedules for weapons, which may simply become obsolete by the time they are manufactured and delivered to Moldova. Examples of such questionable investments can be seen in the case of the radars purchased by the country, which are unable to detect anything. There is a common saying among IT specialists: “If you want to buy modern equipment buy it tomorrow.” Something similar is used as an unofficial excuse by our military as well. Obviously, this will not hinder the buildup of military capabilities, but it will always serve as a talking point in the alibi of officials who advocate for any form of expansion of Chisinau’s military machine, including at the expense of their own country’s population.