Voting in the parliamentary elections organized by the Moldovan authorities for the residents of Transnistria risks leading to a new conflict. RTA expert Sergei Isaenko believes that a major provocation is brewing around the constituencies for the Left Bank.
Profanation
Elections to the Parliament of Moldova with the participation of Transnistrians initially looked like a profanation, not only for the local population, but also for foreign experts. Once upon a time the idea was good, but in the Moldovan realities turned into what it is.
Representatives of the European Union, which has supervised Moldovan politics for 10 years, has long recommended Chisinau to expand its electoral framework in Transnistria. By doing so the official authorities could show the world their desire to peacefully come closer to the Left Bank, to take into account the interests of its residents and even to represent them in the integrated Moldovan parliament. Russia also had similar considerations: Moscow believed that Transnistria’s foreign policy preferences would allow the pro-Russian forces in Moldova to gain power and turn the country to the East.
In 2018, before the next elections, the Moldovan leadership finally decided to give Transnistria 2 mandates in parliament. This is less than the quota for the diaspora – Moldovan citizens living abroad. Given that, according to the Moldovan authorities, over 300 thousand Moldovans live in Transnistria. It is not difficult to guess that such an approach looks like a mockery of both the European recommendations and a sound understanding of democracy: 150,000 people cannot be represented by one deputy.
RTA experts have already noted that this constituencies-for-Transnistria move could be a failure for official Chisinau and a cause for new criticism from European capitals. In actual fact, the fuss over the ‘Transnistrian’ constituencies began to blow over before the elections – out of 50 candidates in the constituencies on the Left Bank, the CEC has hardly registered 12, half of whom permanently live in Chisinau and visit the left bank of the Dniester only in transit. In the final analysis more or less well-known candidates are principals of Moldovan lyceums in Rybnitsa and Tiraspol, who work under the Ministry of Education of Moldova and fight with Transnistrian structures during their entire career.
Despite the failure of voting arrangements for the Left Bank, Chisinau seems to view Transnistria as a ‘trigger’ in future elections.
Or a Provocation?
At the end of last week, the media wrote a lot about the new aggravation in the security zone on the Dniester, where Tiraspol refused to allow Moldovan law enforcement officers on election day February 24. The police were supposed to ensure the security of polling stations and international observers. Experts point out that there have been no serious problems in the elections in these areas for a long time, and in 2016 several thousand residents of the Left Bank freely voted for Igor Dodon, while the usual number of police officers were near the polling stations. It can be assumed that Chisinau expected to provoke Transnistrian officials: Tiraspol would also send additional units of security officials to the disputed areas in the immediate vicinity of the polling stations. Then everything is simple: accusations of obstructing the vote, clashes, tensions and mutual accusations.
Interestingly, the things are already developing exactly in such a framework: the Moldovan CEC, at the suggestion of the police and the Bureau for Reintegration, decided to move some of the stations from the security zone deeper into the territory controlled by the official authorities. Simply put, the stations are “moved away” from the Dniester, explaining that with possible provocations. So, the first accusations are ready.
The aggravation scenario seems to be beneficial to Chisinau. A violent confrontation on the Dniester could lead to the imposition of martial law and cancellation of elections until disputes between Chisinau and Tiraspol are settled. Petro Poroshenko seriously considered a similar maneuver in neighboring Ukraine. He even imposed martial law for a month due to clashes between the combat vessels of Russia and Ukraine in the Kerch Strait. Only the pressure of international partners did not allow the current Ukrainian president to postpone the date of the March elections.
In the event of an aggravation in the security zone, the CEC of Moldova can easily cancel the elections at the polling stations for the Left Bank. In this case, Igor Dodon, who believes that the idea of giving two deputies to Tiraspol belongs to the Party of Socialists, will find himself in a difficult situation, since it is not clear who to criticize in this case: the leadership of unrecognized Transnistria, which is supported by Russia, or the government of the Democratic Party, which can turn on the judiciary grinder and remove PSRM from the elections.
Attempts to ‘dump’ the Party of Socialists on the Transnistrian issue seem to have started already: MFAEI announced that it is recalling Andrei Neguta, Ambassador to Russia. Neguta were a member of the PSRM, and the reason for the recall is opening of the so-called “Representation of Transnistria” in Moscow, which Tiraspol considers almost a diplomatic breakthrough of the century. The former socialist and current diplomat are charged either with connivance or indulging in the opening of the Transnistrian office in Russia.
The aggravation around Transnistria risks becoming a dangerous precedent and ‘blowing up’ Moldova from the inside: Igor Dodon has repeatedly stated that he is ready to bring masses to the streets if the PSRM is removed from the elections. In this case, the ambiguous idea of voting on the Left Bank could become another conflict page in the history of Moldova and provoke a deep power crisis, a series of protests and reelections that will further divide the country, perhaps without a chance to return to the past. 
